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The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Barr, Abigail, Serra, Danila · 2009 · Experimental Economics

Abstract

Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.

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Metadata

Authors
Barr, A., & Serra, D.
Venue
Experimental Economics
Published
2009-12
Volume
12
Issue
4
Pages
488-503
ISSN
  • 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-6938
OpenAlex
W2028987454
Cited by
212
References
3
FWCI
21.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9
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Barr, A., & Serra, D. (2009). The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9

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