The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
Abstract
Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take a partner's money. Dictator game giving therefore does not reveal concern for consequences to others existing independently of the environment, as posited in rational choice theory. It may instead be an artefact of experimentation. Alternatively, evaluations of options depend on the composition of the choice set. Implications of these possibilities are explored for experimental methodology and charitable donations respectively. The data favour the artefact interpretation, suggesting that demand characteristics of experimental protocols merit investigation, and that economic analysis should not exclude context-specific social norms.
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“With this modification, most dictators did not transfer positive amounts to the second player.”
From Personality Psychology and Economics (2011) · cites this paper as Bardsley [2008]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bardsley, N.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 122-133
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2169335427
- Cited by
- 627
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 49.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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