A Signaling Explanation for Charity
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Citations
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Cited by
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
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“Anonymous donations are widely considered to be most admirable, and yet they typically represent at most 1% of the total number of donations (Glazer and Konrad 1996).”
BackgroundDoing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.544 · Cited by 1,753
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Why Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible Mutual Funds?
RIEDL, A., & SMEETS, P. (2017) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12547 · Cited by 1,378
Metadata
- Authors
- Glazer, A., & Konrad, K. A.
- Venue
- 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Published
- 2008
- Pages
- 713-722
- OpenAlex
- W1706113742
- Cited by
- 688
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 211.05
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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