The Primacy of Skilled Intentionality: on Hutto & Satne’s the Natural Origins of Content
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Following a brief reconstruction of Hutto & Satne's paper we focus our critical comments on two issues. First we take up H&S's claim that a non-representational form of ur-intentionality exists that performs essential work in setting the scene for content-involving forms of intentionality. We will take issue with the characterisation that H&S give of this non-representational form of intentionality. Part of our commentary will therefore be aimed at motivating an alternative account of how there can be intentionality without mental content, which we have called skilled intentionality. Skilled intentionality is the individual's selective openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances. A second issue we take up concerns the distinction between ur-intentionality and content-involving intentionality. We will argue that our notion of skilled intentionality as it is found in humans cuts across these two categories. Instead of distinguishing between different forms of intentionality we recommend focusing on how skilled intentionality takes different forms in different forms of life.
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Cited by
Ramstead, M. J. D., Veissière, S. P. L., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01090 · Cited by 422
“See also Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015) for a complementary account of minimal intentionality as a contentless form of skilled intentionality.”
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“We call this the tendency towards an optimal grip on the situation, which we take to be a basic concern of every living animal (Rietveld 2008a; Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationEcological cognition: expert decision-making behaviour in sport
Araújo, D., Hristovski, R., Seifert, L., Carvalho, J., & Davids, K. (2019) · International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology · doi:10.1080/1750984x.2017.1349826 · Cited by 254
Optimal Grip on Affordances in Architectural Design Practices: An Ethnography
Rietveld, E., & Brouwers, A. A. (2017) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9475-x · Cited by 77
“…Skilled Intentionality Framework, we can avoid the problematic dichotomy between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ cognition (Rietveld 2013; Rietveld et al. 2013; Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014, figure 1; Kiverstein and Rietveld 2015; Rietveld et al. forthcoming; cf. Sutton 2007; Geeves et al. 2010; Noë 2012).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E.
- Venue
- Philosophia
- Published
- 2015-09
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 701-721
- ISSN
- 0048-3893 (ISSN-L)
- 1574-9274
- OpenAlex
- W2268898800
- Cited by
- 71
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 3.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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