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When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
Abstract
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that there are many ways to engineer coordination successes.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Devetag, G., & Ortmann, A.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-09
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 331-344
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2259909495
- Cited by
- 319
- References
- 65
- FWCI
- 36.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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