Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?
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If an area includes claims used as premises in the skeptical argument, there are worries about self-defeat.
“Of course, if the area in question includes claims that are used as premises in the skeptical argument, then there are worries about selfdefeat”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Kyriacou 2016
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Flagged first, then by citations
2 of the 70 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
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Korman, D. Z. (2019) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12638 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points
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Self-citationExpressivism, question substitution and evolutionary debunking
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Self-citationSkepticism, Mental Disorder and Rationality
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Self-citationEvolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized
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Darwinism in metaethics: What if the universal acid cannot be contained?
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Scientific Unity in Street’s Darwinian Dilemma
Long, B. (2025) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-024-09685-6
Menuge, A. J. L. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780197635742.003.0011
- Authors
- Kyriacou, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Cyprus (CY)
- Corresponding author
- Kyriacou, Christos
- ORCID
- Kyriacou, Christos
- Venue
- Philosophia
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1351-1366
- ISSN
- 0048-3893 (ISSN-L)
- 1574-9274
- OpenAlex
- W2576213136
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 70
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 10.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophia (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- evolutionary debunking arguments, meta-epistemology, epistemic justification
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