The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity and reference frame for body ownership.
Abstract
When subjects view stimulation of a rubber hand while feeling congruent stimulation of their own hand, they may come to feel that the rubber hand is part of their own body. This illusion of body ownership is termed 'Rubber Hand Illusion' (RHI). We investigated sensitivity of RHI to spatial mismatches between visual and somatic experience. We compared the effects of spatial mismatch between the stimulation of the two hands, and equivalent mismatches between the postures of the two hands. We created the mismatch either by adjusting stimulation or posture of the subject's hand, or, in a separate group of subjects, by adjusting stimulation or posture of the rubber hand. The matching processes underlying body ownership were asymmetrical. The illusion survived small changes in the subject's hand posture, but disappeared when the same posture transformations were applied to the rubber hand. Mismatch between the stimulation delivered to the subject's hand and the rubber hand abolished the illusion. The combination of these two situations is of particular interest. When the subject's hand posture was slightly different from the rubber hand posture, the RHI remained as long as stimulation of the two hands was congruent in a hand-centred spatial reference frame, even though the altered posture of the subject's hand meant that stimulation was incongruent in external space. Conversely, the RHI was reduced when the stimulation was incongruent in hand-centred space but congruent in external space. We conclude that the visual-tactile correlation that causes the RHI is computed within a hand-centred frame of reference, which is updated with changes in body posture. Current sensory evidence about what is 'me' is interpreted with respect to a prior mental body representation.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This suggests that the temporal and spatial patterns of visual and somatosensory signals play an important role in how we come to experience that a limb is part of our own body [5], [7], [18], [19].”
From If I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping (2008) · cites this paper as [18]
In the citing paper
“The reason for this probably relates to the fact that central processing of multisensory signals from the body operates in egocentric reference frames [18], [30], [32], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43] which presupposes the first person perspective.”
From If I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping (2008) · cites this paper as [18]
In the citing paper
“Generally the induction of ownership illusions requires multisensory stimulation with the same spatiotemporal pattern on the real and fake body part [7], [14].”
From Extending body space in immersive virtual reality: a very long arm illusion (2012) · cites this paper as [14]
Citations
Cites
Information theory, inference, and learning algorithms
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-5949 · Cited by 6,536
Information Theory, Inference, and Learning Algorithms
(2004) · Kybernetes · doi:10.1108/03684920410534506 · Cited by 4,937
Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion
Ernst, M. O., & Banks, M. S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415429a · Cited by 4,844
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410
Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates
Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. (1977) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.198.4312.75 · Cited by 3,277
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881
Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning
Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02169 · Cited by 2,004
The Image and Appearance of the Human Body: Studies in the Constructive Energies of the Psyche
Schilder, P. (1936) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/00005053-193602000-00051 · Cited by 1,657
That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb
Ehrsson, H. H., Spence, C., & Passingham, R. E. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1097011 · Cited by 1,348
The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.80 · Cited by 1,328
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Gallagher, 1995, Body schema and body image in a deafferented subject, Journal of Mind and Behaviour, 16, 369
- Paillard, J. (1999). Body schema and body image - a double dissociation in deafferented patients. In G. N. Gantchev, S. Mori, & J. Massion (Eds.), Motor Control, Today and Tomorrow (pp. 197–214).
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Sense of Embodiment in Virtual Reality
Kilteni, K., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2012) · PRESENCE Virtual and Augmented Reality · doi:10.1162/pres_a_00124 · Cited by 1,901
My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership.
Tsakiris, M. (2010) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.034 · Cited by 1,069
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.004 · Cited by 956
Self-citationIf I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping
Petkova, V. I., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2008) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832 · Cited by 953
Behavioral, Neural, and Computational Principles of Bodily Self-Consciousness
Blanke, O., Slater, M., & Serino, A. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.029 · Cited by 698
Metadata
- Authors
- Costantini, M., & Haggard, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Chieti-Pescara (IT)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Costantini, Marcello
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-06
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 229-240
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1972961786
- Semantic Scholar
- 3c725335fe6d65f0c68391d1f50e92a175d15e86
- Cited by
- 489
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 35 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 42 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 21
- FWCI
- 29.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Multisensory perception and integration
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Tactile and Sensory Interactions
- Keywords
- rubber hand illusion, body ownership, body schema, spatial mismatch, posture, multisensory integration, self-representation, body image
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Body Image, Discrimination, Psychological, Ego, Female, Hand, Humans, Illusions, Male, Models, Psychological, Posture, Proprioception, Space Perception, Touch
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
