The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This has been shown theoretically (Kreps et al. 1982) and experimentally (Gächter and Falk, forthcoming).”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Kreps et al. 1982
Citations
Cites
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,043
Self-citationPredation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,851
Self-citationThe Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
Axelrod, R. (1981) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961366 · Cited by 968
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
Smale, S. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911925 · Cited by 148
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- D. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential equilibrium, Econometrica, in press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 1,001–1,003 of 1,003
Reischmann, A., & Oechssler, J. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.009 · Cited by 12
Bridging the Trust Gap in Electronic Markets: A Strategic Framework for Empirical Study
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · Applied Optimization · doi:10.1007/0-387-23392-x_7 · Cited by 11
A study of dynamic information display and decision-making in abstract trust games
Schaffer, J., O’Donovan, J., Marusich, L., Yu, M., Gonzalez, C., & Höllerer, T. (2018) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.01.002 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1982-08
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 245-252
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123850572
- Cited by
- 2,494
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 50 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 51 · 2019: 81 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 86 · 2014: 79 · 2013: 90 · 2012: 125
- FWCI
- 23.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- finitely repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, incomplete information, commitment, tit-for-tat, Nash equilibrium, bounded rationality
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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