The DOI matches its Crossref record; 102 of the 102 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 10 of the 63 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation
Open accessAbstract
We have previously tried to explain perceptual inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pursues Helmholtz's agenda to understand the brain in terms of energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as the minimization of a free-energy bound on the likelihood of sensory inputs, given an internal model of how they were caused. In this article, we consider what would happen if the data themselves were sampled to minimize this bound. It transpires that the ensuing active sampling or inference is mandated by ergodic arguments based on the very existence of adaptive agents. Furthermore, it accounts for many aspects of motor behavior; from retinal stabilization to goal-seeking. In particular, it suggests that motor control can be understood as fulfilling prior expectations about proprioceptive sensations. This formulation can explain why adaptive behavior emerges in biological agents and suggests a simple alternative to optimal control theory. We illustrate these points using simulations of oculomotor control and then apply to same principles to cued and goal-directed movements. In short, the free-energy formulation may provide an alternative perspective on the motor control that places it in an intimate relationship with perception.
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## TL;DR
This paper argues that action, like perception, can be understood as minimizing free energy: agents do not select actions by reward maximization, but by fulfilling prior expectations about the sensory consequences of movement. Through simple simulations, it shows that this framework can produce retinal stabilization, intended movements, multimodal reaching, goal-directed behavior, and learned autonomous trajectories.
## Key findings
- Action can be cast as the suppression of sensory prediction error: the paper states that “the only thing that action can affect is the prediction error at the sensory level,” and that movement is driven by sensory prediction errors rather than explicit motor commands.
- In oculomotor simulations, tight priors on perturbations led to action that “countered almost immediately” the stimulus motion, while flat priors produced perceived motion; the paper reports a 6×6 = 36-channel sensory array in one retinal simulation.
- In the cued reaching simulations, behavior was robust to sensory noise: proprioceptive noise alone could be compensated by vision, visual noise alone by proprioception, but when both modalities were noisy, reaching was compromised.
- In the goal-directed “mountain-car” simulation, the agent learned the controlled dynamics over 16 trials, and after learning it produced the required circuitous trajectory to the target; the paper notes that after 16 trials the parameters “converged roughly” to the control environment.
- In the autonomous-behavior simulation, after 16 trials of 512 time-bins, the agent learned to expect a Lorenz attractor and then continued to follow that learned trajectory even under perturbations, showing robustness to exogenous forces.
## Methods
- The paper is a theoretical and simulation study framed around the free-energy principle and active inference, with action and perception implemented through gradient descent on free energy under Gaussian/Laplace assumptions.
- It uses several toy dynamical systems: retinal stabilization/oculomotor control, two-joint arm reaching, the mountain-car problem, and a Lorenz-attractor learning task; one learning example uses 16 trials of 32 s time-bins, and another uses 16 trials of 512 time-bins.
- Analysis is based on generalized coordinates of motion, prediction errors, and variational (free-energy) updates of conditional expectations and precisions; the paper reports that all simulations were implemented with a single Matlab routine, `spm_ADEM.m`.
## Limitations
- The paper itself states that the simulations are simple and that many motor-control and sensorimotor issues are only addressed “superficially,” with the examples used mainly to “impart the intuitions behind active inference.”
- The text repeatedly says that some claims rely on simplifying assumptions, including Gaussian/Laplace approximations, generalized-state truncation, and assumptions about diffeomorphic sensory mappings (stated in the paper).
- Evident from the text: the results are based on idealized simulations and toy environments rather than empirical experiments on biological agents or neural recordings.
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10 Valid · 3 Not valid · 32 Not checked · 265 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This mixture of weighted error variance is related formally to phenomenological cost functions proposed to account for movement trajectories (cf.Todorov and Jordan 1998;Nakano et al. 1999;Berret et al. 2008).”
§ Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation > 3.1 Motor control and prediction errors
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Todorov and Jordan 1998 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Nakano et al. 1999 source
- Partly supportedcites Berret et al. 2008 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results (Theoretical Analysis; page unavailable) propose an integral cost combining absolute work with a weighted comfort term to model arm movements. The Introduction describes variance-based models separately, but our copy does not establish a formal relationship between weighted error variance and the paper’s cost function. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Furthermore, this perspective on dopaminergic function fits comfortably with a gating role for dopamine (O'Reilly et al. 2002) in selecting the percepts that guide action (Redgrave et al. 1999).”
§ Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation > 7.1 Active inference and optimal control
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites O'Reilly et al. 2002 source
- Partly supportedcites Redgrave et al. 1999 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Dopaminergic regulation of switching” (pp. 13–14), the paper proposes that dopamine helps interrupt and reprioritize behavioral selections in response to salient stimuli. That supports a role in selecting actions guided by stimuli, but not the more specific claim that dopamine selects percepts. “NEW PERSPECTIVES” (p. 16) distinguishes selection for access to motor or cognitive resources from perception itself. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Indeed, the motor plant is probably one of the most important aspects of the environment for predicting sensory input (see Grafton and Hamilton 2007).”
§ Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation > 7.3 Forward models in motor control
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Grafton and Hamilton 2007 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4, “Computational models” (page unavailable), says forward models predict the motor plant’s state and turn motor commands into expected sensory consequences. It does not characterize the motor plant as an aspect of the environment or rank it among the most important factors for predicting sensory input. (LLM, conf=0.83)
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In other words, the image is stabilized in accordance with the prior expectation of no movement.”
§ Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation > 4.1.1 Retinal stabilization and oculomotor reflexes
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 3 assumptions not shown here.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“By manipulating its prior expectations on these perturbations, v(t), we can elicit very different behaviors from the agent.”
§ Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation > 4.1.1 Retinal stabilization and oculomotor reflexes
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 3 assumptions not shown here.
181 more claims
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 67
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- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
- Borderline: one of the tests for a substantial claim is unclear. 1
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The free energy principle (Friston et al. 2010; Badcock et al. 2019) thus casts control theoretic ‘essential variables’ in terms of high precision prior expectations.”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Friston et al. 2010
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Given a chosen time window, accumulated log evidence could be approximated by the integral of free energy, a quantity known as “free action” (Friston K. et al., 2010).”
From Allostatic Self-efficacy: A Metacognitive Theory of Dyshomeostasis-Induced Fatigue and Depression (2016) · cites this paper as Friston K. et al., 2010
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Also, if predictive models are continually probed by control signals that attempt to confirm the currently dominant model via active inference [21], the framework naturally accommodates the phasic physiological changes that accompany RHI induction [58,59] when these changes are taken to reflect altered autonomic control.”
From Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self (2013) · cites this paper as [21]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Thus, perception and action operate synergistically to minimise prediction errors and optimise our internal representations of the environment.”
From The depressed brain: an evolutionary systems theory (2017) · cites this paper as [11]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“In the neurosciences, this is known as active inference [60, 61, 62].”
From The free energy principle made simpler but not too simple (2023) · cites this paper as [60]
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Citations
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Rescorla, R. A. (1972) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 9,461
A neural substrate of prediction and reward
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.275.5306.1593 · Cited by 9,388 · cited 1×
“may call for a reappraisal of reinforcement learning as an explanation for behavior and, in particular, the role of dopamine in coding unpredicted reward (Montague et al. 1995; Schultz et al. 1997; Doya 2002): If dopamine encodes precision through its classical neuromodulatory effects (cf., Yu and Dayan 2005) how can…”
BackgroundWatkins, C. J. C. H., & Dayan, P. (1992) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/bf00992698 · Cited by 9,083
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120
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“This appeals to the principle of maximum information transfer (Linsker 1990), which has been very useful in understanding the emergence of things like receptive fields (e.g., Olshausen and Field 1996 ).”
BackgroundRao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483 · cited 4×
“The idea that the brain uses hierarchical inference has been established for years (Mumford 1992; Rao and Ballard 1998; Friston 2005; Friston et al. 2006) and provides a nice explanation for the hierarchical organization of cortical systems.”
BackgroundInfluentialA theory of cortical responses.
Friston, K. (2005) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1622 · Cited by 4,578 · cited 6×
“Please see Friston et al. (2008) for a fuller description of the scheme implied by these circuit diagrams.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationClassical conditioning II: Current research and theory.
Black, A. H., & Prokasy, W. F. (1972) · Appleton-Century-Crofts eBooks · Cited by 4,449
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Research works printed but not linked: 2
- MacKay DJC (1995) Free-energy minimization algorithm for decoding and cryptoanalysis. Electron Lett 31: 445–447
- Watkins CJCH, Dayan P (1992) Q-learning. Mach Learn 8: 279–292
Cited by
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816
An integrated theory of language production and comprehension
Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12001495 · Cited by 1,569
Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215 · Cited by 1,365
Self-citationActive interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K. J., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J., & Kiebel, S. J.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Friston, Karl J.
- Venue
- Biological Cybernetics
- Published
- 2010-02-11
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 227-260
- ISSN
- 0340-1200 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0770
- OpenAlex
- W2130195834
- Semantic Scholar
- 407bb3034daac0fb4fba3d4c09ef3a26dfbfcf5f
- Cited by
- 866
- References
- 100
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 65 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 77 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 79 · 2020: 67 · 2019: 56 · 2018: 67 · 2017: 51 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 39 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 33 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 18.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc
- Locations
- Biological Cybernetics (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Keywords
- free energy principle, active sampling, perceptual inference, motor control, oculomotor control, goal-directed movement, proprioception, perceptual learning
- MeSH terms
- Afferent Pathways, Animals, Bayes Theorem, Behavior, Brain, Computer Simulation, Humans, Learning, Models, Neurological
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