Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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In the citing paper
“Behavioral-finance research identifies mechanisms and regularities that motivate interpretable operationalizations of risk response, experience, memory, and reference dependence (Tversky and Kahneman 1992;Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001;Malmendier andNagel 2011, 2016;Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2020;Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2018;Cohn et al. 2015).”
From FinPerMA: A Theory-Informed, Event-Grounded Personalized-Memory Benchmark for LLM Agents (2026) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman 1992
In the citing paper
“According to the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), consumers’ purchase intention is based on a full comparison of various decision-making factors.”
From How Live Streaming Features Impact Consumers’ Purchase Intention in the Context of Cross-Border E-Commerce? A Research Based on SOR Theory (2021) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman, 1992
In the citing paper
“In the “cross-border e-commerce + live streaming” environment, consumers’ immersive shopping experience and the rich information provided by sellers are all subtly affecting consumers’ perception, which will increase the overall perceived value and reduce the overall perceived uncertainty of consumers.”
From How Live Streaming Features Impact Consumers’ Purchase Intention in the Context of Cross-Border E-Commerce? A Research Based on SOR Theory (2021) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman, 1992
In the citing paper
“Prospect theory explains that people value gains and losses differently, placing more weight on perceived gains versus perceived losses.”
From Explanations Can Reduce Overreliance on AI Systems During Decision-Making (2023) · cites this paper as [87]
In the citing paper
“Prospect Theory suggests that uncertainty (or risk) is not considered independently but together with the expected outcome [61,125].”
From Uncertainty as a Form of Transparency: Measuring, Communicating, and Using Uncertainty (2021) · cites this paper as [125]
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Self-citationProspect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Self-citationJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Self-citation“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
(2001) · Empirical Direction in Design and Analysis · doi:10.4324/9781410600004-24 · Cited by 6,808
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341 · Cited by 6,544
Self-citationLoss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432 · cited 3×
“Essentially the same condition was used by Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) in the analysis of preference reversal, and by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) in the characterization of constant loss aversion.”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationJudgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
Self-citationKahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2013) · World Scientific Handbook in Financial Economics Series · doi:10.1142/9789814417358_0016 · Cited by 5,320
Self-citationMoffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
The Foundations of Statistics.
Good, I. J., & Savage, L. J. (1955) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2343133 · Cited by 4,582 · cited 1×
“For anyf, g e F andA C S, define h = fag by: axiom, also called the sure thing principle (Savage, 1954), is one of the basic qualitative properties underlying expected utility theory, and it is violated by Allais's common consequence effect.”
BackgroundChoquet, G. (1954) · Annales de l'Institut Fourier · doi:10.5802/aif.53 · Cited by 4,204 · cited 1×
“The following representation is defined in terms of the concept of capacity (Choquet, 1955), a nonadditive set function that generalizes the standard notion of probability.”
BackgroundAllais, M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907921 · Cited by 4,112
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042 · cited 1×
“It is noteworthy that the violations of independence reported in tables 1 and 2 are also inconsistent with regret theory, advanced by Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987), and with Fishburn's (1988) SSA model.”
ResultRATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1988) · Decision Making · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.011 · Cited by 3,712
Self-citationRational Choice and the Framing of Decisions
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296365 · Cited by 3,622 · cited 3×
“Although no formal theory of framing is available, we have learned a fair amount about the rules that govern the representation of acts, outcomes, and contingencies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationA theory of anticipated utility
Quiggin, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90008-7 · Cited by 3,129 · cited 2×
“For probabilistic (rather than uncertain) prospects, this model was first established by Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1987), and was further analyzed by Chew (1989), Segal (1989), and Wakker (1990).”
BackgroundSubjective probability and expected utility without additivity
(2004) · Uncertainty in Economic Theory · doi:10.4324/9780203358061-10 · Cited by 2,510
The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
Yaari, M. E. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911158 · Cited by 2,419
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
Schmeidler, D. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911053 · Cited by 2,303
Intransitivity of preferences.
Tversky, A. (1969) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0026750 · Cited by 2,188 · cited 1×
“These procedures include computational shortcuts and editing operations, such as eliminating common components and discarding nonessential differences (Tversky, 1969).”
MethodSelf-citationPreference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty
Heath, C., & Tversky, A. (1991) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00057884 · Cited by 1,654
Self-citationContingent weighting in judgment and choice.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.95.3.371 · Cited by 1,567
Self-citationChoice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved
Machina, M. J. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_2 · Cited by 948
Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved
Machina, M. J. (1987) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.1.1.121 · Cited by 878
Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities
Gilboa, I. (1987) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(87)90022-x · Cited by 818 · cited 1×
“2 Other axiomatizations of this model were developed by Gilboa (1987), Nakamura (1990), and Wakker (1989a, 1989b).”
MethodThe Causes of Preference Reversal
Tversky, A., Slovic, P., & Kahneman, D. (2006) · The Construction of Preference · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511618031.009 · Cited by 752
Self-citationJudgment under uncertainty heuristics and biases
Kahneman, D. (1993) · Cited by 744
Self-citationMONETARY REWARDS AND DECISION COST IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
SMITH, V. L., & WALKER, J. M. (1993) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00881.x · Cited by 560
An experimental test of several generalized utility theories
Camerer, C. F. (1989) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055711 · Cited by 549
RISK PERCEPTION IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS
ARROW, K. J. (1982) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb01138.x · Cited by 542 · cited 1×
“The rational theory of choice assumes description invariance: equivalent formulations of a choice problem should give rise to the same preference order (Arrow, 1982).”
BackgroundNonlinear Preference and Utility Theory.
Sugden, R., & Fishburn, P. C. (1989) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234100 · Cited by 499
Generalized gini inequality indices
Weymark, J. A. (1981) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/0165-4896(81)90018-4 · Cited by 472
Kachelmeier, S. J., & Shehata, M. (1992) · American Economic Review · Cited by 464
An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory
Wakker, P., & Tversky, A. (1993) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf01065812 · Cited by 447
Self-citationSome implications of a more general form of regret theory
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90020-2 · Cited by 438
Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility
Marschak, J. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907264 · Cited by 426
Additive Representations of Preferences
Wakker, P. P. (1989) · Theory and Decision Library C · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7815-8 · Cited by 418 · cited 6×
“A preference relation satisfies comonotonic tradeoff consistency (CTC) if TC holds whenever the prospects x {s}f, y{s}g, x'{s}f, and y'{s}g are pairwise comonotonic, as are the prospects x{t}f', y{t}g', x'{t}f', and y'{t}g' (Wakker, 1989a).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialRational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility (1950)
Marschak, J. (1974) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-9276-0_2 · Cited by 388
Prospective reference theory: Toward an explanation of the paradoxes
Viscusi, W. (1989) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00209389 · Cited by 367
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
(2013) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/11166.1573-0476 · Cited by 358
Additive Representations of Preferences: A New Foundation of Decision Analysis
Wakker, P. P. (1988) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 338
Venture Theory: A Model of Decision Weights
Hogarth, R. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1990) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.36.7.780 · Cited by 337 · cited 2×
“To answer this question, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1991) conducted a series of experiments using Masters students at Beijing University, most of whom had taken at least one course in economics or business.”
BackgroundMethodNonlinear Preference and Utility Theory.
Loomes, G., & Fishburn, P. C. (1989) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554336 · Cited by 314
Rank- and sign-dependent linear utility models for finite first-order gambles
Luce, R. D., & Fishburn, P. C. (1991) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00057885 · Cited by 306 · cited 1×
“By equation (1), therefore, Luce and Fishburn (1991) derived essentially the same representation from a more elaborate theory involving an operation O of joint receipt or multiple play.”
BackgroundCohen, M., Jaffray, J.-Y., & Said, T. (1987) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(87)90043-4 · Cited by 262
Prospect theory's reflection hypothesis: A critical examination
Hershey, J. C., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1980) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(80)90037-9 · Cited by 215
(1991) · Recent Research in Psychology · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-9728-1 · Cited by 206
Recent Tests of Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory
Camerer, C. F. (1992) · Studies in risk and uncertainty · doi:10.1007/978-94-011-2952-7_9 · Cited by 187 · cited 2×
“In particular, there is some evidence to suggest that the curvature of the weighting function is more pronounced when the outcomes are widely spaced (Camerer, 1992).”
BackgroundAnticipated utility: A measure representation approach
Segal, U. (1989) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/bf02283529 · Cited by 153 · cited 1×
“For probabilistic (rather than uncertain) prospects, this model was first established by Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1987), and was further analyzed by Chew (1989), Segal (1989), and Wakker (1990).”
Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1989) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/bf02283515 · Cited by 132 · cited 1×
“Starmer and Sugden (1989) considered a model in which w-(p) = w + (p), as in the original version of prospect theory.”
BackgroundContinuous subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilities
Wakker, P. P. (1989) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(89)90002-5 · Cited by 121
Additive representations on rank-ordered sets
Wakker, P. P. (1993) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(93)90027-i · Cited by 93
Subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilities on finite state spaces
Nakamura, Y. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90022-c · Cited by 90
A ?Pseudo-endowment? effect, and its implications for some recent nonexpected utility models
Prelec, D. (1990) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00116783 · Cited by 55 · cited 1×
“For example, Prelec (1990) observed that most respondents prefer 2% to win $20,000 over 1% to win $30,000; they also prefer 1% to win $30,000 and 32% to win $20,000 over 34% to win $20,000.”
MethodUtility theories: Measurement and applications
Ranyard, R. (1995) · Acta Psychologica · doi:10.1016/0001-6918(95)90083-7 · Cited by 53
Risk taking over gains and losses: A study of oil executives
Wehrung, D. A. (1989) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/bf02283517 · Cited by 50
Wakker, P. P. (1991) · Recent research in psychology · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-9728-1_4 · Cited by 28
Zemach, E. M. (1969) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/30.1.11 · Cited by 13
Research works printed but not linked: 1
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Cited by
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
Self-citationA perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
“…sharply kinked at the reference point and loss averse—steeper for losses than for gains by a factor of about 2–2.5 (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); and (d) several studies suggest that the functions in the two domains are fairly well approximated by power functions…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationIndividual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 2,762
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Published
- 1992-10
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 297-323
- ISSN
- 0895-5646 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0476
- OpenAlex
- W2041946752
- Cited by
- 15,467
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 693 · 2025: 865 · 2024: 887 · 2023: 855 · 2022: 893 · 2021: 945 · 2020: 841 · 2019: 972 · 2018: 827 · 2017: 743 · 2016: 658 · 2015: 764 · 2014: 624 · 2013: 601 · 2012: 549
- FWCI
- 25.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Keywords
- cumulative prospect theory, decision weights, uncertainty, risky prospects, value function, weight functions, diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion, risk preferences, gain and loss, axiomatic analysis
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