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Cited by 333

The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?

Gary Bornstein, Ilan Yaniv · 1998 · Experimental Economics

Abstract

This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie inthe group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less.

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OpenAlex · 10.1007/bf01426217

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Metadata

Authors
Bornstein, G., & Yaniv, I.
Venue
Experimental Economics
Publisher
Springer Science+Business Media
Published
1998-06-01
Volume
1
Issue
1
Pages
101-108
ISSN
1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2121216674
Cited by
333
References
15
FWCI
2.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/bf01426217
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Bornstein, G., & Yaniv, I. (1998). Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01426217

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.