The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Abstract
Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.
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Cites
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0081 · Cited by 1,126 · cited 1×
“Drawing on the discussions of Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Loomes (1999) AHS argued that by comparing behavior across the framed and unframed versions of the game they could identify the role played by 'social and psychological factors' (AHS, p. 104).”
Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., & Ross, L. (2004) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167204264004 · Cited by 671
Cited by
Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis
Barr, A., & Serra, D. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.006 · Cited by 493
Self-citationSocial framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Mollerstrom, J., & Munkhammar, S. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.007 · Cited by 253
A controlled field experiment on corruption
Armantier, O., & Boly, A. (2011) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007 · Cited by 146
Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes
Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 · Cited by 132
Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery
Abbink, K., & Wu, K. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.013 · Cited by 80
Metadata
- Authors
- Barr, A., & Serra, D.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-12
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 488-503
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2028987454
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 21.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Barr, A., & Serra, D. (2009). The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9
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