Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,971

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

A World of States of Affairs

Armstrong, David M.·1996·Nijhoff International Philosophy Series
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-8733-4_5
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts (or states of affairs, as the author calls them) the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/978-94-015-8733-4_5

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

No references could be resolved yet.

Research works printed but not linked: 20

  1. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1971: “Causality and determination”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Sosa 1975.
  2. Armstrong, D.M. 1983: What is a law of nature?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. · DOI · Paper page
  3. Armstrong, D.M. 1989: A combinatorial theory of possibility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. · DOI
  4. Armstrong, D.M. 1991: “Classes are states of affairs”, Mind 100, 189–200. · doi:10.1093/mind/c.398.189
  5. Bigelow, J. and Pargetter R. 1990: Science and necessity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  6. Campbell, K., Bacon J. and Reinhardt, L. (eds.) 1993: Ontology, causality and mind: essays on the philosophy of D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  7. Capitan, W.H. and Merrill, D.D. (eds.): Metaphysics and explanation, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press.
  8. Fine, K. 1982: “First -order modal theories — facts”, Synthese 53, 43–122. · DOI
  9. Forrest, P. 1986: “Ways worlds could be”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 15–24.. · doi:10.1080/00048408612342201
  10. Forrest P. and Armstrong, D.M. 1987: “The nature of number”, Philosophical Papers 16, 165–86. · DOI
  11. Grossmann, R. 1983: The categorial structure of the world, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
  12. Heathcote, A. and Armstrong, D.M. 1991: “Causes and laws”, Nous 25, 63–73. · DOI
  13. Hochberg, H. n.d.: “Things and qualities”, in Capitan and Merrill, 82–97. · doi:10.2307/jj.11895537.14
  14. Lewis, D. K. 1983: “New work for a theory of universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61, 343–77. · DOI · Paper page
  15. Lewis, D. K. 1986: “Against structural universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 25–46. · doi:10.1080/00048408612342211
  16. Lewis, D. K. (1993): “Many, but almost one”, in Campbell, Bacon and Reinhardt 1993.
  17. Putnam, H. 1967: “The thesis that mathematics is logic”, in Shoenman 1976. Reprinted in Putnam, H.: Philosophical papers, vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  18. Shoenman, R. (ed.) 1967: Bertrand Russell, philosopher of the century, London, Allen & Unwin.
  19. Skyrms, B. 1981: “Tractarian nominalism”, Philosophical Studies 40, 199–206. Reprinted as “Appendix” in Armstrong 1989. · doi:10.1007/bf00353791
  20. Sosa, E. 1975: Causation and Conditionals, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Armstrong, D. M.
Venue
Nijhoff International Philosophy Series
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published
1996
Volume
7
Pages
159-171
ISSN
0924-4530 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1007/978-94-015-8733-4_5
OpenAlex
W2050691920
Cited by
1,971
References
0
FWCI
0.00
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.