Extended Life
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“It is in this sense that the water boatman plus its self-orchestrated air bubbles constitute a Markov blanket the boundaries of which reach all the way out to include parts of the environment.”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“Were the system not able to do this it would cease to exist [26,31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“The water boatman is an example of an autonomous system, the internal states of which comprise environmental aspects [31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“A broad constraint on these conditions is epistemic: A definition of agency should be operational, that is, based on what can be explained about a concrete instance without appealing to historical or contextual knowledge beyond the concrete current situation (Di Paolo, 2009; Varela, 1979).”
From Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency (2023) · cites this paper as Di Paolo, 2009
Citations
Cites
Bourdieu, P. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9781503621749 · Cited by 17,271
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 4×
“1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E. H., & Thompson, E. T. (2017) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 5,910
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 · Cited by 5,815
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., Varela, F. J., & Beer, S. (1980) · Cited by 4,703
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(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696 · cited 5×
“In a recent article, Wheeler (in press) has put a question mark on the relation between enactivism (in its life/mind continuity version, e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialPrinciples of Biological Autonomy
Varela, F. J. (2025) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14875.001.0001 · Cited by 1,885 · cited 2×
“Such could be the case of sensorimotor loops, conversations and social interactions in general (Varela 1979, 1991, 1997; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007).”
BackgroundParticipatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology.
Merlan, P., & Jonas, H. (1967) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2105293 · Cited by 916
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Barandiaran X, Di Paolo EA (2008) Artificial mental life (Abstract). In: Bullock S, Noble J, Watson RA, Bedau MA (eds) Proceedings of the 11th international conference on artificial life, Alife XI, Winchester, UK, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
- Di Paolo EA (2003) Organismically-inspired robotics: homeostatic adaptation and natural teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop. In: Murase K, Asakura T (eds) Dynamical systems approach to embodiment and sociality. Advanced Knowledge International, Adelaide, pp 19–42
- Di Paolo EA (forthcoming) Overcoming autopoiesis: an enactive detour on the way from life to society. In: Magalhaes R, Sanchez R (eds) Autopoiesis in organizations and information systems. Elsevier, New York
- Heidegger M (2001) The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world, finitude, solitude (translated by McNeill W, Walker N). Indiana University Press, Bloomington
- Wheeler M (in press) Mind, things and materiality. In: Renfrew C, Malafouris L (eds) The cognitive life of things: recasting the boundaries of the mind. McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Publications, Cambridge
Cited by
Items 101–200 of 393
Thermodynamics and the structure of living systems
Virgo, N. (2011) · OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) · Cited by 35
Robotics Inspired in the Organism
Paolo, E. A. D. (2010) · Intellectica Revue de l Association pour la Recherche Cognitive · doi:10.3406/intel.2010.1181 · Cited by 42
“In proposing this view on habit formation, we are simply saying that the underlying processes are autonomous in the sense of organisational closure proposed by Varela (1979), see also (Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundNeither Individualistic nor Interactionist
Paolo, E. A. D., & Jaegher, H. D. (2017) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262035552.003.0005 · Cited by 36
“…adaptive autonomous system (e.g., an organism) regulates its coupling with the world and its own states as a function of the virtual (non-actualized) implications for its continuing form of life (organic, sensorimotor, cognitive, social, etc.) (Varela, 1997, Di Paolo, 2005, 2009, Thompson, 2007).”
BackgroundLocked-in Syndrome, BCI, and a Confusion about Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enacted Cognition
Walter, S. (2009) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-009-9050-z · Cited by 42
Can the mind be embodied, enactive, affective, and extended?
Maiese, M. L. (2017) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-017-9510-6 · Cited by 41
“While Wheeler (2010) maintains that there is deep tension between enactivism and the extended mind thesis (EM), theorists such as Di Paolo (2009), Colombetti (2015), and Thompson and Stapleton (2009) all maintain that EE is fully compatible with the non-bio-chauvinist approach of EM. What we need to do, in their view,…”
BackgroundInfluentialHarvey, M. I. (2015) · Language Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2014.12.004 · Cited by 34
Computational enactivism under the free energy principle
Korbak, T. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02243-4 · Cited by 40
“…of environment (e.g., Virgo et al. 2011) and dependence on other living systems (e.g., Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004; Hoffmeyer 1998); it also lacks consideration of functional interaction cycles (e.g., Arnellos et al. 2010; Di Paolo 2009; Barandiaran and Moreno 2008; Moreno and Etxeberria 2005).”
BackgroundAre living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply
Villalobos, M., & Razeto‐Barry, P. (2019) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318823723 · Cited by 31
“One of these interpretations, advanced by enactivist authors such as Virgo, Egbert, and Froese (2011; but see also Colombetti, 2015; Di Paolo, 2009; McGregor & Virgo, 2011), views living beings as autopoietic systems that may extend beyond their own physical boundaries as organisms, including…”
BackgroundEnacting a Jazz Beat: Temporality in Sonic Environment and Symbolic Communication
Solli, M., & Netland, T. (2021) · The British Journal of Aesthetics · doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayab048 · Cited by 29
On the nature and origins of cognition as a form of motivated activity
Barrett, N. F. (2019) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318824325 · Cited by 30
Cognitive extension: the parity argument, functionalism, and the mark of the cognitive
Walter, S. (2010) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9844-x · Cited by 39
The brain is not an isolated “black box,” nor is its goal to become one
Froese, T., & Ikegami, T. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12002348 · Cited by 27
Enactive individuation: technics, temporality and affect in digital design and fabrication
Poulsgaard, K. S. (2017) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-017-9539-6 · Cited by 34
“…MET proposes to move beyond more conservative theories of extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008), by rejecting mental representations and content while shifting the gravitational centre of mind away from the individual (cf. Gallagher 2013, Hutto and Myin 2013:152, Di Paolo 2009).”
BackgroundSelf-Organization and Semiosis in Jazz Improvisation
Walton, A. E., Richardson, M. J., & Chemero, A. P. (2014) · International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems · doi:10.4018/ijsss.2014070102 · Cited by 29
Froese, T., Suzuki, K., Ogai, Y., & Ikegami, T. (2012) · Cognitive Computation · doi:10.1007/s12559-012-9153-4 · Cited by 31
Candiotto, L., & Jaegher, H. D. (2021) · The Journal of Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10892-020-09357-9 · Cited by 35
“…social interaction processes are measureable and operationalisable, i.e. they consist of coordination patterns with specific dynamic signatures, as well as have an inextricable experiential dimension (Fuchs 1 From Varela (1979, 1991), over Thompson (2007), to Di Paolo (2005, 2009, 2018, 2020).”
BackgroundWas Canguilhem a Biochauvinist? Goldstein, Canguilhem and the Project of Biophilosophy
Wolfe, C. T. (2015) · Philosophy and medicine · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9870-9_12 · Cited by 39
Stapleton, M., & Froese, T. (2016) · Historical-analytical studies on nature, mind and action · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-30502-8_8 · Cited by 34
“Yet if values arise from the self-creation and self-maintenance of a particular system, then if you abstract that system from the physical basis that it creates and with which it maintains itself, then those values cease to exist for that system (Di Paolo 2009 ).”
BackgroundWheeler, M. (2015) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9356-x · Cited by 30
Life is Precious Because it is Precarious: Individuality, Mortality and the Problem of Meaning
Froese, T. (2017) · Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_3 · Cited by 29
Jaegher, H. D. (2015) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 44
Overcoming Autopoiesis: An Enactive Detour on the Way from Life to Society
Paolo, E. A. D. (2009) · Cited by 26
Habits of affluence: unfeeling, enactivism and the ecological crisis of capitalism
Slaby, J. (2024) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1007/s11299-024-00309-6 · Cited by 27
Knowing Groundlessness: An Enactive Approach to a Shift From Cognition to Non-Dual Awareness
Meling, D. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.697821 · Cited by 30
“It relinquishes any assignment of location, any search for a substantial ground that may give rise to everything else (Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundPerceptual Modalities: Modes of Presentation or Modes of Interaction?
McGann, M. (2010) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 30
Dynamics of Experience in a Learning Protocol: A Case Study in Climbing
Rochat, N., Hacques, G., Ganière, C., Seifert, L., Hauw, D., Iodice, P., & Adé, D. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00249 · Cited by 25
“Individualized pathways can therefore be investigated at the level of the learner’s lived experience, as proposed by the enactive paradigm, which conceives individuals as embodied agents who meaningfully interact with the environment (Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundLocked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self
Kyselo, M. (2011) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-011-9104-x · Cited by 27
“Because, as Di Paolo so aptly points out: “ Before asking where it is we must first say what it is ” (p.10) [25].”
BackgroundInfluentialInter- and En- activism: Some thoughts and comparisons
Bickhard, M. H. (2016) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.12.002 · Cited by 24
“…just depend on non-equilibrium conditions: they are constituted as interactive processes that (tend to) maintain those conditions, and do so recursively.16 15 This is essentially the same definition of autonomy presented by Di Paolo (2009), and in other sources (e.g., Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014).”
BackgroundBioethics and the Hypothesis of Extended Health
Morar, N., & Skorburg, J. A. (2018) · Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal · doi:10.1353/ken.2018.0020 · Cited by 28
Autopoietic theory, enactivism, and their incommensurable marks of the cognitive
Villalobos, M., & Palacios, S. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02376-6 · Cited by 26
“According to the enactivists, in defining “cognition as sensemaking […] we capture most (perhaps all) of our important intuitions about the term [cognition]” (Di Paolo 2009, p. 15.”
BackgroundInfluentialMind in Life or Life in Mind? Making Sense of Deep Continuity
Wheeler, M. (2011) · Stirling Online Research Repository (University of Stirling) · Cited by 38
Integrating Autopoiesis and Behavior: An Exploration in Computational Chemo-ethology
Egbert, M. D., & Paolo, E. A. D. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343821 · Cited by 27
Enactivism and the Perception of Others’ Emotions
Overgaard, S. (2017) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/misp.12068 · Cited by 23
Minds, materials and metaphors
Toon, A. (2020) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819120000406 · Cited by 22
Ecological-enactive account of autism spectrum disorder
Nešić, J. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04073-x · Cited by 26
Embodied Cognitive Robotics and the learning of sensorimotor schemes
Lara, B., Astorga, D., Mendoza-Bock, E., Pardo, M., Escobar, E., & Ciria, A. (2018) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318780679 · Cited by 23
“Also, placing the labels under the same general scheme risks losing both the individual nuances and the real disagreements between the different proposals (Di Paolo, 2009; Kiverstein and Clark, 2009; Menary, 2010).”
BackgroundThe holobiont mind: A bridge between 4E cognition and the microbiome
Palacios-García, I., & Parada, F. J. (2021) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123211053071 · Cited by 24
Grasso‐Cladera, A., Costa‐Cordella, S., Rossi, A., Fuchs, N. F., & Parada, F. J. (2022) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123211072613 · Cited by 23
“This broad understanding is closer to the enactive approach de fi nition (Di Paolo, 2009) as we frame both the distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995) and the extended mind / active externalism (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) notions within an interaction/emergentist view.”
MethodSocioenactive Interaction: Addressing Intersubjectivity in Ubiquitous Design Scenarios
Baranauskas, M. C. C., Duarte, E. F., & Valente, J. A. (2023) · International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1080/10447318.2023.2188536 · Cited by 24
“…of living beings with the environment through, e.g., moving, picking up objects, walking, etc. constitutes their experienced world; they do not just receive and internally represent information from their environment (Di Paolo, 2009; Fuchs, 2018; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009; Varela et al., 1991).”
BackgroundThe holobiont mind: A bridge between 4E-cognition and the microbiome
Palacios-Garcia, I., & Parada, F. J. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/thuvc · Cited by 21
Meaning-making and creativity in musical entrainment
Schiavio, A., Witek, M. A. G., & Stupacher, J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1326773 · Cited by 21
“Consider the definition of cognition offered by Di Paolo: “[c]ognition is sense-making in interaction: the regulation of coupling with respect to norms established by the self-constituted identity that gives rise to such regulation in order to conserve itself” (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 19).”
BackgroundToward an expansion of an enactive ethics with the help of care ethics
Urban, P. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01354 · Cited by 23
“…whose philosophical foundations have been laid by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in The Embodied Mind (Varela et al., 1991) and which has been further exemplified by Thompson (2005, 2007), Di Paolo (2005, 2009), De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), Di Paolo et al. (2010), and Froese and Di Paolo (2011).”
BackgroundProcess, habit, and flow: a phenomenological approach to material agency
Ransom, T. G. (2017) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-017-9541-z · Cited by 21
“But whereas embodied, enactive, and DST theorists acknowledge the relationality of the body and the world, and the consequences that this has for the structure of the organism’s activity, many of them, like Di Paolo (2005, 2009), conceive of agency as an asymmetrical operation.”
BackgroundTemporality of sense-making in narrative interactions
Popova, Y. B., & Cuffari, E. C. (2018) · Cognitive Semiotics · doi:10.1515/cogsem-2018-0007 · Cited by 24
Behaviour and the Origin of Organisms
Egbert, M. D., Hanczyc, M. M., Harvey, I. R., Virgo, N., Parke, E. C., Froese, T., Sayama, H., Penn, A. S., & Bartlett, S. (2023) · Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres · doi:10.1007/s11084-023-09635-0 · Cited by 27
On the naturalisation of teleology: self-organisation, autopoiesis and teleodynamics
García-Valdecasas, M. (2021) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712321991890 · Cited by 21
“In his attempt to pave the way for embodied cognition, Di Paolo (2009) argues that ‘a system (...) requires (...) access to how it currently stands against the all-ornothing barrier given by that norm [the norm of selfconstruction]’ (p. 15).”
BackgroundVörös, S., Froese, T., & Riegler, A. (2016) · VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) · Cited by 38
Froese, T. (2013) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-013-0130-y · Cited by 23
“If societies really were like organisms and people their cells, as has occasionally been proposed by theorists, our personal freedoms would be drastically curtailed (Di Paolo 2009b).”
BackgroundEnactive social cognition: Diachronic constitution & coupled anticipation
Jurgens, A., & Kirchhoff, M. D. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.02.001 · Cited by 22
“Action is at the root of what it is to be alive (Di Paolo 2009; Friston 2013).”
BackgroundAn enactive approach to appropriation in the instrumented activity of trail running
Rochat, N., Seifert, L., Guignard, B., & Hauw, D. (2019) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-019-00921-2 · Cited by 19
“The theoretical assumption that underlies the activitycentered approach is that athletes are embodied agents who continuously interact with the environment in a meaningful way (Theureau 2003; Di Paolo 2009).”
BackgroundChapter 3 Overcoming Autopoiesis: An Enactive Detour on the Way from Life to Society
Paolo, E. A. D. (2010) · Advanced series in management · doi:10.1108/s1877-6361(2009)0000006004 · Cited by 24
“This is the idea of autonomy that we adapt from (Varela, 1979) to include a requirement of precariousness (see also Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundPoulsgaard, K. S., & Malafouris, L. (2020) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-020-01044-5 · Cited by 21
“…recasting the bounds of cognition; deprived of representations mind becomes enactive, essentially world involving, inherently extensive rather than occasionally extended (Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013; Chemero 2009; Gal-lagher 2017; Gallagher and Allen 2018).”
Breathing new life into cognitive science
Froese, T. (2011) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 19
Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency
Di Paolo, E. A., Lawler, D., & Vaccari, A. P. (2023) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00632-9 · Cited by 17
Passivity in Aesthetic Experience: Husserlian and Enactive Perspectives
Høffding, S., & Roald, T. (2019) · Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology · doi:10.1080/20539320.2019.1589042 · Cited by 20
Cognitive ontology in flux: the possibility of protean brains
Hutto, D. D., Peeters, A., & Segundo‐Ortin, M. (2017) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1312502 · Cited by 18
What Is Heideggerian Cognitive Science?
Kiverstein, J. D. (2012) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-137-00610-3_1 · Cited by 22
Walter, S., & Kästner, L. (2010) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.10.001 · Cited by 18
“) thinks parity considerations provide the only plausible basis for cognitive extension, Clark (2008a, p. 77) denigrates them to a mere " rule of thumb, " and others deny they can play any substantive role at all (Coleman, in press; Di Paolo, 2009; Rupert, 2009, 2010).”
Henry, A. J., & Thompson, E. T. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0010 · Cited by 15
Extended Consciousness: an Interim Report
Wheeler, M. (2015) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/sjp.12124 · Cited by 15
“Thus Froese et al. claim that ‘[i]f cognition [consciousness] is a relational phenomenon, it logically cannot be located inside the brain (or anywhere)’ (Froese et al. 2013, 1420; for similar claims, see di Paolo 2009, Thompson and Stapleton 2009).”
BackgroundFrom analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry
Gauld, C., Nielsen, K., Job, M., Bottemanne, H., & Dumas, G. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2022.981787 · Cited by 15
Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism
Caiani, S. Z. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02049-w · Cited by 18
“…among scholars in fields such as philosophy, experimental psychology, and neuroscience, spurring a lively debate about the ontology and methodology of the cognitive sciences (e.g., Thompson 2007; Di Paolo 2009; Chemero 2011; Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Gallagher 2017; Hutto and Myin 2012, 2017).”
BackgroundEnactive cognitive science and biology of cognition: A response to Humberto Maturana
Froese, T., & Stewart, J. R. (2012) · Cybernetics & human knowing · Cited by 21
Convergently Emergent: Ecological and Enactive Approaches to the Texture of Agency
McGann, M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01982 · Cited by 17
“This is done under conditions of precarity (Di Paolo, 2009) which is to say that without the self-supporting organization, the system would tend to run down or disintegrate.”
BackgroundProjection or encounter? Investigating Hans Jonas’ case for natural teleology
Hverven, S., & Netland, T. (2021) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-021-09748-9 · Cited by 19
Cognition from life: the two modes of cognition that underlie moral behavior
Andringa, T., van den Bosch, K. A., & Wijermans, N. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00362 · Cited by 14
“This is the basis of the individual’s autonomy and freedom that Di Paolo (2009) describes as follows: The fact that metabolism sustains a dynamic form of identity (not coinciding with its material constitution at any given time except at the time of death) allows an organism to become free.”
BackgroundInfluentialBitbol (2018) · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2017.12.011 · Cited by 13
Conviviality: our primary connectedness to living beings
Fuchs, T. A. E. (2025) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1007/s11299-024-00315-8 · Cited by 18
Hierarchical Markov blankets and adaptive active inference
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2018) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2017.12.009 · Cited by 13
Sepúlveda-Pedro, M. A. (2023) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123231190153 · Cited by 14
“Both works of embodied cognition seem to be closely related to the view of the enactive approach, but they also imply signi fi cant divergences (Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2021).”
BackgroundEnactive psychiatry and social integration: beyond dyadic interactions
Dengsø, M. J. (2024) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-024-09957-y · Cited by 17
The Behavior-Based Hypercycle: From Parasitic Reaction to Symbiotic Behavior
Froese, T., Ikegami, T., & Virgo, N. (2012) · Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE) · doi:10.7551/978-0-262-31050-5-ch060 · Cited by 13
Life as a process of open-ended becoming: Analysis of a minimal model
Froese, T., Virgo, N., & Ikegami, T. (2011) · European Conference on Artificial Life · doi:10.7551/978-0-262-29714-1-ch040 · Cited by 14
“…is sufficiently disrupted it will stop being maintained (i.e. death); and individuated, in the sense that organisms are spatially localized, and this localization is a result of the dissipative processes that make up the organism, rather than being imposed from outside (see also Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons
Steiner, P. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9309-z · Cited by 13
Dynamics, agency and intentional action
Silberstein, M. (2011) · Humana.mente · Cited by 17
Autopoiesis, Autonomy, and Organizational Biology: Critical Remarks on “Life After Ashby”Preprint
Bich, L., & Arnellos, A. (2012) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 28
Introducing the SMILE_PH method: Sense-making interviews looking at elements of philosophical health
de Miranda, L. (2023) · Methodological Innovations · doi:10.1177/20597991231179336 · Cited by 12
Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?
Gärtner, K., & Clowes, R. W. (2017) · Kairos · doi:10.1515/kjps-2017-0003 · Cited by 20
“Its inheritors are multiple from work on the extended mind (Clark, 2008), to embodiment (Gallagher, 2005), from biology and life (Di Paolo, 2009) to methodology (Hutto & Myin, 2013), to name just very few.”
BackgroundWhy the extended mind is nothing special but is central
Ongaro, G., Hardman, D. I., & Deschenaux, I. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09827-5 · Cited by 13
Extended Predictive Minds: do Markov Blankets Matter?
Facchin, M. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00607-9 · Cited by 15
Solli, M. (2022) · The British Journal of Aesthetics · doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayac002 · Cited by 11
On Being Mindful About Misunderstandings in Languaging
Cuffari, E. C. (2014) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781137363367_9 · Cited by 15
The necessity of extended autopoiesis
Virgo, N. (2019) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319841557 · Cited by 11
“(Di Paolo, 2009) and (Virgo, Egbert, & Froese, 2009) were both, in part, responses to (Wheeler, 2008), who argued that autopoietic enactivism entailed a view that an organism, viewed as a cognitive system, is ‘bounded by its skin’.”
BackgroundIn Search of Ontological Emergence: Diachronic, But Non-supervenient
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2013) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-013-9214-7 · Cited by 12
Wolfe, C. T. (2014) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230369580 · Cited by 11
Political philosophy of mind: inverting the concepts, expanding the niche
Tzima, S., & Slaby, J. (2024) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-024-10051-6 · Cited by 11
People are STRANGE: towards a philosophical archaeology of self
Malafouris, L. (2024) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-024-10002-1 · Cited by 10
Recurrences and Human Agential Meaning Grounding: Laying a Path in Walking
Rodríguez, S. (2016) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-016-9267-2 · Cited by 10
“…facts we can differentiate the following: artifacts, with functions assigned; conventional signs, with meanings assigned conventionally; and interactive practices (De Jaegher et al. 2010; Froese and Di Paolo 2009), in which agents combine intentions to achieve joint action and joint sense making.”
BackgroundInfluentialMorganti, F. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02410 · Cited by 11
Agents of Habit: Refining the Artificial Life Route to Artificial Intelligence
Ramírez–Vizcaya, S., & Froese, T. (2020) · Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE) · doi:10.1162/isal_a_00298 · Cited by 10
“The enactive approach to habits also pursues this idea through the notion of sensorimotor autonomy, proposing that a cognitive self emerges out of the selforganization of a network of habits (Barandiaran, 2008; Di Paolo, 2005, 2009, 2010; Di Paolo et al., 2017; RamírezVizcaya and Froese, 2019).”
BackgroundSepúlveda-Pedro, M. A. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01666 · Cited by 11
“The third relevant form of sense-making and normativity articulated by the enactive approach is the enaction of norms that occasionally emerge from the interaction of two or more autonomous systems, called participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Froese and Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundEnactivism Meets Mechanism: Tensions & Congruities in Cognitive Science
Lee, J. (2023) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-022-09618-6 · Cited by 13
“166 J. Lee 1 3 like), that some enactivists may wish to preserve (Zahavi, 2003; Di Paolo, 2009; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009).14 In acknowledging that enactivists might sometimes confuse relations of dependence for evidence of constitution, it ought to be stressed that, at least in certain guises,…”
BackgroundAutopoiesis + extended cognition + nature = can buildings think?
Dollens, D. (2015) · Communicative & Integrative Biology · doi:10.4161/19420889.2014.994373 · Cited by 11
Bio-Agency and the Possibility of Artificial Agents
Meincke, A. S. (2018) · European studies in philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-72577-2_5 · Cited by 10
Bogotá, J. D. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04746-1 · Cited by 9
“Therefore, the interactions between organism and environment are asymmetrical, allowing enactiv-ists to conceptualise them as behaviour (Di Paolo, 2009).”
Investigations of an Adaptive and Autonomous Sensorimotor Individual
Egbert, M. D. (2018) · Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE) · doi:10.1162/isal_a_00065 · Cited by 9
“In our investigation we found individuals constituted by both ‘internal’ (to the robot) dynamics and robot-world relation dynamics, providing an example of autonomous individuals that are (as argued in Di Paolo, 2009) compatible with notions of the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers, 1998).”
BackgroundRobustness as a non‐localizable relational phenomenon
Fernández-León, J. A. (2013) · Biological reviews/Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · doi:10.1111/brv.12067 · Cited by 9
“In this respect, (Di Paolo, 2009) implies that cognition is a relational phenomenon of brain, body, and environment, and thereby is not localizable (see Ashby, 1960, p. 70).”
BackgroundThe Clinical Concept of Opioid Addiction Since 1877: Still Wanting After All These Years
Schütz, C. G., Ramírez–Vizcaya, S., & Froese, T. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00508 · Cited by 9
“In this regard, according to enactivism, the preservation of habits constitutes a central source of normativity that guides an agent’s perception, thought and behavior: agents will tend to avoid situations and actions that may threaten their habitual identities and to look for favorable ones (46).”
BackgroundENACTIVISM AND CARE ETHICS: MERGING PERSPECTIVES
Urban, P. (2015) · ASEP · Cited by 19
Guibourdenche, J. (2013) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/5d8f8b5azd9adz44d6z88bfz83fce5382a5c · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Di Paolo, E.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2008-12-18
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9-21
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W3188690837
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 7.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Topoi (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- extended mind, enactivism, autopoiesis, internalism, relational cognition, autonomy, individuality, mediation, agency, definition of cognition
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