Evolution of cooperation by the introduction of the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
Open accessAbstract
There are two types of costly punishment, i.e. peer-punishment and pool-punishment. While peer-punishment applies direct face to face punishment, pool-punishment is based on multi-point, collective interaction among group members. Regarding those two types of costly punishment, peer-punishment is especially considered to have the flaws that it lowers the average payoff of all players as well as pool-punishment does and facilitates antisocial behaviour like retaliation of a defector on a cooperator. Here, this study proposes the new peer-punishment that punishment to an opponent player works at high probability when an opponent one is uncooperative and the difference of payoff between a player and an opponent one becomes large in order to prevent such antisocial behaviour. It is natural to think that players of high payoff do not expect to punish others of lower payoff because they do not have any complaints regarding their economic wealth. The author shows that the introduction of the proposed peer-punishment increases both the number of cooperative players and the average payoff of all players in various types of topology of connections between players.
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Altruistic punishment is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible.
“However, this solution is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible and when social interactions are noisy.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [35]
The Abstract (page unavailable) reports that ordinary peer-punishment can facilitate antisocial retaliation, supporting a concern about counter-punishment. The Discussion (page unavailable) mentions incorrectly reported actions, but does not say altruistic punishment is ineffective when interactions are noisy; it also reports that the paper’s proposed punishment promotes cooperation despite the retaliation concern. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAltruistic punishment is ineffective when social interactions are noisy.
“However, this solution is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible and when social interactions are noisy.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [35]
The Abstract (page unavailable) reports that peer-punishment can facilitate antisocial retaliation and that a punishment mechanism works best when ambiguities in identifying defectors are small. It does not say altruistic punishment is ineffective when social interactions are noisy; the Discussion (page unavailable) also describes a form of punishment that is effective when actions are occasionally reported incorrectly. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPunishment-based mechanisms only solve the free-rider problem under restrictive conditions.
“Unfortunately, numerous studies have shown that punishment-based mechanisms only solve the free-rider problem under restrictive conditions34–38.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [35]
The Abstract (page unavailable) describes limitations of conventional costly punishment, including reduced average payoffs and antisocial behaviour. But the Results and Discussion report that this paper’s proposed punishment mechanism increased cooperation across various network topologies. The source therefore supports the concern about some punishment mechanisms, not the unqualified claim that such mechanisms work only under restrictive conditions. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPool punishment is ineffective when the cost of maintaining central authority outweighs the benefits of cooperation.
“Specifically, pool punishment is ineffective when the cost of maintaining central authority outweighs the benefits of cooperation.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [35]
The Abstract says pool punishment can lower average payoff and discusses its efficiency in maintaining socially advantageous states. Neither the supplied passages nor searches for central-authority costs and the claimed cost–benefit condition say that pool punishment becomes ineffective when those costs outweigh the benefits of cooperation. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
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- Authors
- Ohdaira, T.
- Affiliations
- Aoyama Gakuin University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Ohdaira, Tetsushi
- ORCID
- Ohdaira, Tetsushi
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2016-05-05
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 25413-25413
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4857114
- OpenAlex
- W2345710231
- Cited by
- 26
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 7.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, peer punishment, antisocial behavior, retaliation, network topology
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Peer Group, Probability, Punishment
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