What is embodiment? A psychometric approach
Open accessAbstract
What is it like to have a body? The present study takes a psychometric approach to this question. We collected structured introspective reports of the rubber hand illusion, to systematically investigate the structure of bodily self-consciousness. Participants observed a rubber hand that was stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own hand and then made proprioceptive judgments of the location of their own hand and used Likert scales to rate their agreement or disagreement with 27 statements relating to their subjective experience of the illusion. Principal components analysis of this data revealed four major components of the experience across conditions, which we interpret as: embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, and affect. In the asynchronous condition, an additional fifth component, deafference, was found. Secondary analysis of the embodiment of runner hand component revealed three subcomponents in both conditions: ownership, location, and agency. The ownership and location components were independent significant predictors of proprioceptive biases induced by the illusion. These results suggest that psychometric tools may provide a rich method for studying the structure of conscious experience, and point the way towards an empirically rigorous phenomenology.
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TL;DR
This study applies psychometric methods (principal components analysis) to structured introspective reports of the rubber hand illusion to decompose the experience of embodiment. It identifies four components present in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions, with an additional deafference component in the asynchronous condition, and shows that ownership and location subcomponents independently predict proprioceptive drift.
Key findings
In the synchronous condition, PCA extracted four components accounting for 55.3% of variance: embodiment of rubber hand (26.3% of variance), loss of own hand, movement, and affect. In the asynchronous condition, five components emerged accounting for 59.4% of variance, with the same four plus a new deafference component (embodiment accounted for 24.6%). Secondary PCA on the ten embodiment items revealed three subcomponents in both conditions — ownership, location, and agency — accounting for 79.0% (synchronous) and 76.2% (asynchronous) of variance, with ownership comprising 35.4% and 34.3% respectively. Proprioceptive displacement toward the rubber hand was significant after synchronous stroking (1.34 cm, t(119) = 4.56, p < .0001) but not asynchronous (0.30 cm, n.s.), and was predicted by the embodiment component (β = 0.609, p < .001), specifically by the location (β = .485, p < .005) and ownership (β = .425, p < .01) subcomponents but not agency (β = .110, n.s.).
Methods
131 current and prospective UCL students (75 female; all but six right-handed) participated. Participants viewed a rubber hand stroked either synchronously or asynchronously (180° out of phase, ~1 Hz) with their own hand for 60 seconds, made pre- and post-test proprioceptive location judgments, and rated agreement with 27 statements on a 7-point Likert scale. Separate PCAs with varimax rotation were run per condition, followed by secondary PCAs on the embodiment items, ANOVAs on component scores, and multiple linear regression relating component scores to proprioceptive displacement.
Limitations
The paper states that the selection of questionnaire items restricts the potential structure that can emerge, and that additional components of embodiment may not have been covered; it also notes that the structure found may not generalise to other uses of the term "embodiment" (e.g., emphases on affect, sublinguistic thought, or social interaction). Evident from the text: proprioceptive judgments from 11 participants were missing or unusable, and the questionnaire items were designed based on qualitative research with only five participants.
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- Findingown data
In the asynchronous condition, PCA extracted five components together accounting for 59.4% of variance.
“A similar analysis of the asynchronous condition led to the extraction of five components, together accounting for 59.4% of the variance in the data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the synchronous condition, PCA extracted four components that together accounted for 55.3% of variance.
“In the synchronous condition, analysis of the scree plot and eigenvalues led to the extraction of four components which together accounted for 55.3% of variance in the data (see Table 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Secondary analysis of the embodiment of rubber hand component revealed three subcomponents in both conditions: ownership, location, and agency.
“Secondary analysis of the embodiment of rubber hand component revealed three subcomponents in both conditions: ownership, location, and agency.”
- Also stated in: § *** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** · plain
“For both synchronous and asynchronous conditions three subcomponents of embodiment of rubber hand were identified, together account for 79.0% and 76.2% of the variance in the two conditions, respectively.We termed these the senses of ownership, location, and agency (see Table 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Also stated in: § *** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** · plain
- Findingown data
In the asynchronous condition, an additional fifth component, deafference, was found.
“In the asynchronous condition, an additional fifth component, deafference, was found.”
- Also stated in: § Structure Underlying Subjective Reports · plain
“However, the major difference was that an entirely new component appeared, which we termed deafference.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“Furthermore, an additional component, deafference, emerged only in the asynchronous condition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Also stated in: § Structure Underlying Subjective Reports · plain
- Findingown data
The ownership and location components were independent significant predictors of proprioceptive biases induced by the illusion.
“The ownership and location components were independent significant predictors of proprioceptive biases induced by the illusion.”
- Also stated in: § Relations between Objective and Subjective Measures · plain
“More interestingly, the ownership subcomponent also independently predicted proprioceptive drift, β = .425,t(116) = 2.85, p < .01,whereas the agency subcomponent did not, β = .110,t(116) = .75,p > .20.”
- Also stated in: § Relations between Objective and Subjective Measures · plain
“Unsurprisingly, the location subcomponent was a significant predictor of prioprioceptive displacement, β = .485,t(116) = 3.02, p < .005.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Also stated in: § Relations between Objective and Subjective Measures · plain
- Findingown data
Additional PCAs on only those items loading strongly (>0.50) on the embodiment of rubber hand component identified ten such items (1-10).
“We therefore conducted additional PCAs on only those items loading strongly (> 0.50; cf.Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006;Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) on the embodiment of rubber hand component, both in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions.Ten such items were identified (1-10).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Principal components analysis of introspective reports of the rubber hand illusion revealed four major components of experience across conditions, interpreted as embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, and affect.
“Principal components analysis of this data revealed four major components of the experience across conditions, which we interpret as: embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, and affect.”
- Also stated in: § Structure Underlying Subjective Reports · plain
“In the synchronous condition, analysis of the scree plot and eigenvalues led to the extraction of four components which together accounted for 55.3% of variance in the data (see Table 1).”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“Specifically, we identified four components that emerged in both conditions: embodiment of rubber hand (which itself was composed of subcomponents relating to ownership, location, and agency), loss of own hand, movement, and affect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Also stated in: § Structure Underlying Subjective Reports · plain
- Findingown data
The second component in the synchronous condition, loss of own hand, related to feelings of being unable to move one's hand, one's hand disappearing, and one's hand being out of one's control.
“The second component we termed loss of own hand.Items loading on this component related to the feelings of: being unable to move one's hand, one's hand disappearing, and one's hand being out of one's control.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In multiple linear regression, embodiment of rubber hand significantly predicted proprioceptive displacement, β=0.609, t(115)=3.40, p<.001.
“Embodiment of rubber hand significantly predicted the proprioceptive displacement, β = 0.609, t(115) = 3.40, p < .001,and movement had a marginal effect, β = 0.290, t(115) = 1.68, p = .096,but the loss of own hand and affect components did not significantly predict proprioceptive displacement, β = -.128,.087,t(115) = -.76,.32,respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Movement had a marginal effect on proprioceptive displacement, β=0.290, t(115)=1.68, p=.096.
“Embodiment of rubber hand significantly predicted the proprioceptive displacement, β = 0.609, t(115) = 3.40, p < .001,and movement had a marginal effect, β = 0.290, t(115) = 1.68, p = .096,but the loss of own hand and affect components did not significantly predict proprioceptive displacement, β = -.128,.087,t(115) = -.76,.32,respectively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
At pretest, proprioceptive judgments showed a significant bias towards the body midline across conditions (0.58 cm), t(119)=2.43, p<.05.
“Judgments at pretest showed a significant bias towards the body midline across conditions (0.58 cm), t(119) = 2.43, p < .05,(cf.Ghilardi, Gordon, & Ghez, 1995).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
No significant displacement towards the rubber hand was observed at post-test following asynchronous stroking (0.30 cm), t(119)=1.20, n.s.
“A significant further displacement towards the rubber hand was observed at post-test following synchronous stroking (1.34 cm), t(119) = 4.56, p < .0001,but not asynchronous stroking (0.30 cm), t(119) = 1.20, n.s.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Findingown data
For both synchronous and asynchronous conditions, three subcomponents of embodiment of rubber hand were identified, together accounting for 79.0% and 76.2% of variance respectively.
“For both synchronous and asynchronous conditions three subcomponents of embodiment of rubber hand were identified, together account for 79.0% and 76.2% of the variance in the two conditions, respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant interaction of condition and primary component, F(3,390)=69.24, p<.0001, indicating that the effects of synchronous stroking did not influence all aspects of experience in the same way.
“More importantly, we found a significant interaction of the two factors, F(3, 390) = 69.24,p < .0001,indicating that the effects of synchronous stroking did not influence all aspects of experience in the same way.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Findingown data
The difference in proprioceptive displacement between synchronous and asynchronous conditions was significant, t(119)=3.22, p<.005.
“The difference between conditions was also significant; t(119) = 3.22, p < .005.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Findingown data
ANOVA on subcomponent scores found a significant main effect of component, F(2,260)=11.26, p<.0001, suggesting these aspects of experience were differentially present.
“There was a significant main effect of component, F(2, 260) = 11.26,p < .0001,suggesting that these aspects of experience were differentially present.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The loss of own hand component included feelings of lack of agency over one's own hand.
“This is in contrast to the loss of own hand component which emerged in the primary analysis, which included feelings of lack of agency over one's own hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Loss of own hand and affect components did not significantly predict proprioceptive displacement, β=-.128 and .087, t(115)=-.76 and .32, respectively.
“Embodiment of rubber hand significantly predicted the proprioceptive displacement, β = 0.609, t(115) = 3.40, p < .001,and movement had a marginal effect, β = 0.290, t(115) = 1.68, p = .096,but the loss of own hand and affect components did not significantly predict proprioceptive displacement, β = -.128,.087,t(115) = -.76,.32,respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
ANOVA on component scores with condition and primary component as within-subjects factors found a significant main effect of component, F(3,390)=107.41, p<.0001, suggesting these aspects of experience were differentially present.
“There was a significant main effect of component, F(3, 390) = 107.41,p < .0001,suggesting that these aspects of experience were differentially present.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant main effect of condition, F(1,130)=29.05, p<.0001.
“There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 130) = 29.05,p < .0001.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Findingown data
For the movement component, the relation was reversed, with synchronous stroking showing a score significantly more negative than asynchronous.
“However, this relation was reversed for the movement component, with synchronous stroking showing a score significantly more negative than asynchronous (see Figure for stats).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Findingown data
A significant further displacement towards the rubber hand was observed at post-test following synchronous stroking (1.34 cm), t(119)=4.56, p<.0001.
“A significant further displacement towards the rubber hand was observed at post-test following synchronous stroking (1.34 cm), t(119) = 4.56, p < .0001,but not asynchronous stroking (0.30 cm), t(119) = 1.20, n.s.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Findingown data
The agency subcomponent did not significantly predict proprioceptive displacement, β=.110, t(116)=.75, p>.20.
“More interestingly, the ownership subcomponent also independently predicted proprioceptive drift, β = .425,t(116) = 2.85, p < .01,whereas the agency subcomponent did not, β = .110,t(116) = .75,p > .20.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The conditions differed in terms of the extent to which each component was present or absent.
“While each of these components was part of the structure of experience of both conditions, the conditions differed in terms of the extent to which each component was present or absent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Findingown data
The ownership subcomponent independently predicted proprioceptive drift, β=.425, t(116)=2.85, p<.01.
“More interestingly, the ownership subcomponent also independently predicted proprioceptive drift, β = .425,t(116) = 2.85, p < .01,whereas the agency subcomponent did not, β = .110,t(116) = .75,p > .20.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The participant's own hand is felt to disappear.
“Furthermore, the participant's own hand is felt to disappear.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Deafference was not a significant predictor of proprioceptive biases in the asynchronous condition, β=-.034, t(118)=-.53, p>.20.
“Deafference was not a significant predictor of proprioceptive biases in the asynchronous condition, β = -.034,t(118) = -.53,p > .20.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The location subcomponent was a significant predictor of proprioceptive displacement, β=.485, t(116)=3.02, p<.005.
“Unsurprisingly, the location subcomponent was a significant predictor of prioprioceptive displacement, β = .485,t(116) = 3.02, p < .005.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The feeling that the brushstrokes observed on the rubber hand had caused the feeling of being stroked loaded on location, rather than ownership.
“Specifically, the feeling that the brushstrokes observed on the rubber hand had caused the feeling of being stroked loaded on location, rather than ownership.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The experience of the location of one's own hand relative to the rubber hand was dissociable from the sense of ownership over the hand.
“Second, the experience of the location of one's own hand relative to the rubber hand was dissociable from the sense of ownership over the hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A latent variable related to items reflecting paralysis and disappearance of the participant's own hand was significantly more present following synchronous than asynchronous stroking.
“Specifically, this component related to items reflecting paralysis of the hand, and its disappearance.This latent variable was significantly more present following synchronous than asynchronous stroking.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Somatic sensory experiences are tied to location, not to ownership.
“Having separated the ownership and location components, our analyses further showed that somatic sensory experiences are tied to location, not to ownership.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Proprioceptive bias linked to the illusion was related specifically to the experience of ownership and of perceived location.
“Furthermore, we found that proprioceptive bias linked to the illusion was related specifically to the experience of ownership and of perceived location.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
An entirely new component of experience emerged only in the asynchronous stroking condition.
“Third, while the asynchronous stroking condition has generally been regarded as a control condition, we found an entirely new component of experience that emerged only in that condition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The presence of the same four components in the two conditions provides convergent evidence that the PCAs are reliably decomposing the structure of bodily experience.
“The presence of the same four components in the two conditions provides convergent evidence that the PCAs are reliably decomposing the structure of bodily experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The rubber hand illusion selectively inverts the sense of embodiment concerning the rubber hand.
“This suggests that the rubber hand illusion selectively inverts the sense of embodiment concerning the rubber hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Interpretationown data
The interaction suggests that multisensory synchrony differentially affected the three aspects of experience.
“This interaction suggests that multisensory synchrony differentially affected these three aspects of experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
- Interpretationcitation
Plasticity of body representations is constrained by a principle of body constancy: the novel rubber hand is incorporated by functionally suppressing the existing hand, rather than by adding an additional supernumerary hand.
“But it also suggests that plasticity is constrained by a principle of body constancy: the novel rubber hand is incorporated by functionally suppressing the existing hand, rather than by adding an additional 'supernumerary' hand (McGonigle et al., 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McGonigle et al., 2002 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Sensory perception is possible in a body part that is not perceived as being one's own.
“This suggests the possibility of sensory perception in a body part that is not perceived as being one's own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The correlation between ownership and location components of experience might normally be sufficient to differentiate self from other in practice.
“Thus, even if the sense of self is not intrinsically reducible to perceived location, the correlation between these components of experience might normally be sufficient to differentiate self from other in practice (Jeannerod, 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jeannerod, 2007
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The rubber hand may in some sense displace the participant's actual hand.
“This suggests that rather that simply being incorporated as part of the body, the rubber hand may in some sense displace the participant's actual hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The rubber hand actively displaces the actual hand, rather than merely being mistaken for it.
“This suggests that the rubber hand actively displaces the actual hand, rather than merely being mistaken for it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The dissociation of body ownership and location suggests that 'me-ness' is not reducible to 'here-ness'.
“The present dissociation of body ownership and location suggests that 'me-ness' is not reducible to 'here-ness'.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Psychometric methods can be useful tools in elucidating structure underlying complex conscious experience.
“These results suggest that psychometric methods can be useful tools in elucidating structure underlying complex conscious experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The structure found is broadly consistent with results of previous experimental and conceptual work on embodiment.
“While the analysis of embodiment we report here may be incomplete, and may not generalise to all 'embodied' experience, the structure we found is broadly consistent with results of previous experimental and conceptual work on embodiment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Tactile sensations can be dissociated from ownership of the limb on which they are felt to occur.
“Our analysis supports the concept that tactile sensations can be dissociated from ownership of the limb on which they are felt to occur.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The authors provided the first direct empirical evidence confirming the intuition that body ownership and agency reflect dissociable components of embodiment.
“We provided the first direct empirical evidence confirming the intuition that body ownership and agency reflect dissociable components of embodiment (cf.Gallagher, 2000;Synofzik et al., in press;Tsakiris et al., 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Gallagher, 2000 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Synofzik et al., in press
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Tsakiris et al., 2006 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The present findings represent the first systematic attempt to measure embodiment.
- Interpretationown data
The rubber hand illusion is validated as an experimental manipulation of the normal sense of one's own body.
“This validates use of the rubber hand illusion as an experimental manipulation of the normal sense of one's own body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
- Interpretationown data
The restricted relation between proprioceptive biases and ownership items is evidence of selectivity in this relation, rather than weakness.
“In contrast, we would argue that this is evidence of selectivity in this relation, rather than weakness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Psychological models focused on simple qualia are not appropriate for composite, background states of experience such as embodiment.
“These models, however, are not appropriate for composite, background states of experience such as embodiment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Intersensory conflict in the asynchronous condition may create a form of deafferentation.
“We suggest that intersensory conflict in the asynchronous condition may create a form of deafferentation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The pattern of latent variables suggests at least two types of influences structuring embodiment: those associated with immediate sensations from the body and with stored representations of the body, respectively.
“In general, the pattern of latent variables suggests at least two types of influences structuring embodiment: those associated with immediate sensations from the body and with stored representations of the body, respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
- Interpretationreasoning
By decomposing such experiences psychometrically, it is possible to search for the neural correlates of specific subcomponents of bodily self-consciousness.
“By decomposing such experiences psychometrically, we have made it possible to search for the neural correlates of specific subcomponents of bodily self-consciousness, and made an initial step towards uniting experimental and phenomenological research (cf.Gallagher & Brøsted Sørensen, 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gallagher & Brøsted Sørensen, 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The asynchronous condition can only be conceived of as involving conflict to the extent that some rudimentary form of ownership of the rubber hand is elicited merely from the visual perception of the rubber hand, at least when it is in plausible alignment with the participant's actual hand.
“Interestingly, the asynchronous condition can only be conceived of as involving conflict to the extent that some rudimentary form of ownership of the rubber hand is elicited merely from the visual perception of the rubber hand (at least when it is in plausible alignment with the participant's actual hand).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The experiential link between the senses of ownership and agency belies the traditional view that these are distinct.
“This experiential link between the senses of ownership and agency belies the traditional view that these are distinct (Gallagher, 2000;Sato & Yasuda, 2005;Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Gallagher, 2000 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Sato & Yasuda, 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007b
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
To the extent that structure emerges in psychometric analysis, it demonstrates agreement across participants regarding the structure of their experience.
“Conversely, to the extent that structure does emergeas in the present studyit demonstrates agreement (however implicit) across participants regarding the structure of their experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The experience of embodiment emerges from a complex interplay of bottom-up and top-down influences.
“Both research approaches suggest that the experience of embodiment emerges from a complex interplay of bottom-up and top-down influences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
- Interpretationcitation
A visually-driven gating mechanism might suppress transmission or interpretation of conflicting afferent information.
“For example, a visually-driven gating mechanism might suppress transmission or interpretation of conflicting afferent information (cf.Press et al., in press).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Press et al., in press
Not checked in the free run.
- May combine two claims. 34
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 15
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe deafference component in the asynchronous condition related to sensation of pins-and-needles and numbness in one's hand, and experience of the hand being less vivid than normal.
“This related to the sensation of pins-and-needles and numbness in one's hand, and the experience of the hand being less vivid than normal.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe same four components appeared in the asynchronous data, and the embodiment component accounted for 24.6% of variance.
“The same four components appeared in this data, and again the embodiment component accounted for the bulk of the variance (24.6%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe third component in the synchronous condition, movement, comprised two items relating to perceived motion of one's own hand and to movement of the rubber hand.
“The third component we termed movement; it was comprised of two items relating to perceived motion of one's own hand, and to movement of the rubber hand.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe first component in the synchronous condition, embodiment of rubber hand, accounted for 26.3% of variance and comprised items 1-10 relating to feelings that the rubber hand belonged to the participant, the participant had control over it, the rubber hand and real hand were in the same location, and the rubber hand took on features of the actual hand.
“The first component, which accounted for substantially more variance than any other (26.3%),we termed embodiment of rubber hand.It comprised items relating to the feelings that: the rubber hand belonged to the participant, the participant had control over the rubber hand, the rubber hand and real hand were in the same location, and the rubber hand had taken on features of the actual hand (items 1-”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOwnership comprised a large portion of variance (35.4% and 34.3% in synchronous and asynchronous conditions, respectively) and was composed of items related to feeling that the rubber hand was part of one's body, feeling of looking directly at one's hand, and rubber hand taking on characteristics of one's own hand.
“Ownership comprised a large portion of the variance (35.4% and 34.3% in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, respectively), and was composed of items related to the feeling that the rubber hand was part of one's body, the feeling of looking directly at one's hand, and the rubber hand taking on the characteristics of one's own hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataComponent scores were significantly higher following synchronous than asynchronous stroking for the embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, and affect components.
“Inspection of the component scores showed that these were significantly higher following synchronous than asynchronous stroking for the embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, and affect components.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThere was a significant main effect of condition, F(1,130)=110.69, p<.0001, and a significant interaction of condition and subcomponent, F(2,260)=3.60, p<.05.
“There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 130) = 110.69,p < .0001,and a significant interaction of the two factors, F(2, 260) = 3.60, p < .05.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataOn average, participants had the sense that the rubber hand was part of their body in the synchronous but not the asynchronous condition.
“On average, participants had the sense that the rubber hand was part of their body in the synchronousbut not the asynchronouscondition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningAgency scores were negative in both conditions, which was predicted since neither the participant's hand nor the rubber hand moved at any time.
“Agency scores were negative in both conditions, which was predicted since neither the participant's hand nor the rubber hand moved at any time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAdditional ANOVA including sex and rubber hand laterality found a significant main effect of sex, F(1,127)=4.06, p<.05, with females showing significantly more agreement with questionnaire items generally (-.055) than males (-.324).
“There was a significant main effect of sex, F(1, 127) = 4.06, p < .05,with females showing significantly more agreement with questionnaire items generally (-.055), than males (-.324), consistent with findings that females are, on average, slightly more suggestible than males (e.g., Page & Green, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataLocation related to feeling that the rubber hand and one's own hand were in the same place, and also to sensations of causation between the seen and felt touches.
“Location related to the feeling that the rubber hand and one's own hand were in the same place, and also to sensations of causation between the seen and felt touches.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataComponent scores for embodiment of rubber hand were significantly positive following synchronous stroking, but significantly negative following asynchronous stroking.
“In contrast, component scores for embodiment of rubber hand were significantly positive following synchronous stroking, but significantly negative following asynchronous stroking.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataComponent scores for ownership and location were positive following synchronous stroking, but negative following asynchronous stroking.
“Component scores for ownership and location were positive following synchronous stroking, but negative following asynchronous stroking.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown dataAgency related to feelings of being able to move the rubber hand, and control over it.
“Agency related to the feelings of being able to move the rubber hand, and control over it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOwnership and location components are highly correlated, as they were merged in the primary PCA and separated only at a secondary stage.
“Indeed, ownership and location were merged in our primary PCA, and separated only at a secondary stage, suggesting that these components are highly correlated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataExperience of one's own body is not a single dimension, but a composite of several different subjective components, organised with a characteristic structure.
“Our study demonstrates for the first time that experience of one's own body is not a single dimension, but a composite of several different subjective components, organised with a characteristic structure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataOwnership and location along with the sense of agency grouped together in the omnibus PCA, suggesting that these three components of embodiment, while dissociable in a focused analysis, form a coherent cluster of experience.
“Nevertheless, ownership and location along with the sense of agency grouped together in the omnibus PCA, suggesting that these three components of embodiment, while dissociable in a focused analysis, form a coherent cluster of experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe richer description confirmed significant embodiment of the rubber hand following synchronous but not asynchronous stroking.
“This richer description confirmed significant embodiment of the rubber hand following synchronousbut not asynchronousstroking.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataPsychometric tools may provide a rich method for studying the structure of conscious experience, and point the way towards an empirically rigorous phenomenology.
“These results suggest that psychometric tools may provide a rich method for studying the structure of conscious experience, and point the way towards an empirically rigorous phenomenology.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
“These results suggest that psychometric methods can be useful tools in elucidating structure underlying complex conscious experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe emergence of an additional component in the asynchronous condition only suggests that the structure underlying conscious experience in the two conditions, while similar, is not identical.
“The emergence of an additional component in the asynchronous condition only suggests that the structure underlying conscious experience in the two conditions, while similar, is not identical.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenProprioceptive judgments from 11 participants were missing or unusable due to experimenter error or failure of participants to follow instructions.
“Proprioceptive judgments from 11 participants were missing or unusable due to experimenter error or failure of participants to follow instructions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationown dataThe three subcomponents of embodiment were termed ownership, location, and agency.
“We termed these the senses of ownership, location, and agency (see Table 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe effect of sex did not interact with component or synchrony, suggesting it is not related to the rubber hand illusion, or to embodiment.
“This effect of sex did not interact, however, with component or synchrony, suggesting that it is not related to the rubber hand illusion, or to embodiment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataWhile the three subcomponents of embodiment bundled together in the primary analysis, suggesting they are tightly interrelated in experience, more focused analysis was able to separate them, suggesting they are dissociable components of experience.
“Thus, while these three components of experience bundled together in the primary analysis, suggesting that they are tightly interrelated in experience, more focused analysis was able to separate them, suggesting that they are dissociable components of experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataFor affect and movement components, synchronous stroking exaggerated the effects of asynchronous stroking, whether positive or negative; synchrony sharpened these aspects of experience but did not qualitatively alter them.
“In the case of the affect and movement components, synchronous stroking simply exaggerated the effects of asynchronous stroking, whether they were positive or negative respectively.That is, synchrony sharpened these aspects of experience, but did not qualitatively alter them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThere were no other main effects or interactions involving sex or rubber hand laterality, suggesting that these factors do not strongly influence the rubber hand illusion.
“There were no other main effects or interactions involving sex or rubber hand laterality, suggesting that these factors do not strongly influence the rubber hand illusion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe presence of ownership following synchronous stimulation does not necessarily cause a corresponding positive sense of agency, suggesting that these are dissociable aspects of experience.
“The presence of ownership following synchronous stimulation does not necessarily cause a corresponding positive sense of agency, suggesting that these are dissociable aspects of experience (cf.Sato & Yasuda, 2005;Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, in press;Tsakiris et al., 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataTwo specific aspects of embodiment are manipulated in the rubber hand illusion: the sense of ownership of the rubber hand and perceived location of the hand.
“In summary, two specific aspects of embodiment are manipulated in the rubber hand illusion.These are the sense of ownership of the rubber hand and perceived location of the hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataProprioceptive displacement appears to be a genuine by-product of embodiment, but also related specifically to body ownership, but not agency.
“Proprioceptive displacement therefore appears to be a genuine by-product of embodiment, but also related specifically to body ownership, but not agency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenParticipants were randomly assigned to either the right-hand (N=67) or left-hand (N=64) apparatus.
“Participants were randomly assigned to either the right-(N = 67) or left-hand (N = 64) apparatus.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe order of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions was alternated across participants.
“The order of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions was alternated across participants.Sixty-six participants completed the synchronous condition first; sixty-five completed the asynchronous condition first.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductown dataThe 27 questionnaire items were designed based on qualitative research with five participants who freely reported their experiences during the illusion.
“We designed 27 items based on qualitiative research with five participants, who were asked to freely report their experiences during the illusion.Analysis of these transcripts motivated a selection of questionnaire items.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataCombining an experimental manipulation of the experience of one's own body and a structured psychometric approach to measuring that experience allowed the authors to characterize what sort of experience embodiment is, and decompose it into sub-aspects.
“By combining an experimental manipulation of the experience of one's own body, and a structured psychometric approach to measuring that experience, we were able to characterize what sort of experience embodiment is, and decompose it into sub-aspects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe order of subsequent questionnaire items was randomized separately for each participant in each condition.
“The first two items presented were always items (20 and 21) relating to the experience being interesting and enjoyable; the order of subsequent items was randomized separately for each participant in each condition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationown dataThis pattern represents the characteristic structure of the rubber hand illusion, one of the few experimental models of embodiment.
“This pattern represents the characteristic structure of the rubber hand illusion, one of the few experimental models of embodiment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenA random ruler offset that varied from trial to trial was used to discourage participants from re-using remembered verbal labels from prior trials.
“A random ruler offset that varied from trial to trial was used to discourage participants from re-using remembered verbal labels from prior trials.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe results support the claim that affect associated with somatic sensations is separable from other forms of afferent input, as the pleasantness of touch loaded on the affect component, whereas the sense of causation associated with touch loaded on the location component.
“Our results, furthermore, support the claim that affect associated with somatic sensations is separable from other forms of afferent input (cf.Rolls et al., 2003), as the pleasantness of touch loaded on the affect component, whereas the sense of causation associated with touch loaded on the location component”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rolls et al., 2003 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Study design and conductown dataStructured introspective reports are a rigorous tool for the study of bodily self-consciousness, validated by showing systematic structure across participants and relation of individual differences to proprioceptive displacement.
“We validated the use of structured introspective reports as a rigorous tool for the study of bodily self-consciousness in two ways: first, by showing that systematic structure emerges in the pattern of responses across participants, and that such structure is similar across experimental conditions, and second, by showing that individual differences between participants were nevertheless related to”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataComponents of experiences are selectively related to proprioceptive biases, attesting to the validity of the method.
“That comparable structure emerged in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions speaks to the reliability of our method; that components of experiences are selectively related to proprioceptive biases attests to its validity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningIf a potential component of the experience of embodiment was not reflected by any of the items used, it could not have emerged in the analysis.
“If a potential component of the experience of embodiment was not reflected by any of the items we used, it could not have emerged in our analysis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThere are at least two types of cause of the rubber hand illusion: purely visual information from the perception of the hand in plausible configuration, and multisensory synchrony.
“This suggests that there are at least two types of cause of the rubber hand illusion: purely visual information from the perception of the hand in plausible configuration, and multisensory synchrony.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSome aspects of embodiment reflect bottom-up sensory factors (as captured by the location component), while others reflect top-down influences of an explicit model of the body as an object (such as the loss of own hand component).
“Thus, some aspects of embodiment clearly reflect bottom-up sensory factors (as captured by our location component), while others reflect top-down influences of an explicit model of the body as an object (such as our loss of own hand component).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataComparable structure emerged in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, speaking to the reliability of the method.
“That comparable structure emerged in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions speaks to the reliability of our method; that components of experiences are selectively related to proprioceptive biases attests to its validity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenMost psychological models of conscious experience focus on simple qualia.
“Most psychological models of conscious experience focus on simple qualia.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataEmbodiment, at least in the model instance of the rubber hand illusion studied here, is a genuine but complex experience with a common structure, and identifiable subcomponents.
“To conclude, our results suggest that embodiment, at least in the model instance of the rubber hand illusion studied here, is a genuine but complex experience with a common structure, and identifiable subcomponents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenThe selection of questionnaire items restricts the potential structure that can emerge from psychometric studies.
“The selection of questionnaire items always restricts the potential structure that can emerge from psychometric studies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThis study represents the first systematic application of psychometric methods to investigate complex conscious experience elicited under controlled, experimental conditions, and to identify subcomponents of that experience by systematic questioning.
“To our knowledge, however, this study represents the first systematic application of psychometric methods to investigate complex conscious experience elicited under controlled, experimental conditions, and to identify subcomponents of that experience by systematic questioning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe psychometric structure found here may or may not generalise to other instances of embodiment.
“The psychometric structure found here may or may not generalise to such other instances of embodiment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThere are additional components of embodiment which were not covered by the questionnaire.
“However, there are no doubt additional components of embodiment which were not covered by our questionnaire.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.
“The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different phenomenology.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most studies simply report the occurrence of the illusion, or a behavioural or neural proxy of it such as a change in the perceived position of the participant's own hand, without systematic description or quantitative measurement of the changed sense of embodiment.
“However, most studies simply report the occurrence of the illusion, or a behavioural or neural proxy of it such as a change in the perceived position of the participant's own hand, without systematic description or quantitative measurement of the changed sense of embodiment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Recognition of the importance of embodiment has not been matched by theoretical clarity about what embodiment is or involves.
“However, recognition of the importance of embodiment has not been matched by theoretical clarity about what embodiment is or involves.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The phenomenological tradition has not offered the operational working definitions and measures needed for rigorous empirical research.
“However, it has not offered the operational working definitions and measures needed for rigorous empirical research.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The present findings represent the first systematic attempt to measure embodiment.
“To our knowledge, the present findings represent the first systematic attempt to measure embodiment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The rubber hand illusion is an experimental model of embodiment.
“While the rubber hand illusion is well accepted as an experimental model of embodiment, there has been less consensus on how to measure the illusion.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The rubber hand illusion can be elicited under systematically controlled experimental conditions.
“Second, we have focussed on the rubber hand illusion as an initial model for embodiment, because it is subjectively compelling for many people, and can elicited under systematically controlled experimental conditions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The rubber hand illusion is subjectively compelling for many people.
“Second, we have focussed on the rubber hand illusion as an initial model for embodiment, because it is subjectively compelling for many people, and can elicited under systematically controlled experimental conditions.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Longo et al. found that ownership and location, although strongly linked, were independent components in their analyses.
“Longo et al. (Longo et al., 2008) clearly found that ownership and location, although strongly linked, were independent components in their analyses, suggesting that they independently contribute to the RHI.”
From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Longo et al., 2008
Previous studies on the RHI have reported changes in the perceived similarity between felt and seen bodies whereby the rubber hand is perceived to become more similar to one's own hand.
“Previous studies on the RHI have reported changes in the perceived similarity between felt and seen bodies whereby the rubber hand is perceived to become more similar to one’s own hand [24], [49].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [49]
The change in self-face recognition was similar but subjectively not as strong as changes observed in other body-illusions that use multisensory stimulation to manipulate body-awareness.
“This change was similar but subjectively not as strong as those changes observed in other body-illusions that use multisensory stimulation to manipulate body-awareness [24], [49].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [49]
Other bodily illusions (e.g., RHI) produce stronger phenomenological effects than IMS, as reported by participants.
“although it seems that other bodily illusions (e.g., RHI) produce stronger phenomenological effects, as reported by participants.”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [49]
The pattern of results is consistent with that reported for other bodily illusions.
“The pattern of results is also consistent with that reported for other bodily illusions [49]”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [49]
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- ConsistentF(3, 390) = 107.41reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 390) = 107.41,p < .0001”
- ConsistentF(1, 130) = 29.05reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 130) = 29.05,p < .0001”
- ConsistentF(3, 390) = 69.24reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 390) = 69.24,p < .0001”
- ConsistentF(2, 260) = 11.26reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(2, 260) = 11.26,p < .0001”
- ConsistentF(1, 130) = 110.69reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 130) = 110.69,p < .0001”
- ConsistentF(2, 260) = 3.6reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .029
“F(2, 260) = 3.60, p < .05”
- ConsistentF(1, 127) = 4.06reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .046
“F(1, 127) = 4.06, p < .05”
- Consistentt(119) = 2.43reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .017
“t(119) = 2.43, p < .05”
- Consistentt(119) = 4.56reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(119) = 4.56, p < .0001”
- Consistentt(119) = 1.2reported n.s. · recomputed p = .233
“t(119) = 1.20, n.s.”
- Consistentt(119) = 3.22reported p < .005 · recomputed p = .002
“t(119) = 3.22, p < .005”
- Consistentt(115) = 3.4reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(115) = 3.40, p < .001”
- Consistentt(115) = 1.68reported p = .096 · recomputed p = .096
“t(115) = 1.68, p = .096”
- Consistentt(118) = -0.53reported p > .2 · recomputed p = .597
“t(118) = -.53,p > .20”
- Consistentt(116) = 3.02reported p < .005 · recomputed p = .003
“t(116) = 3.02, p < .005”
- Consistentt(116) = 2.85reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .005
“t(116) = 2.85, p < .01”
- Consistentt(116) = 0.75reported p > .2 · recomputed p = .455
“t(116) = .75,p > .20”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.
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- Authors
- Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- Utrecht University (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Longo, Matthew R.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 978-998
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2017142040
- Semantic Scholar
- 76b6e7c63ec2052504d447ca18f61930b57a773d
- Cited by
- 956
- References
- 75
- Citations by year
- 2026: 45 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 65 · 2023: 53 · 2022: 85 · 2021: 102 · 2020: 82 · 2019: 71 · 2018: 67 · 2017: 57 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 43 · 2013: 42 · 2012: 21
- FWCI
- 60.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- BIROn (Birkbeck, University of London) (acceptedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Fundação Bial
- Directorate for Biological Sciences
- Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BB/D009529/1)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Tactile and Sensory Interactions
- Keywords
- embodiment, rubber hand illusion, bodily self-consciousness, proprioception, body ownership, body location, bodily agency, introspective reports, subjective experience, phenomenology, psychometric structure
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Perception, Proprioception, Psychometrics
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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