The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This has been shown theoretically (Kreps et al. 1982) and experimentally (Gächter and Falk, forthcoming).”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Kreps et al. 1982
Citations
Cites
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,043
Self-citationPredation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,851
Self-citationThe Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
Axelrod, R. (1981) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961366 · Cited by 968
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
Smale, S. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911925 · Cited by 148
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- D. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential equilibrium, Econometrica, in press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 801–900 of 1,003
On the computational complexity of ethics: moral tractability for minds and machines
Stenseke, J. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence Review · doi:10.1007/s10462-024-10732-3 · Cited by 34
Santos, J. I., Pereda, M., Zurro, D., Álvarez, M., Caro, J., Galán, J. M., & Godino, I. B. I. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888 · Cited by 23
Is there a Spirit of Overseas Chinese Capitalism?
Chuah, S., Hoffmann, R. F., Ramasamy, B., & Tan, J. H. W. (2016) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-016-9746-5 · Cited by 21
Institutional Analysis of Neighborhood Collective Action
Craw, M. (2016) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12707 · Cited by 21
Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Krockow, E. M. (2018) · Acta Psychologica · doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2018.04.014 · Cited by 21
The Effect of Market and Nonmarket Competition on Firm and Industry Corporate Social Responsibility
Hawn, O. V., & Kang, H. (2018) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/s0742-332220180000038017 · Cited by 21
Liu, Q., & Li, L. (2019) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph16234777 · Cited by 21
Living Up to Expectations: Corporate Reputation and Persistence of Firm Performance
Cabral, L. (2015) · Strategy Science · doi:10.1287/stsc.2015.0002 · Cited by 23
Chiesa, V., & Manzini, R. (1998) · International Journal of Technology Management · doi:10.1504/ijtm.1998.002597 · Cited by 21
Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
Harrington, J. E., & Zhao, W. (2012) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.005 · Cited by 21
Kagel, J. H. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.009 · Cited by 21
Nair, A., Blome, C., Choi, T. Y., & Lee, G. (2018) · Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management · doi:10.1016/j.pursup.2017.11.006 · Cited by 22
Théorie des jeux et genèse des institutions
Walliser, B. (1989) · Recherches économiques de Louvain · doi:10.1017/s0770451800029705 · Cited by 21
Advice, Trust, and Gossip Among Artificial Agents
Prietula, M. J. (2000) · Cited by 22
A characterisation of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
Harris, C. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90032-8 · Cited by 21
Time and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Mor, Y., & Rosenschein, J. S. (2007) · Open Research Online (The Open University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cs/0701139 · Cited by 21
Betrand, S., My, K. B., & Verchère, A. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 21
Contractual incompleteness and the nature of market interactionsPreprint
Brown, M., Falk, A., & Fehr, E. (2002) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-004373395 · Cited by 21
Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems - Theory and Implications for ReformsPreprint
Berndt, M. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.255886 · Cited by 21
Limited Records and ReputationPreprint
Liu, Q., & Skrzypacz, A. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1435096 · Cited by 21
Does Auctioning of Entry Licenses Affect Consumer Prices?: An Experimental StudyPreprint
Offerman, T., & Potters, J. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.246966 · Cited by 21
Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market InteractionsPreprint
Brown, M., Falk, A., & Fehr, E. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.305707 · Cited by 21
Civic engagement, the leverage effect and the accountable state
Kamei, K., Putterman, L. G., & Tyran, J. (2023) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104466 · Cited by 20
Bargaining Power in Electronic Negotiations: A Bilateral Negotiation Mechanism
Buettner, R., & Kirn, S. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85717-4_10 · Cited by 20
Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons
Isaksen, E. T., Brekke, K. A., & Richter, A. P. (2018) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.005 · Cited by 20
Hatak, I. R., Fink, M., & Frank, H. (2014) · Review of Managerial Science · doi:10.1007/s11846-014-0127-7 · Cited by 20
Kartal, M., & Müller, W. (2018) · Quantitative Economics · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3222964 · Cited by 21
Welfare impacts of the 1996 United States - Canada softwood lumber agreement: an update
Zhang, D. (2006) · Canadian Journal of Forest Research · doi:10.1139/x05-231 · Cited by 20
Can Adequate Child Support Be Legislated? Responses to Guidelines and Enforcement
Argys, L. M., & Peters, H. E. (2003) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1093/ei/cbg021 · Cited by 20
Does players’ identification affect trust and reciprocity in the lab?
Dubois, D., Willinger, M., & Blayac, T. (2011) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.09.012 · Cited by 18
Reciprocity, social ties, and competition in markets for experience goods
Huck, S., & Tyran, J. (2006) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.051 · Cited by 20
Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
Levin, D., & Zhang, L. (2017) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00990 · Cited by 20
Shogren, J. F. (2006) · American Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00926.x · Cited by 19
TIME CONSISTENCY IN ALTERNATING-MOVE POLICY GAMES*
Cho, I., & Matsui, A. (2005) · Japanese Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00326.x · Cited by 20
Stickiness of Rental Rates and Developers’ Option Exercise Strategies
Lai, R. N., Wang, K., & Yang, J. (2007) · The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics · doi:10.1007/s11146-007-9004-3 · Cited by 20
Aspiration-Based and Reciprocity-Based Rules in Learning Dynamics for Symmetric Normal-Form Games
Stahl, D. O., & Haruvy, E. E. (2002) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1006/jmps.2001.1409 · Cited by 20
Competition and Well-BeingPreprint
Brandts, J., Riedl, A. M., & van Winden, F. A. A. M. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.548222 · Cited by 20
Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990-1999Preprint
Igami, M., & Sugaya, T. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2889837 · Cited by 20
Centrality and cooperation in networks
van Leeuwen, B., Ramalingam, A., Arjona, D. R., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2018) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1 · Cited by 19
Li, H., Su, L., Zuo, J., Zhao, X., Chang, R., & Wang, F. (2022) · International Journal of Strategic Property Management · doi:10.3846/ijspm.2022.15969 · Cited by 19
Trust-Your-Doctor: A Simple Heuristic in Need of a Proper Social Environment
Wegwarth, O., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388435.003.0003 · Cited by 20
Urban Economic Policy Networks in Britain and France; A Sociometric Approach
John, P. C. (1998) · Environment and Planning C Government and Policy · doi:10.1068/c160307 · Cited by 19
Executive Board Member Financial Expertise and IPO Performance
Ettredge, M., Li, C., Qian, W., & Xu, Y. (2020) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/horizons-18-020 · Cited by 19
The Effects of Experience on Deception in Human-Agent Negotiation
Mell, J., Lucas, G., Mozgai, S., & Gratch, J. S. (2020) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.1.11924 · Cited by 19
The Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. M. (2000) · Cited by 19
Identity changes and the efficiency of reputation systems
Wibral, M. (2014) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9410-3 · Cited by 19
The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment
Yang, C.-L., Yue, C.-S. J., & Yu, I. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9139-8 · Cited by 19
The Effects of Management Demography on Auditor Choice and Earnings Quality: Evidence from China
Cheng, L. T. W., & Leung, T. Y. (2012) · Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies · doi:10.1142/s0219091511500093 · Cited by 19
The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game
Lunawat, R. (2012) · European Accounting Review · doi:10.1080/09638180.2012.748256 · Cited by 19
Bilancini, E., & Boncinelli, L. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.002 · Cited by 19
Best neighbor strategy to enforce cooperation among selfish nodes in wireless ad hoc network
Komathy, K., & Narayanasamy, P. (2007) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2007.07.004 · Cited by 19
Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
Heifetz, A., & Kets, W. (2018) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te2098 · Cited by 19
Simple Heuristics: The Foundations of Adaptive Social Behavior
Hertwig, R., & Hoffrage, U. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388435.003.0001 · Cited by 20
Should you compete or cooperate with your schoolmates?
Bratti, M., Daniele Checchi, A., & Filippin, A. (2011) · Education Economics · doi:10.1080/09645292.2011.585021 · Cited by 19
Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation
Amann, E., & Yang, C.-L. (1998) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00078-x · Cited by 19
Explaining competitive practices in the bus industry: the British experience
Preston, J. (1991) · Transportation Planning and Technology · doi:10.1080/03081069108717459 · Cited by 19
Overgaard, P. B. (1993) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(93)90035-s · Cited by 19
Unions and Cooperative Behavior: The Effect of Discounting
Kahn, L. M. (1993) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298311 · Cited by 19
Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination
Basu, K. (1987) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(87)90028-0 · Cited by 19
Game Theory and the History of Ideas about Rationality: An Introductory Survey
Cudd, A. E. (1993) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100005137 · Cited by 19
Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
Jurca, R., & Faltings, B. V. (2004) · doi:10.1109/wi.2004.62 · Cited by 19
How to Learn Sociality: True and False Solutions to Mandeville's Problem
Bianchi, M. (1993) · History of Political Economy · doi:10.1215/00182702-25-2-209 · Cited by 19
Cooperation Through DelegationPreprint
Fershtman, C. (1987) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 19
Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary ContributionsPreprint
Figuières, C., David Masclet, B., & Willinger, M. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1752249 · Cited by 21
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive MarketsPreprint
Schmidt, K. M., Spann, M., & Zeithammer, R. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2191934 · Cited by 19
Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments
Dovis, A., & Kirpalani, R. (2017) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w23942 · Cited by 19
Can comment letters impact excess perks? Evidence from China
Hong, Y., & Yao, Y.-F. (2023) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102943 · Cited by 15
Ambiguity and Public Good Provision in Large Societies
BAILEY, R. W., Eichberger, J., & Kelsey, D. H. (2005) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00242.x · Cited by 18
Predicting human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma using case-based decision theory
Guilfoos, T., & Pape, A. (2015) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-015-9495-y · Cited by 18
Strategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models from Logical Formulas
Ghosh, S., Meijering, B., & Verbrugge, R. (2014) · Journal of Logic Language and Information · doi:10.1007/s10849-014-9196-x · Cited by 17
Chakravarty, S., Fonseca, M. A., Ghosh, S., & Marjit, S. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164708 · Cited by 18
On the Effect of Incentive Schemes on Trust and Trustworthiness
Harbring, C. (2010) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE · doi:10.1628/093245610793524938 · Cited by 18
Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games--an Unrefinable Folk Theorem
Weinstein, J., & Yıldız, M. (2012) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rds027 · Cited by 18
Boosting trust by facilitating communication: A model of trustee investments in information sharing
Frey, V. (2017) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463117734171 · Cited by 18
Secure Information Sharing in Adversarial Adaptive Diffusion Networks
Ντέμος, Κ., Plata-Chaves, J., Kolokotronis, N., Kalouptsidis, N., & Moonen, M. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks · doi:10.1109/tsipn.2017.2787910 · Cited by 18
The Effects of Industry-Wide Price Regulation on Industrial Organization
Daughety, A. F., & Forsythe, R. S. (1987) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036937 · Cited by 18
THE COMPLEXITY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY
Elinor Ostrom, B. (2005) · Cited by 17
Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory
Crawford, V. P. (1985) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002785029002003 · Cited by 18
Not Just Babble: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment with Iterative Numerical MessagesPreprint
Putterman, L. G., & Bochet, O. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.724244 · Cited by 18
Rational Choice Theory in Sociology
Buskens, V. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.32177-8 · Cited by 18
The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
Powell, R. (1994) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-2790-9_7 · Cited by 17
Balancing nanotoxicity and returns in health applications: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Gkika, D. A., Magafas, L., Cool, P., & Braet, J. (2017) · Toxicology · doi:10.1016/j.tox.2017.11.008 · Cited by 17
Economic theories and their Dueling interpretations
Gilboa, I., Postlewaite, A., Samuelson, L., & Schmeidler, D. (2022) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2022.2142270 · Cited by 17
Beyond a binary theorizing of prosociality
Shen, C., He, Z., Guo, H., Hu, S., Tanimoto, J., Ши, Л., & Holme, P. (2024) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2412195121 · Cited by 18
Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma
Cox, C. A., Jones, M. T., Pflum, K. E., & Healy, P. J. (2015) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1 · Cited by 17
Building a Reputation under Frequent Decisions
Faingold, E. D. (2008) · Cited by 17
Barreda‐Tarrazona, I., Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A., Pavan, M., & Sabater‐Grande, G. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00596 · Cited by 21
Ethics, Bounded Rationality, and IP Sharing in IT Outsourcing
Anand, K. S., & Goyal, M. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3190 · Cited by 17
Kimbrough, E. O., & Rubin, J. (2015) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewu019 · Cited by 17
When Negotiations Become Routine: Not Reinventing the Wheel While Thinking Outside the Box
Kesting, P., & Smolinski, R. (2007) · Negotiation Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2007.00153.x · Cited by 17
Achieving greater cooperation in a noisy prisoner’s dilemma: an experimental investigation
Sainty, B. J. (1999) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00049-9 · Cited by 17
Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners' Dilemma
Burton-Chellew, M. N., & West, S. A. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344 · Cited by 17
Relational Contracting and Lean Construction
Ballard, G., & Howell, G. A. (2005) · Cited by 17
Magical thinking: A representation result
Daley, B., & Sadowski, P. (2017) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te2099 · Cited by 17
Halevy, N. (2016) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2016.03.001 · Cited by 16
Behera, B., & Mishra, P. (2018) · Water Economics and Policy · doi:10.1142/s2382624x18500108 · Cited by 17
Conditional cooperation with negative externalities – An experiment
Engel, C., & Zhurakhovska, L. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.005 · Cited by 17
Learning by (limited) forward looking players
Mengela, R. (2014) · Cited by 17
Fundamental Arbitrage under the Microscope: Evidence from Detailed Hedge Fund Transaction Data
von Beschwitz, B., Lunghi, S., & Schmidt, D. M. (2021) · The Review of Asset Pricing Studies · doi:10.1093/rapstu/raab013 · Cited by 17
What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels?
Mason, C. F., & Polasky, S. (2005) · Resource and Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2005.04.003 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1982-08
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 245-252
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123850572
- Cited by
- 2,494
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 50 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 51 · 2019: 81 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 86 · 2014: 79 · 2013: 90 · 2012: 125
- FWCI
- 23.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- finitely repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, incomplete information, commitment, tit-for-tat, Nash equilibrium, bounded rationality
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
