The DOI matches its Crossref record; 95 of the 97 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet driving competition or market monopolization?
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In the citing paper
“Users may gain control but, because the emergence evaluative infrastructure as protocol creates ever bigger network effects (Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2014), users lose power to resist or even exit the platforms as switching costs increase with every new user.”
From Evaluative infrastructures: Accounting for platform organization (2017) · cites this paper as Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2014
Citations
Cites
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND OPTIMUM PRODUCT DIVERSITYPreprint
Dixit, A., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1975) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.268957 · Cited by 7,394
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility
Katz, M. L. (1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 6,052
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade
(1990) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5933.003.0005 · Cited by 4,463
Two-sided markets: A progress report
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x · Cited by 2,994
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799
Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design
PARKER, G. G., & Alstyne, M. V. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0400 · Cited by 1,684
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118
A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service
Rohlfs, J. H. (1974) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003090 · Cited by 1,019
Benkler, Y. R. (2006) · Cited by 756
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Von Blanckenburg K, Michaelis M (2008a) dDay – eBay: Funktionsdefekte auf dem Markt für Online-Auktionshäuser. Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 4(2008):463–470
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 301–302 of 302
Fremveksten av Google som dominerende aktør i markedet for internettsøk
Johansen, I. H. (2015) · NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives
Metadata
- Authors
- Haucap, J., & Heimeshoff, U.
- Affiliations
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Haucap, Justus
- Heimeshoff, Ulrich
- Venue
- International Economics and Economic Policy
- Published
- 2013-08-21
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 49-61
- ISSN
- 1612-4804 (ISSN-L)
- 1612-4812
- OpenAlex
- W2017085528
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 97
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 20 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 11
- FWCI
- 83.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- International Economics and Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Law › Diverse Legal and Medical Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Keywords
- digital markets, market concentration, market power, competition policy, search engines, online auction platforms, social networks, digital platforms, competition law, market regulation, monopolization
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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