The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This has been shown theoretically (Kreps et al. 1982) and experimentally (Gächter and Falk, forthcoming).”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Kreps et al. 1982
Citations
Cites
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,043
Self-citationPredation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,851
Self-citationThe Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
Axelrod, R. (1981) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961366 · Cited by 968
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
Smale, S. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911925 · Cited by 148
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- D. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential equilibrium, Econometrica, in press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 301–400 of 1,003
Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Komorita, S. S., Hilty, J. A., & Parks, C. D. (1991) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002791035003005 · Cited by 110
Sustainable reputations with rating systems
Ekmekci, M. (2011) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.015 · Cited by 109
Ansell, C. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199251789.003.0006 · Cited by 111
Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments
Murnighan, J. K., Oesch, J. M., & Pillutla, M. M. (2001) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0847 · Cited by 108
Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economyPreprint
Ciccone, A. (2003) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 108
Building Social Capital Through MicroFinance
Feigenberg, B., Field, E., & Pande, R. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16018 · Cited by 108
Borzaga, C., & Depedri, S. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.007 · Cited by 113
Whinston, M. D. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555458 · Cited by 106
Gallouj, C. (1997) · International Journal of Service Industry Management · doi:10.1108/09564239710161079 · Cited by 106
Lifting the veil of ignorance: An experiment on the contagiousness of norm violations
Diekmann, A., Przepiorka, W., & Rauhut, H. (2015) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463115593109 · Cited by 105
Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment
Bochet, O., & Putterman, L. G. (2008) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.005 · Cited by 106
What motivates common pool resource users? Experimental evidence from the field
Vélez, M. A., Stranlund, J. K., & Murphy, J. J. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.008 · Cited by 116
Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market InteractionsPreprint
Brown, M., Falk, A., & Fehr, E. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.459587 · Cited by 103
Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas.
Weber, J. M., & Murnighan, J. K. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0012454 · Cited by 104
The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Reputation Systems
Dellarocas, C. N. (2001) · Cited by 102
Fairness in the Labour Market - A Survey of Experimental Results
Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2002) · Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) · doi:10.5167/uzh-52014 · Cited by 104
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry, and EfficiencyPreprint
Page, T., Putterman, L. G., & Unel, B. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.314705 · Cited by 102
Can Trustworthiness in a Supply Chain Be Signaled?
Beer, R., Ahn, H., & Leider, S. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2817 · Cited by 106
Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes
Potters, J., & Suetens, S. (2006) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00548.x · Cited by 101
Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games
Kalai, E. (1990) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-370182-4.50010-6 · Cited by 101
Path dependence in economic processes: implications for policy analysis in dynamical system contexts
David, P. A. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511492297.006 · Cited by 100
Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment
Harrison, G. W., & McCabe, K. (1996) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf02425260 · Cited by 100
Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion
Lichbach, M. I. (1994) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463194006001003 · Cited by 99
Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An Experimental Study
Rice, S. C. (2011) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1110.0362 · Cited by 99
Convention et Common knowledge
Dupuy, J. (1989) · Revue économique · doi:10.2307/3502118 · Cited by 99
James Andreoni, A., & Samuelson, L. (2005) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.09.002 · Cited by 98
Disclosing conflicts of interest – Do experience and reputation matter?
Koch, C. W., & Schmidt, C. (2009) · Accounting Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2009.05.001 · Cited by 97
Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 97
Self-citationBargaining with Imperfect Commitment
Kambe, S. (1999) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0700 · Cited by 97
Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods
Botelho, A., Harrison, G. W., Pinto, L. M. C., & Rutström, E. E. (2008) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.013 · Cited by 96
Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study
Cochard, F., Willinger, M., & Xepapadeas, A. (2005) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-004-5986-y · Cited by 96
Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment
Sergiu Hart, A., Kremer, I., & Perry, M. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20150913 · Cited by 96
Ettinger, D., & Jéhiel, P. (2010) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.2.1.1 · Cited by 95
On a Source of Social Capital: Gift Exchange
Dolfsma, W. A., van der Eijk, R., & Jolink, A. (2008) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-008-0002-z · Cited by 98
Organizational Economics: An Impending Revolution in Organization Theory?
Hesterly, W. S., Liebeskind, J. P., & Zenger, T. R. (1990) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1990.4308822 · Cited by 110
Corporate governance in Scandinavia: comparing networks and formal institutions
Sinani, E., Stafsudd, A., Thomsen, S., Edling, C., & Randøy, T. (2008) · European Management Review · doi:10.1057/emr.2008.1 · Cited by 94
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time
Bigoni, M., Casari, M., Skrzypacz, A., & Spagnolo, G. (2011) · Econometrica · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1961025 · Cited by 94
The Evolution of Strong ReciprocityPreprint
Bowles, S. (2021) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.7275/1072044 · Cited by 94
Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
Burton-Chellew, M. N., Nax, H. H., & West, S. A. (2015) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.2678 · Cited by 63
Gender, Strategies, and Contributions to Public Goods
Sell, J. A. (1997) · Social Psychology Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2787085 · Cited by 93
Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Hauk, E., & Nagel, R. (2001) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002701045006004 · Cited by 93
Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems
Elinor Ostrom, B. (1989) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463189001001004 · Cited by 92
Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept
Halpern, J. Y., & Pass, R. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.012 · Cited by 92
Supply Auctions and Relational Contracts for Procurement
Tunca, T. I., & Zenios, S. A. (2006) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1060.0097 · Cited by 92
Breeding hybrid strategies: optimal behaviour for oligopolists
Marks, R. E. (1992) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01196459 · Cited by 92
Risk and Temptation: A Meta‐study on Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Mengel, F. (2017) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12548 · Cited by 91
A Dynamic Level-k Model in Sequential Games
Ho, T., & Su, X. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1645 · Cited by 91
Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing
Edlin, A. S. (2002) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/797567 · Cited by 91
Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games
Rigdon, M. L., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. S. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02075.x · Cited by 90
Trust and reciprocity with transparency and repeated interactions
Kanagaretnam, K., Mestelman, S., Nainar, S. M. K., & Shehata, M. (2009) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.03.007 · Cited by 90
Something to prove: reputation in teams
Bar‐Isaac, H. (2007) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00080.x · Cited by 85
Strategic reward and altruistic punishment support cooperation in a public goods game experiment
Choi, J.-K., & Ahn, T. K. (2013) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.01.001 · Cited by 89
Grounded Symbolic Communication between Heterogeneous Cooperating Robots
Jung, D., & Zelinsky, A. (2000) · Autonomous Robots · doi:10.1023/a:1008929609573 · Cited by 89
Is sovereign policymaking bad?
Canzoneri, M. B., & Henderson, D. W. (1988) · Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy · doi:10.1016/0167-2231(88)90021-8 · Cited by 89
Punishment and Counter-Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Still Govern Ourselves?Preprint
Nikiforakis, N. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.764185 · Cited by 102
James Andreoni, A., Harbaugh, W. T., & Vesterlund, L. (2010) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230280786_2 · Cited by 92
Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test
Beard, T. R., & Beil, R. O. (1994) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.40.2.252 · Cited by 88
Customary law as a social contract: International commercial law
Benson, B. L. (1992) · Constitutional Political Economy · doi:10.1007/bf02393230 · Cited by 88
Binmore, K. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0098 · Cited by 88
Extraversion, neuroticism, and the prisoner’s dilemma
Hirsh, J. B., & Peterson, J. B. (2008) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2008.10.006 · Cited by 95
Reciprocity: An Economics of Social Relations
Kolm, S. (2008) · Cited by 87
When Trust Matters: Explaining Differences in Voter Turnout
Cox, M. (2003) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00444 · Cited by 86
An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles
Powell, B., & Wilson, B. J. (2007) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.011 · Cited by 86
Salvato, C., Reuer, J. J., & Battigalli, P. (2017) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2014.0001 · Cited by 86
Evolving continuous behaviors in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Harrald, P. G., & Fogel, D. B. (1996) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/0303-2647(95)01550-7 · Cited by 86
Individual differences and social norms: the distinction between reciprocators and prosocials
Perugini, M., & Gallucci, M. (2001) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.419 · Cited by 86
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
Halpern, J. Y., & Rêgo, L. C. (2012) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.002 · Cited by 84
Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information
Campbell, D. E. (1995) · Cited by 84
Ripoffs, Lemons, and Reputation Formation in Agency Relationships: A Laboratory Market Study
DeJong, D. V., FORSYTHE, R., & Lundholm, R. J. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05006.x · Cited by 84
Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment
Corazzini, L., Cotton, C. S., & Valbonesi, P. (2015) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.005 · Cited by 83
Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments
Ambrus, A., & Pathak, P. A. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.016 · Cited by 83
Chapter 13 Reputation Mechanisms
Dellarocas, C. N. (2006) · Handbooks in information systems · doi:10.1016/s1574-0145(06)01013-0 · Cited by 82
Explaining the performance of state–community joint forest management in India
Behera, B. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.08.015 · Cited by 86
Selective Play: Choosing Partners in an Uncertain World
Hayashi, N., & Yamagishi, T. (1998) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0204_4 · Cited by 80
Rasmussen, L. N., & Meinzen-Dick, R. S. (1995) · AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA) · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.97520 · Cited by 82
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
Halpern, J. Y., & Rêgo, L. C. (2006) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.1145/1160633.1160765 · Cited by 81
Quantum-like dynamics of decision-making
Asano, M., Basieva, I., Khrennikov, A. Y., Ohya, M., & Tanaka, Y. (2011) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.11.042 · Cited by 81
Gulati, R., & Wang, L. O. (2004) · Research in the sociology of organizations · doi:10.1016/s0733-558x(02)20008-7 · Cited by 80
A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement
Fenn, P., & Veljanovski, C. G. (1988) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233719 · Cited by 79
China's social capital and financial performance of private enterprises
Zhang, Q., & Fung, H. (2006) · Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development · doi:10.1108/14626000610665908 · Cited by 79
Reputation and Time Consistency
Stokey, N. L. (1989) · American Economic Review · Cited by 79
Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation
Powell, R. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962402 · Cited by 78
Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Conglomerate Markets
Phillips, O. R., & Mason, C. F. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555870 · Cited by 78
Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas
Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., Myrseth, K. O. R., & Wollbrant, C. (2016) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-015-9475-7 · Cited by 79
On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties
Olivier Compte, Y., & Jéhiel, P. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00339 · Cited by 77
Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
Pothos, E. M., Perry, G., Corr, P. J., Matthew, M. R., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2010) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.002 · Cited by 76
Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a Trust Game
Ho, B. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1410 · Cited by 76
Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations
Majeski, S. J., & Fricks, S. (1995) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002795039004002 · Cited by 78
Trust at Scale: The Economic Limits of Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains
Budish, E. B. (2024) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjae033 · Cited by 80
Chapter 1 Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity
Kolm, S. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01001-3 · Cited by 75
Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments
Dovis, A., & Kirpalani, R. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20181432 · Cited by 74
Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods
Eichberger, J., & Kelsey, D. H. (2002) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2898 · Cited by 74
Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration A simple model
Garvey, G. T. (1995) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00042-9 · Cited by 74
Binmore, K. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05230145 · Cited by 73
Religion, ethnicity and cooperation: An experimental study
Chuah, S.-H., Hoffmann, R., Ramasamy, B., & Tan, J. H. W. (2014) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.07.002 · Cited by 79
Rationality and backward induction
Binmore, K. (1997) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/13501789700000002 · Cited by 72
On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity
Fehr, E., Brown, M., & Zehnder, C. (2009) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02240.x · Cited by 72
Complex Securities and Underwriter Reputation: Do Reputable Underwriters Produce Better Securities?
Griffin, J. M., Lowery, R., & Alessio Saretto, B. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu030 · Cited by 72
Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts
Witt, U. (1986) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1986.tb00770.x · Cited by 71
Self Control and Commitment: Can Decreasing the Liquidity of a Savings Account Increase Deposits?
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Harris, C., Laibson, D., Madrian, B., & Jung, S. (2015) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w21474 · Cited by 69
Metadata
- Authors
- Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1982-08
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 245-252
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123850572
- Cited by
- 2,494
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 50 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 51 · 2019: 81 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 86 · 2014: 79 · 2013: 90 · 2012: 125
- FWCI
- 23.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- finitely repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, incomplete information, commitment, tit-for-tat, Nash equilibrium, bounded rationality
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review