The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?
Abstract
This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie inthe group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less.
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Cites
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The Handbook of experimental economics
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Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
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Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups.
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Cain, D. M., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D. A. (2005) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/426699 · Cited by 614
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Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201431 · Cited by 464
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Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries
Bolton, G. E., Brandts, J., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01032.x · Cited by 397
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Self-citationGüth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · Cited by 362
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Kugler, T., Kausel, E. E., & Kocher, M. G. (2012) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1184 · Cited by 309
The Decision Maker Matters: Individual Versus Group Behaviour in Experimental Beauty‐Contest Games
Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2005) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00966.x · Cited by 298
Let’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling
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One, Two, (Three), Infinity, … : Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments
Bosch-Domènech, A., Montalvo, J. G., Nagel, R., & Satorra, A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024737 · Cited by 274
Efficiency gains from team-based coordination-large-scale experimental evidence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bornstein, G., & Yaniv, I.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Springer Science+Business Media
- Published
- 1998-06-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101-108
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2121216674
- Cited by
- 333
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 2.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.