Extended Life
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“It is in this sense that the water boatman plus its self-orchestrated air bubbles constitute a Markov blanket the boundaries of which reach all the way out to include parts of the environment.”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“Were the system not able to do this it would cease to exist [26,31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“The water boatman is an example of an autonomous system, the internal states of which comprise environmental aspects [31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“A broad constraint on these conditions is epistemic: A definition of agency should be operational, that is, based on what can be explained about a concrete instance without appealing to historical or contextual knowledge beyond the concrete current situation (Di Paolo, 2009; Varela, 1979).”
From Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency (2023) · cites this paper as Di Paolo, 2009
Citations
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BackgroundInfluentialThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E. H., & Thompson, E. T. (2017) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 5,910
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“In a recent article, Wheeler (in press) has put a question mark on the relation between enactivism (in its life/mind continuity version, e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialPrinciples of Biological Autonomy
Varela, F. J. (2025) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14875.001.0001 · Cited by 1,885 · cited 2×
“Such could be the case of sensorimotor loops, conversations and social interactions in general (Varela 1979, 1991, 1997; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007).”
BackgroundParticipatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
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- Di Paolo EA (forthcoming) Overcoming autopoiesis: an enactive detour on the way from life to society. In: Magalhaes R, Sanchez R (eds) Autopoiesis in organizations and information systems. Elsevier, New York
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Cited by
Items 201–300 of 393
Sensorimotor incorporation: an operational definition
Mojica, L., & Paolo, E. A. D. (2025) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-025-10103-5 · Cited by 9
Hans Jonas and the phenomenological continuity of life and mind
Prokop, M. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09863-1 · Cited by 8
“: Ch. 7), is orga-nizationally closed , i.e. all constituent processes maintain a relationship of circular dependence, such that every constituent process (a) enables, and (b) is itself enabled by another constituent process (Di Paolo, 2009: 15 f.).”
InfluentialThe temporal and affective structure of living systems: A thermodynamic perspective
Dengsø, M. J. (2023) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123231176346 · Cited by 9
“For an account focused on the spatial aspect, see Di Paolo (2009).”
BackgroundFacing life: the messy bodies of enactive cognitive science
McGann, M. (2024) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-024-09958-x · Cited by 10
“…and identifies itself not by a separation from the world, but by a valued orientation within it (endorsed by several authors, including Thompson, this approach owes much to the philoso-pher Hans Jonas’s view of living as metabolic activity; see Weber & Varela, 2002, but also Di Paolo, 2005, 2009).”
Beyond the extended mind: new arguments for extensive enactivism
Sganzerla, L., Hutto, D. D., & Kirchhoff, M. D. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-04931-w · Cited by 12
“Di Paolo (2009) provides a case in point.”
InfluentialEmbodied Space in Natural and Virtual Environments: Implications for Cognitive Neuroscience Research
Morganti, F. (2016) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32270-4_11 · Cited by 8
Stuck in between. Phenomenology’s Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice
Casper, M.-O., & Haueis, P. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09853-3 · Cited by 11
Varieties of Organicism: A Critical Analysis
Wolfe, C. T. (2023) · History, philosophy and theory of the life sciences · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-38968-9_3 · Cited by 13
Hogue, T. (2021) · Cambridge Archaeological Journal · doi:10.1017/s0959774321000020 · Cited by 8
Homo Virtualis: Virtual Worlds, Learning, and an Ecology of Embodied Interaction
Jarmon, L. H. (2010) · International Journal of Virtual and Personal Learning Environments · doi:10.4018/jvple.2010091704 · Cited by 14
Urban, P. (2015) · Ethics and Social Welfare · doi:10.1080/17496535.2015.1022356 · Cited by 11
“…whose philosophical foundations have been laid by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) in The Embodied Mind and which has been further exemplified by Thompson (2005, 2007), Di Paolo (2005, 2009), De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher (2010), Froese and Di Paolo (2011).”
BackgroundAn encounter between 4e cognition and attachment theory
Petters, D. (2016) · Connection Science · doi:10.1080/09540091.2016.1214947 · Cited by 8
“Di Paolo (2009) proposes a concept of autopoiesis where behavioural habits, arise from ‘within’, coordinating with the intimate details of ‘without’.”
BackgroundThinking like a State : Embodied intelligence in the deep history of our collective mind
GUÉNIN--CARLUT, A. (2022) · IOP Conference Series Materials Science and Engineering · doi:10.1088/1757-899x/1261/1/012026 · Cited by 8
Enacting Selves, Enacting Worlds: On the Buddhist Theory of Karma
MacKenzie, M. (2013) · Philosophy East and West · doi:10.1353/pew.2013.0022 · Cited by 7
COMMON-SENSE FUNCTIONALISM AND THE EXTENDED MIND
Wadham, J. (2015) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqv071 · Cited by 7
Autonomy and Openness in Human and Machine Systems: Participatory Sense-Making and Artificial Minds
Zebrowski, R. L., & McGraw, E. B. (2021) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s2705078521500181 · Cited by 7
Homeostats for the 21st Century? Simulating Ashby Simulating the Brain
Franchi, S. (2013) · Constructivist Foundations · Cited by 7
Kyselo, M. (2013) · osnaDocs (Osnabrück University) · Cited by 10
Extremal properties and self-preserving behavior
Barrett, N. F. (2019) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319863043 · Cited by 7
The feeling of being alive: phenomenology and biology
Fuchs, T. (2026) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-026-10145-3 · Cited by 7
Not thinking about the same thing. Enactivism, pragmatism and intentionality
Steiner, P. (2023) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-023-09949-4 · Cited by 7
Material Sense: Perceptual Experience in Stone and Mineral Selection for Tool-Making
Efrati, B. (2024) · Archaeologies · doi:10.1007/s11759-024-09490-z · Cited by 6
Coping and Co-creation: One Attempt and One Route to Well-Being. Part 1. Conceptual Framework
Andringa, T., & Denham, F. C. (2021) · Psychology in Russia State of Art · doi:10.11621/pir.2021.0210 · Cited by 6
Precedent as a path laid down in walking: Grounding intrinsic normativity in a history of response
Rust, J. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09865-z · Cited by 7
“Recent work in the enactivist tradition also focuses on habitual body memory as a possible grounds of intrinsic normativity (e.g., Di Paolo, 2005, 2008, 2010; Barandiaran, 2008; Barandiaran & Di Paolo, 2014; Cappuccio & Froese, 2014; Barandiaran, 2017 Di Paolo et al., 2017; Ramírez-Vizcaya &…”
Causal Parity and Externalisms: Extensions in Life and Mind
Huneman, P. (2013) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-013-9309-3 · Cited by 6
Embodiment and Phenomenal Qualities: An Enactive Interpretation
Gallagher, S. (2011) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics201139111 · Cited by 11
The Ultimate Rx: Cutting Through the Delusion of Self-cherishing
Miller, L. D. (2016) · Mindfulness in behavioral health · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44019-4_22 · Cited by 6
The organism as reality or as fiction: Buffon and beyond
Demarest, B., & Wolfe, C. T. (2016) · History & Philosophy of the Life Sciences · doi:10.1007/s40656-016-0128-8 · Cited by 6
“…concept tie it directly to what sort of position we take on the relation between the ‘organic’ understood as a placeholder for the ‘human’ as something irreducible to ‘mere physics’, and physico-mechanical science; indeed a form of what one might term ‘biochauvinism’ (Di Paolo 2009; Wolfe 2014b).”
BackgroundBehavioural robustness and the distributed mechanisms hypothesis
Leon, F. G., & Jose, A. M. (2011) · Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex) · Cited by 7
Scaffolded Agents, for Better or Worse: Assessing the Formative Aspect of Scaffolding
Dengsø, M. J. (2025) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-024-10148-2 · Cited by 5
Extending the enactive concept of habit: from sensorimotor schemes to regional identities
Ramírez–Vizcaya, S. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05237-7 · Cited by 5
“Then, I will propose extending the definition to the timescale of months and years through the concept of regional identities (Di Paolo, 2009; Paolo, 2010; Ramírez-Vizcaya & Froese, 2019 ), understood as self-sustaining and precarious networks of habitual activities corresponding to the various…”
InfluentialExistentialism and Cognitive Science
Wheeler, M., & Paolo, E. A. D. (2014) · Bloomsbury Publishing Plc eBooks · doi:10.5040/9781474227759.ch-013 · Cited by 5
Reddy, V. (2019) · Educating the young child · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-15202-4_11 · Cited by 8
Extended X: Extending the Reach of Active Externalism
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El estudio de la cognición: hacia una perspectiva corporizada
Quirós, D. A. E., Rojas, A. L. D., & Canal, J. Y. (2024) · Psicologia USP · doi:10.1590/0103-6564e210099 · Cited by 5
Patients as Experts, Participatory Sense-Making, and Relational Autonomy
Maiese, M. L. (2024) · Crítica (México D F En línea) · doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1529 · Cited by 6
“Di Paolo (2009) defines an autonomous system as “a system composed of several processes that actively generate and sustain an identity under precarious circumstances” (p. 15).”
Werner, K. (2020) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712320937475 · Cited by 5
“…life and cognition in terms of autopoiesis more broadly, it turns out that the exact location of the boundary of the autopoietic system is not obvious and there is a debate sparked by Di Paolo (2009) and Virgo et al. (2011), among others, who came up with the idea of extended autopoiesis.”
BackgroundInfluentialVillalobos, M., Frick, R., & Vicencio-Jiménez, S. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24070914 · Cited by 4
Rust, J. (2023) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-023-09952-9 · Cited by 4
Off the beaten path: perception in enactivism and the realism-idealism question
van Es, T. (2024) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-024-10011-0 · Cited by 4
Behavioural robustness: A link between distributed mechanisms and coupled transient dynamics
Fernández-León, J. A. (2011) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2011.03.006 · Cited by 4
Fernández-León, J. A., & Froese, T. (2010) · IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC) · doi:10.1109/cec.2010.5586056 · Cited by 4
“More recently, it has even been argued that the essential organization which defines the identity of a living organism should itself be conceived as extended across the boundary of living tissue (e.g. [5]).”
When the affordances disappear: Dynamical and computational explanations of optic ataxia
Caiani, S. Z. (2017) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354317722867 · Cited by 4
“…theoretical approaches sharing this view, many of them converge on the assumption that the dynamical systems theory has the potential to increase our understanding of traditional problems of cognition (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Di Paolo, 2009; Hutto & Myin, 2013; Thomson, 2007; van Gelder, 1998).”
BackgroundCognitive Science, Embodiment, and Materiality
Barrett, N. F. (2020) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118660072.ch5 · Cited by 4
Casper, M.-O., & Artese, G. F. (2020) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712320967053 · Cited by 4
The lived, living, and behavioral sense of perception
Netland, T. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09858-y · Cited by 6
“8 Enactivists draw inspiration from Hans Jonas’ ( 1966 ) existential biology when arguing that even the simplest organisms instantiate forms of teleology and agency (Weber & Varela, 2002 ; Thompson, 2007a; Di Paolo 2009 ).”
MUTUAL INCORPORATION, INTERCORPOREALITY, AND THE PROBLEM OF MEDIATING SYSTEMS
Zebrowski, R. L. (2022) · Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia · doi:10.24193/subbphil.2022.3.02 · Cited by 4
Interdisciplinarity in Cognitive Science and the Nature of Cognition
Gärtner, K., & Clowes, R. W. (2023) · Logic, argumentation & reasoning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20405-0_9 · Cited by 5
Protevi, J. L. (2023) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/sjp.12525 · Cited by 6
la Chapelle, R. A., & Stroebel, L. (2017) · Signifiances (Signifying) · doi:10.52497/signifiances.v1i3.104 · Cited by 4
Chemical Robot: Self-organizing Self-moving Oil Droplet
Ikegami, T. (2010) · Journal of the Robotics Society of Japan · doi:10.7210/jrsj.28.435 · Cited by 4
McAuliffe, A., & McGann, M. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00674 · Cited by 5
“They tend to vary, however, in terms of their descriptions of the relationships between experience and behavior (Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2009; Shapiro, 2010; Wilson and Golonka, 2013) though most commonly the specifics of that relationship remain ill-defined.”
BackgroundThe Encultured Mind: From Cognitive Science to Social Epistemology
Eck, D. C. (2015) · Digital Commons - University of South Florida (University of South Florida) · Cited by 4
Harnessing non-modernity: a case study in artificial life
Aicardi, C. (2010) · OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) · Cited by 7
Thinking like a State - Embodied intelligence in the deep history of our collective mindsPreprint
GUÉNIN--CARLUT, A. (2021) · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/dxnzt · Cited by 4
Beyond Control: Finding the Purpose of Enactive Cognitive Science
Nave, K. (2026) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123261435796 · Cited by 5
“Nonetheless, in the kind of enactive work that I would treat as representative of a more ‘ organicist ’ tendency there is frequent emphasis on aspects such as ‘ precarious-ness ’ and processes of ‘ open-ended becoming ’ (Di Paolo, 2009, 2021; Di Paolo et al., 2022).”
Tretter, F., Löffler‐Stastka, H., Braun, H., Schleim, S., Falkenburg, B., Hastedt, H., Northoff, G., Fuchs, T., Kotchoubey, B., Maderthaner, R., et al. (2026) · Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnint.2026.1792478 · Cited by 3
“It proposes that the mind/cognition is “embodied,” “enacted,” “extended,” and “embedded” (Varela et al., 1991; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Gallagher, 2005, 2018; Di Paolo, 2005, 2009; see also Newen et al., 2018).”
Ströbel, L. (2019) · Discourse approaches to politics, society and culture · doi:10.1075/dapsac.85.06str · Cited by 3
Leporace, C. D. P. (2022) · Perspectiva Filosófica · doi:10.51359/2357-9986.2022.252618 · Cited by 3
Complexigraphy: theoretical foundations and methodological challenges of mapping complex thinking
de Melo, A. T., & Renault, L. (2025) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-025-10071-w · Cited by 3
Enactivizing dialectics: from individual to social normativity and back
Gambarotto, A., & van Es, T. (2025) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-025-10261-w · Cited by 3
Lessons from a virtual slime: marginal mechanisms, minimal cognition and radical enactivism
Walmsley, L. D. (2019) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318824544 · Cited by 4
“Family members include Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014), Chemero (2009), Di Paolo (2009), Froese and Di Paolo (2011) and Thompson (2007).”
BackgroundLanguage, Habit, and the Future
Cuffari, E. C. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108682312.012 · Cited by 4
Building cognition through material engagement
Mulder, H. (2022) · Frontiers of Architectural Research · doi:10.1016/j.foar.2022.02.008 · Cited by 3
Enactive framework for psychiatric disorders
Nešić, J. (2022) · Engrami · doi:10.5937/engrami44-40298 · Cited by 5
“U enaktivizmu se granica u potpunosti briše, jer enaktivizam dovodi u pitanje samu dihotomiju unutrašnje/ spoljašnje kad je u pitanju svest i kogni-cija [14, 9] .”
BackgroundInfluentialGuiding Principles for Youth-Centric Development: Ethical AI
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Fuchs, H. U., Dumont, E., & Corni, F. (2025) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110782844-008 · Cited by 3
Introduction: Political Philosophy of Mind
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Vers une psychiatrie énactive et computationnelle
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Clues and caveats concerning artificial consciousness from a phenomenological perspective
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“24 Di Paolo offers us a possible path here: robots need not be invested with life, but instead be given “the mechanisms for acquiring a way of life , that is, with habits” (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 13).”
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Afterword: After the Great Undoing
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Por que somos o nosso cérebro: o enativismo posto em questão
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Where There Is Life There Is Mind… And Free Energy Minimisation?
Bogotá, J. D. (2024) · Interdisciplinary evolution research · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-70847-3_8 · Cited by 2
Acción y cognición: una educación física de la acción presente
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Authors’ Response: Complementarity of Symmetry and Asymmetry
Fultot, M. F., Nie, L., & Carello, C. (2016) · Constructivist Foundations · Cited by 2
Methodological consequences of weak embodied cognition and shared intentionality
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Die Wahrnehmungstheorie des Enaktivismus
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Prioritizing Otherness: The Line Between Vacuous Individuality and Hollow Collectivism
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EXPLORING PAIN AND CLINICAL COMMUNICATION
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An Enactive Approach to Causes, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders
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An instrumentalist take on the models of the Free-Energy Principle
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I Act Therefore I Live? Autopoiesis, Sensorimotor Autonomy, and Extended Agency
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Extending the Extended Mind : From Cognition to Consciousness
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Enactive Psychiatry: Psychiatric Disorders Are Disorders of Sense-Making
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Bienestar enactivo: un programa triaxial transdisciplinar
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How to build a better 4E cognition
Dove, G. O. (2024) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2024.2403340 · Cited by 1
“Enactive cognition focuses on the way that thinking emerges from the interaction of autonomous living organisms and their environments (DiPaolo, 2009; Thompson, 2007).”
Witherington, D. C., & deCruz-Dixon, N. (2024) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/17540739241303494 · Cited by 1
Self-equilibration, borderline personality disorder, and dance-movement therapy
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“Di Paolo (2009) defines an autonomous system as one “composed of several processes that actively generate and sustain an identity under precarious circumstances” (15).”
Ecology as oikology – reflections on science and worldview
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Rule-Following, Meaning Constitution, and Enaction
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“Therefore neither internalism nor externalism will be satisfying (Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundMind in Nature, Nature in Mind: A Reply to Ule
Vörös, S. (2015) · Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems · doi:10.7906/indecs.13.4.3 · Cited by 1
Root-Brains: The Frontiers of Cognition in the Light of John Dewey’s Philosophy of Nature
Madzia, R. (2017) · Contemporary Pragmatism · doi:10.1163/18758185-01401006 · Cited by 1
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Metadata
- Authors
- Di Paolo, E.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2008-12-18
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9-21
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W3188690837
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 7.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Topoi (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- extended mind, enactivism, autopoiesis, internalism, relational cognition, autonomy, individuality, mediation, agency, definition of cognition
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.