Extended Life
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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“It is in this sense that the water boatman plus its self-orchestrated air bubbles constitute a Markov blanket the boundaries of which reach all the way out to include parts of the environment.”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“Were the system not able to do this it would cease to exist [26,31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“The water boatman is an example of an autonomous system, the internal states of which comprise environmental aspects [31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“A broad constraint on these conditions is epistemic: A definition of agency should be operational, that is, based on what can be explained about a concrete instance without appealing to historical or contextual knowledge beyond the concrete current situation (Di Paolo, 2009; Varela, 1979).”
From Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency (2023) · cites this paper as Di Paolo, 2009
Citations
Cites
Bourdieu, P. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9781503621749 · Cited by 17,271
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 4×
“1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E. H., & Thompson, E. T. (2017) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 5,910
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
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The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., Varela, F. J., & Beer, S. (1980) · Cited by 4,703
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“In a recent article, Wheeler (in press) has put a question mark on the relation between enactivism (in its life/mind continuity version, e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialPrinciples of Biological Autonomy
Varela, F. J. (2025) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14875.001.0001 · Cited by 1,885 · cited 2×
“Such could be the case of sensorimotor loops, conversations and social interactions in general (Varela 1979, 1991, 1997; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007).”
BackgroundParticipatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
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Merlan, P., & Jonas, H. (1967) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2105293 · Cited by 916
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Barandiaran X, Di Paolo EA (2008) Artificial mental life (Abstract). In: Bullock S, Noble J, Watson RA, Bedau MA (eds) Proceedings of the 11th international conference on artificial life, Alife XI, Winchester, UK, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
- Di Paolo EA (2003) Organismically-inspired robotics: homeostatic adaptation and natural teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop. In: Murase K, Asakura T (eds) Dynamical systems approach to embodiment and sociality. Advanced Knowledge International, Adelaide, pp 19–42
- Di Paolo EA (forthcoming) Overcoming autopoiesis: an enactive detour on the way from life to society. In: Magalhaes R, Sanchez R (eds) Autopoiesis in organizations and information systems. Elsevier, New York
- Heidegger M (2001) The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world, finitude, solitude (translated by McNeill W, Walker N). Indiana University Press, Bloomington
- Wheeler M (in press) Mind, things and materiality. In: Renfrew C, Malafouris L (eds) The cognitive life of things: recasting the boundaries of the mind. McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Publications, Cambridge
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“Among enactivists, there are some [e.g. Thompson & Varela 2001; Thompson & Stapleton 2009; Di Paolo 2009; Hutto & Myin 2013] who don’t formulate their positions as versions of vehicle externalism.”
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Chanet, C., & Eubelen, D. (2019) · Springer series in cognitive and neural systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03104-6_10
“(Di Paolo 2009, 20).”
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Lampredi, G. (2019) · Culture e Studi del Sociale · doi:10.14273/unisa-1570
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“…built from fundamentally different assumptions, as extended functionalism (Clark, 2008a, 2008b; Kiverstein, 2012; Kiverstein & Clark, 2009; Wheeler, 2017) and several sorts of enactive approaches (di Paolo, 2009; Gallagher & Crisafi, 2009; Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009).”
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““ A precarious autonomous system, at whatever level, inter-venes in its own substrate in order to sustain a form which is made out of components that paradoxically provide the very tendencies towards the dissolution of the same form ” (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 16).”
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“Sup-porters of the EA have addressed these criticisms extensively (Barandiaran, 2017; Di Paolo, 2009; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009), but some controversies remain.”
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“Enactivists themselves frequently appeal to the Aristotelian notion of form when characterizing autonomy, organization, and self-maintenance (Thompson 2007, 66 – 72; Fuchs 2018, 96 – 7; Maiese 2022, 57; Di Paolo 2009, 16).”
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“Sensorimotor schemes are constitutively dependent on the environment, suggesting that the organism’s sensorimotor organisation may be partly constituted by physical structures beyond its physical boundaries (Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2017).”
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“Definition 3 reformulates Jonas’s needful freedom (Jonas, 1966) and Di Paolo’s precariousness (Di Paolo, 2005, 2009) in terms of the terminal set.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Di Paolo, E.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2008-12-18
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9-21
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W3188690837
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 7.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Topoi (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- extended mind, enactivism, autopoiesis, internalism, relational cognition, autonomy, individuality, mediation, agency, definition of cognition
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