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Cited by 243Mental Health and PsychiatrySchizophrenia research and treatmentFree Will and Agency

Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique

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Gallagher, Shaun·2004·Psychopathology
DOI 10.1159/000077014
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Abstract

This paper argues that Frith's (1992) account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of a disruption of metarepresentational self-monitoring is inadequate in several specific ways. More generally, this paper argues against top-down explanations for the loss of the sense of agency in such symptoms. In addition, even if delusions of control might be explained by problems involved in motor control mechanisms involving efference copy and comparators, there are good reasons why the same model cannot explain thought insertion. In place of such neurocognitive explanations, the author develops a neurophenomenological explanation for the loss of the sense of agency and the misattribution of actions and thoughts to others in such symptoms.

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Crossref · 10.1159/000077014

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  • In thought insertion, the system fails to attribute self-generated outcomes to endogenous rather than exogenous causes, with the phenomenological manifestation being a perceived loss of agency over thoughts.

    “Here, the system fails to attribute self-generated outcomes to endogenous rather than exogenous causes, with the phenomenological manifestation to the agent being a perceived loss of agency over their thoughts (Stephens and Graham 1994; O’Brien and Opie 2003; Gallagher 2004).”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Gallagher 2004

    In “A Neurophenomenological Approach” (page unavailable), Gallagher says thought insertion involves a first-order experience lacking a sense of agency and can involve misattributing agency to someone else. But the proposed sequence runs from neurological disruption to that experience and then to misattribution; the paper does not present the perceived loss of agency as the manifestation of a failure to attribute self-generated outcomes to endogenous causes. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. 17 Marcel AJ: The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of actions and intentions; in Roessler J, Eilan N (eds): Agency and Self-Awareness. Oxford, Oxford University Press, in press.
  2. 27 Gallagher S: Sense of agency and higher-order cognition: Levels of explanation for schizophrenia. Cogn Semiotics, in press.
  3. 32 Jeannerod M: To act or not to act: perspectives on the representation of actions. Q J Exp Psychol A 1999;52:1-29.

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Authors
Gallagher, S.
Affiliations
University of Central Florida (US)
Corresponding author
Gallagher, Shaun
ORCID
Gallagher, Shaun
Venue
Psychopathology
Publisher
S. Karger AG
Published
2004
Volume
37
Issue
1
Pages
8-19
ISSN
  • 0254-4962 (ISSN-L)
  • 1423-033X
DOI
10.1159/000077014
OpenAlex
W2151740100
Cited by
243
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 9
FWCI
93.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Psychopathology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (submittedVersion)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
schizophrenia, positive symptoms, neurophenomenology, sense of agency, delusions of control, thought insertion, efference copy, motor control, top-down model
MeSH terms
Cognition Disorders, Delusions, Humans, Internal-External Control, Models, Psychological, Schizophrenia, Schizophrenic Psychology, Self Psychology

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