If I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping
Open accessAbstract
The concept of an individual swapping his or her body with that of another person has captured the imagination of writers and artists for decades. Although this topic has not been the subject of investigation in science, it exemplifies the fundamental question of why we have an ongoing experience of being located inside our bodies. Here we report a perceptual illusion of body-swapping that addresses directly this issue. Manipulation of the visual perspective, in combination with the receipt of correlated multisensory information from the body was sufficient to trigger the illusion that another person's body or an artificial body was one's own. This effect was so strong that people could experience being in another person's body when facing their own body and shaking hands with it. Our results are of fundamental importance because they identify the perceptual processes that produce the feeling of ownership of one's body.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation from a first-person perspective can make healthy volunteers experience a mannequin’s body, or another person’s body, as their own. The illusion is strong enough that participants can face their own body and shake hands with it while feeling located in the other body.
Key findings
- In Experiment 1, synchronous stroking of a mannequin’s abdomen produced questionnaire evidence of whole-body ownership; illusion statements differed significantly between synchronous and asynchronous conditions (p = .000, F(1, 95) = 107.508), while asynchronous controls showed no such illusory perceptions (p = .703, F(1, 223) = 1.513).
- Threat-evoked skin conductance responses (SCRs) provided physiological evidence: threatening the mannequin with a knife in the synchronous condition elicited greater SCR than control conditions (N = 10, p = .009, Z = −2.599; p = .028, Z = −2.191), and ownership generalised from stimulated hands or abdomen to the whole body (N = 13, p = .011, Z = −2.511 and p = .033, Z = −2.132).
- Only human-like bodies were owned: SCR was stronger when the mannequin was threatened in the synchronous condition than when a same-sized rectangular object was threatened after synchronous stimulation (N = 12, p = .008); synchronous vs asynchronous stimulation mattered for the mannequin (p = .04) but not for the rectangular object (p = .819).
- In Experiment 5, participants facing their own body while shaking hands with the experimenter experienced the experimenter’s body as their own; SCR was greater when the experimenter’s wrist was threatened than when the participant’s own hand was threatened in the synchronous condition (N = 20, p = .0002, Z = −3.099), with no such difference in the asynchronous condition (p = .737) and a significant Hand × Condition interaction (p = .001, F(1, 19) = 17.083). Gender and body-shape differences were not significant (Experiment 1: N = 32, p = .613, F(1, 223) = .257; pooled SCR: p = .952, F = .004).
Methods
- Five experiments used separate groups of naïve healthy volunteers: Experiment 1, N = 32 (16 females, mean age 25 ± 6 years); Experiment 2, N = 10 (2 females, 25 ± 4); Experiment 3, N = 13 (8 females, 27 ± 6.5); Experiment 4, N = 12 (4 females, 29 ± 6); Experiment 5, N = 20 (13 females, 27 ± 6.5). The studies were approved by the local Ethical Committee of Karolinska Institute.
- Participants wore head-mounted displays connected to CCTV cameras mounted on a mannequin or the experimenter’s head to provide a first-person visual perspective. Experiments compared synchronous versus asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (stroking the abdomen or hands, or hand squeezing) and measured threat-evoked SCRs using a Biopac MP150 system with electrodes on the left index and middle fingers.
- Questionnaire ratings used a seven-point Likert scale. SCR was analysed as the peak conductance change up to 5 seconds after threat onset. Parametric tests were used for Experiments 1 and 4 (which passed normality testing), and non-parametric tests for the other experiments; alpha was set at 5%.
Limitations
- Stated limitations: Not stated in the paper.
- Evident from the text: sample sizes were small and each experiment used a separate group of healthy young adults (N = 10–32), so generalisability to clinical, older, or other populations is untested; the gender comparison pooled data from Experiments 3 and 4 to obtain sufficient males and females.
- Evident from the text: in Experiment 5, the asynchronous control did not fully abolish the illusion—several participants reported a weaker illusion, and the first-person perspective still influenced them—which the authors note likely explains the lack of SCR difference between hands in the asynchronous condition.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 57 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
Manipulation of the visual perspective, in combination with the receipt of correlated multisensory information from the body, was sufficient to trigger the illusion that another person's body or an artificial body was one's own.
“Manipulation of the visual perspective, in combination with the receipt of correlated multisensory information from the body was sufficient to trigger the illusion that another person's body or an artificial body was one's own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
People could experience being in another person's body when facing their own body and shaking hands with it.
“This effect was so strong that people could experience being in another person's body when facing their own body and shaking hands with it.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · boosted
“Particularly strong evidence for this was the counter-intuitive demonstration that one can face one's physical body and shake hands with it whilst experiencing the illusion of being within another person's body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Discussion · boosted
- Findingown data
Threat-evoked SCRs were significantly stronger in the synchronous condition with the mannequin than in the synchronous one with the rectangular object.
“The results of the data analysis revealed that the threat-evoked SCRs were significantly stronger in the synchronous condition with the mannequin than in the synchronous one with the rectangular object. (N = 12, p = .008, two-tailed t-test) (Figure 5).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Pilot experiments suggested that the illusion did not work with objects that do not resemble a human body, such as boxes, chairs and tables.
“Pilot experiments suggested that the illusion did not work with objects that do not resemble a human body, such as boxes, chairs and tables.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
SCR was significantly stronger when the knife was moved near the experimenter's wrist than when it was moved towards the participant's own hand in the synchronous condition.
“We observed significantly stronger skin conductance responses when the knife was moved near the experimenter's wrist than when it was moved towards the participant's own hand in the synchronous condition (N = 20, p = .0002, Z = −3.099, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) (Figure 7).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
Participants' sensations of tactile and muscular stimulation elicited by squeezing the hands seemed to originate from the experimenter's hand, not from their own clearly visible hand.
“Most remarkably, the participants' sensations of the tactile and muscular stimulation elicited by the squeezing of the hands seemed to originate from the experimenter's hand, and not from their own clearly visible hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The effect is so robust that, while experiencing being in another person's body, a participant can face his or her biological body and shake hands with it without breaking the illusion.
“This effect is so robust that, while experiencing being in another person's body, a participant can face his or her biological body and shake hands with it without breaking the illusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A greater SCR was registered when the experimenter's hand was threatened in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous one.
“Finally, we registered a greater SCR when the experimenter's hand was threatened in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous one (N = 20, p = 0.037, Z = −2.091, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
No such illusory perceptions were reported in the asynchronous control condition.
“No such illusory perceptions were reported in the asynchronous control condition (p = .703, F(1, 223) = 1.513, ANOVA).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire statements S1–S3 validly capture the illusory experience of being the artificial body, and S4–S7 validly control for suggestibility and task-compliance.
- Findingown data
The SCR response was also significantly stronger than the low level control condition with the spoon threat after asynchronous stimulation.
“(This response was also significantly stronger than the low level control condition with the spoon threat after asynchronous stimulation; p = .017, Z = −2.395; not shown in Figure 3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
SCR was significantly greater when the artificial body was threatened with the knife in the synchronous condition than in either of the two control conditions.
“The key observation was a significantly greater SCR when we threatened the artificial body with the knife in the synchronous condition than in either one of the two control conditions (N = 10, p = .009, Z = −2.599, p = .028, Z = −2.191, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; see Figure 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Threat-evoked SCR was significantly higher after synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of either the hands or the abdomen as compared to the asynchronous control conditions.
“The key observation was a significantly higher threat-evoked SCR after synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of either the hands or the abdomen as compared to the asynchronous control conditions (N = 13, p = 0.011, Z = −2.511 and p = 0.033, Z = −2.132, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) (Figure 4).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In six other participants, the illusion worked well when the cameras were tilted downwards so that the participant could see the torso, legs and both arms of the experimenter's body during the manual interaction.
“In six other participants we also observed that this illusion worked well when the cameras were tilted downwards so that the participant could see the torso, legs and both arms of the experimenter's body during the manual interaction.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
No such difference was observed during the asynchronous control condition.
“No such difference was observed during the asynchronous control condition, which did not elicit a vivid illusion (N = 20, p = 0.737, Z = −.336, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Responses to the three questions addressing illusory perception of owning the new body differed significantly between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions.
“The responses to the three questions, which addressed the illusory perception of owning the new body, differed significantly between the two conditions (p = .000, F(1, 95) = 107.508, GLM for repeated measurements) (Figure 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire statements S1–S3 validly capture the illusory experience of being the artificial body, and S4–S7 validly control for suggestibility and task-compliance.
- Findingown data
Several participants reported a weaker illusion in the asynchronous condition.
“It is relevant to point out here that several of the participants also reported a weaker illusion in the asynchronous condition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was no significant difference between the knife vs. spoon threat-evoked responses in the asynchronous condition.
“There was no significant difference between the knife vs. spoon threat-evoked responses in the asynchronous condition (N = 10, p = .484, Z = −.700, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, the data are not shown).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The effect of varying the timing of the seen and the felt hand movements was significant only from the first-person perspective.
“Importantly, the effect of varying the timing of the seen and the felt hand movements was significant only from the first-person perspective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The first person perspective was clearly dominant since most participants experienced being in the new body.
“The first person perspective was clearly dominant since most participants experienced being in the new body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the first experiment there was no significant difference in rating scores between male and female subjects in the synchronous illusion condition, despite only a male mannequin being used.
“In the first experiment there was no significant difference in rating scores between male and female subjects in the synchronous illusion condition, despite the fact that we only used a male mannequin (N = 32, p = .613, F(1,223) = .257, ANOVA) (Figure 8).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Threats to the 'new body' evoked greater skin conductance responses than threats to the 'old' physical one during the illusory body swapping.
“Similarly, threats to the ‘new body’ evoked greater skin conductance responses than threats to the ‘old’ physical one during the illusory body swapping.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Objective evidence for the illusion of owning an entire body was obtained by demonstrating that physical threats to the 'new' body elicited increased sweating (skin conductance responses) when people experienced the illusion.
“Objective evidence for the illusion of owning an entire body was obtained by demonstrating that physical threats to the ‘new’ body elicited increased sweating (skin conductance responses) when people experienced the illusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Correlations of visual and tactile signals coming to a single body part (the abdomen or a hand) are sufficient to cause a feeling of ownership of the entire body (whole-body ownership).
“The present data show that correlations of visual and tactile signals coming to a single body part (the abdomen or a hand) are sufficient to cause a feeling of ownership of the entire body (referred to as ‘whole-body ownership’).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was no significant difference in the illusion related SCR between males and females after threatening the new artificial body.
“We found no significant difference in the illusion related SCR between males and females (p = .952, F = .004, Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the second experiment, male and female subjects alike were able to accept the arm of the female experimenter as their own.
“Similarly, in the second experiment, male and female subjects alike were able to accept the arm of the female experimenter as their own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Visual information from the first person perspective is critical for the experience of owning a body.
“Our data also directly demonstrate that visual information from the first person perspective is critical for the experience of owning a body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The body-swap illusions worked well even though the mannequin or the other person looked different from the participant.
“The body-swap illusions worked well even though the mannequin or the other person looked different from the participant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
These experiments have demonstrated how remarkably easy it is to 'move' a human centre of awareness from one body to another.
“In conclusion, these experiments have demonstrated how remarkably easy it is to ‘move’ a human centre of awareness from one body to another.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
People with pathological conditions affecting frontal and parietal lobes can sometimes fail to recognise their limbs as belonging to themselves.
“From neurology we know that these functions can break down as people with pathological conditions affecting frontal and parietal lobes can sometimes fail to recognise their limbs as belonging to themselves [12], [13], [14].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [12] B Baier, 2008, Tight Link Between Our Sense of Limb Ownership and Self-Awareness of Actions., Stroke source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [13] M Critchley, 1953, The Parietal Lobes.
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [14] KJ Meador, 2000, Anosognosia and asomatognosia during intracarotid amobarbital inactivation., Neurology source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Temporal and spatial patterns of visual and somatosensory signals play an important role in how we come to experience that a limb is part of our own body.
“This suggests that the temporal and spatial patterns of visual and somatosensory signals play an important role in how we come to experience that a limb is part of our own body [5], [7], [18], [19].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [5] M Botvinick, 2004, Neuroscience. Probing the neural basis of body ownership., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [7] HH Ehrsson, 2004, That's My Hand! Activity in Premotor Cortex Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [18] M Costantini, 2007, The rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity and reference frame for body ownership., Consciousness and Cognition source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Damage to, or abnormal physiology of, frontal, parietal and temporal regions can be associated with feelings of being outside the body.
“Similarly, damage to, or abnormal physiology of, frontal, parietal and temporal regions can be associated with feelings of being outside the body [15], [16].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationown data
The results identify the perceptual processes that produce the feeling of ownership of one's body.
“Our results are of fundamental importance because they identify the perceptual processes that produce the feeling of ownership of one's body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
This effect probably explains the lack of difference in the SCR observed when threatening the two hands in the asynchronous condition.
“This effect probably explains the lack of difference in the SCR observed when threatening the two hands in the asynchronous condition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
People had the experience that the entire artificial body was their own body.
“These findings together with the questionnaire data and spontaneous comments made after the experiments, conclusively demonstrated that people had the experience that the entire artificial body was their own body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire statements S1–S3 validly capture the illusory experience of being the artificial body, and S4–S7 validly control for suggestibility and task-compliance.
- Premisecitation
Adoption of the first person perspective is an important factor in determining how we perceive our own body.
“Another important factor in determining how we perceive our own body is the adoption of the first person perspective [6], [20].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [6] HH Ehrsson, 2007, The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [20] 1979, The ecological approach to visual perception.
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
There is a direct relationship between the degree of anxiety evoked by threatening an artificial body part and the strength of illusory body ownership.
“This test has been used before to provide physiological evidence of body illusions [24], [25], and there is a direct relationship between the degree of anxiety evoked by threatening an artificial body part and the strength of illusory body ownership [25].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [24] KC Armel, 2003, Projecting sensations to external objects: evidence from skin conductance response., Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [25] HH Ehrsson, 2007, Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
Participants' emotional systems reacted more strongly when the new body was threatened than when their own body was under threat.
“Thus, the participants' emotional systems reacted more strongly when the new body was threatened than when their own body was under threat.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Participants' emotional systems responded as one would anticipate a person to respond were their own body being threatened.
“Thus, the participants' emotional systems responded as one would anticipate a person to respond were their own body being threatened.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
People can only experience human-like bodies as part of themselves.
“Thus, people can only experience human-like bodies as part of themselves.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The differences in SCR between synchronous and asynchronous conditions are highly specific for the illusion.
“In addition the differences in the SCR between synchronous and asynchronous conditions are highly specific for the illusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The synchronized movements of the two people squeezing each other's hands did not provide evidence in favour of either body being one's own.
“The synchronized movements of the two people squeezing each other's hands did not provide evidence in favour of either body being one's own”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
The design of the experiments, employing multiple control conditions, ruled out potentially confounding factors such as attention to unexpected sensory events, the emotional salience of the stimuli presented, or associative learning.
“The design of our experiments, employing multiple control conditions, ruled out potentially confounding factors such as attention to unexpected sensory events, the emotional salience of the stimuli presented, or associative learning (see Results for details).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The central body representation is a 'map of connected nodes' where limbs and body segments form a continuous whole.
“The central body representation is a ‘map of connected nodes’ where limbs and body segments form a continuous whole.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
A continuous match between visual and somatosensory information about the state of the body is a critical condition for eliciting the perceptual illusion.
“The critical conditions for eliciting this perceptual illusion are: (i) a continuous match between visual and somatosensory information about the state of the body; (ii) the usage of a sufficiently humanoid body; and (iii) the adoption of a first person visual perspective of the body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The effect of correlated visual and tactile events on one limb generalises to non-stimulated body parts.
“Thus the effect of correlated visual and tactile events on one limb generalises to non-stimulated body parts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
This relationship is mirrored by the activity in multisensory areas, related to ownership, and areas in the emotional system, related to anxiety and pain anticipation.
“This relationship is mirrored by the activity in multisensory areas, related to ownership, and areas in the emotional system, related to anxiety and pain anticipation [25].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [25] HH Ehrsson, 2007, Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The findings identify the perceptual processes that make us feel that we own our entire body.
“These findings are of fundamental importance because they identify the perceptual processes that make us feel that we own our entire body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The differences in threat-evoked SCR observed in response to the experimental manipulations reflected the perceptual illusion of owning an entire body.
“the differences in threat-evoked SCR that we observed in response to our experimental manipulations reflected the perceptual illusion of owning an entire body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The structure of the body representation coupled with the fact that the perceptual systems tend to produce single resolutions when resolving sensory conflicts makes whole-body illusions possible.
“It is this structure of the body representation coupled with the fact that the perceptual systems tend to produce single resolutions when resolving sensory conflicts [36], [37], [38] that makes whole-body illusions possible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [36] J Lackner, 1988, Some proprioceptive influences on the perceptual representation of body shape and orientation., Brain source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [37] 1965, On binocular rivalry.
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- cites [38] E Naito, 2002, I Feel My Hand Moving: A New Role of the Primary Motor Cortex in Somatic Perception of Limb Movement., Neuron source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The feeling of ownership of an entire body is the result of a consistent pattern of spatially and temporally congruent multisensory signals from all body parts and the integration of this information in ego-centric reference frames centred on the various limbs and segments.
“The feeling of ownership of an entire body is , therefore, the result of a consistent pattern of spatially and temporally congruent multisensory signals from all body parts and the integration of this information in ego-centric reference frames centred on the various limbs and segments (that is, arm-centred, head-centred, etc).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The usage of a sufficiently humanoid body is a critical condition for eliciting the perceptual illusion.
“The critical conditions for eliciting this perceptual illusion are: (i) a continuous match between visual and somatosensory information about the state of the body; (ii) the usage of a sufficiently humanoid body; and (iii) the adoption of a first person visual perspective of the body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The matching of multisensory and motor signals from the first person perspective is sufficient to create a full sense of ownership of one's own entire body.
“Thus, the matching of multisensory and motor signals from the first person perspective is sufficient to create a full sense of ownership of one's own entire body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The dominance of the first person perspective probably explains why people did not show a very strong response when their actual body was threatened in the asynchronous condition.
“This dominance of the first person perspective probably explains why people did not show a very strong response when their actual body was threatened in the asynchronous condition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
There is a direct linear relationship between the strength of ownership of a hand and the degree of anxiety experienced when the hand is being subjected to physical threats.
“There is a direct linear relationship between the strength of ownership of a hand and the degree of anxiety experienced when the hand is being subjected to physical threats [25].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [25] HH Ehrsson, 2007, Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The adoption of a first person visual perspective of the body is a critical condition for eliciting the perceptual illusion.
“The critical conditions for eliciting this perceptual illusion are: (i) a continuous match between visual and somatosensory information about the state of the body; (ii) the usage of a sufficiently humanoid body; and (iii) the adoption of a first person visual perspective of the body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The SCR elicited by physical threats is a particularly good objective measure of body ownership.
“The SCR elicited by physical threats is a particularly good objective measure of body ownership.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [24] KC Armel, 2003, Projecting sensations to external objects: evidence from skin conductance response., Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [25] HH Ehrsson, 2007, Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The critical determinant for ownership in the body swap set-up was the visual perspective.
“so the critical determinant for ownership in this set-up was the visual perspective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The continuous integration of multisensory and motor signals in ego-centric reference frames maintains the co-alignment between the experienced self and the physical body.
“The continuous integration of multisensory and motor signals in ego-centric reference frames thus maintains the co-alignment between the experienced self and the physical body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
According to recent statistical models of perception, the interpretation of multisensory signals could be sped up and made more precise by incorporating memory information ('priors') in the decision process.
“According to recent statistical models of perception, the interpretation of multisensory signals could be sped up and made more precise by incorporating memory information (‘priors’) in the decision process [44], [45], [46].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [44] S Deneve, 2004, Bayesian multisensory integration and cross-modal spatial links., J Physiol Paris source
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- cites [45] KP Koerding, 2007, Causal Inference in Multisensory Perception., Plos One
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [46] DM Wolpert, 2007, Probabilistic models in human sensorimotor control., Human Movement Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
In the experiments reported here, the spatial dimensions experienced as being occupied by one's own body, and the co-localisation of this sensed body and the physical body, are produced by this perceptual integration mechanism.
“This implies that, in the experiments reported here, the spatial dimensions experienced as being occupied by one's own body, and the co-localisation of this sensed body and the physical body, are produced by this perceptual integration mechanism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The function of body ownership is probably related to the problem of localizing and correctly identifying the body in space.
“The function of body ownership is probably related to the problem of localizing and correctly identifying the body in space.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The reason for this probably relates to the fact that central processing of multisensory signals from the body operates in egocentric reference frames which presupposes the first person perspective.
“The reason for this probably relates to the fact that central processing of multisensory signals from the body operates in egocentric reference frames [18], [30], [32], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43] which presupposes the first person perspective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [18] M Costantini, 2007, The rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity and reference frame for body ownership., Consciousness and Cognition source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [30] G Rizzolatti, 1981, Afferent properties of periarcuate neurons in macaque monkeys. I. Somatosensory responses., Behavioural Brain Research source
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- cites [32] MSA Graziano, 1999, Where is my arm? The relative role of vision and proprioception in the neuronal representation of limb position., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
This neuronal system has the capacity to perform the binding of visual, tactile, proprioceptive and motor signals in ego-centric coordinate systems centred on the new body.
“Thus, this neuronal system has the capacity to perform the binding of visual, tactile, proprioceptive and motor signals in ego-centric coordinate systems centred on the new body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
It is possible that bimodal and multimodal cells in premotor and posterior parietal areas could play important roles by mediating critical multisensory integration.
“It is possible that bimodal and multimodal cells in premotor and posterior parietal areas could play important roles by mediating critical multisensory integration [7], [41], [42], [43], [47].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [7] HH Ehrsson, 2004, That's My Hand! Activity in Premotor Cortex Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [41] L Fogassi, 1996, Coding of peripersonal space in inferior premotor cortex (area F4)., J Neurophysiol source
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- cites [42] MSA Graziano, 2000, Coding the Location of the Arm by Sight., Science source
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- Interpretationreasoning
It is likely that the present illusions involve different processes than those probed in earlier experiments on self-recognition in mirrors or self-recognition of bodies and body parts observed from a third person perspective.
“It is therefore likely that the present illusions involve different processes than those probed in earlier experiments on self-recognition in mirrors [48] or self-recognition of bodies [8], [49] and body parts observed from a third person perspective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [48] EL Altschuler, 2007, A simple method to stand outside oneself., Perception source
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- cites [8] B Lenggenhager, 2007, Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness., Science source
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- cites [49] GM Stratton, 1899, The spatial harmony of touch and sight., Mind source
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The sensory experience of one's own body from the first person perspective is different from recognising oneself in mirrors, TV screens or other image representations as observed from a third person perspective.
- Rests on an assumption: When we recognise ourselves in a mirror, we do not have the experience that we are actually in the mirror, or that there has been a change in ownership of our body.
- Premisecitation
These areas contain many neurons that integrate visual, tactile and proprioceptive information in head and body-part centred reference frames.
“they contain many neurons that integrate visual, tactile and proprioceptive information in head and body-part centred reference frames [7], [41], [42], [43], [47].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [7] HH Ehrsson, 2004, That's My Hand! Activity in Premotor Cortex Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [41] L Fogassi, 1996, Coding of peripersonal space in inferior premotor cortex (area F4)., J Neurophysiol source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [42] MSA Graziano, 2000, Coding the Location of the Arm by Sight., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
This would explain why we have an on-going experience of being located inside our bodies.
“This would explain why we have an on-going experience of being located inside our bodies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
These multisensory cells are sensitive to the temporal and spatial congruency of multisensory signals.
“Furthermore, these multisensory cells are sensitive to the temporal and spatial congruency of multisensory signals [47].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [47] M Avillac, 2007, Multisensory Integration in the Ventral Intraparietal Area of the Macaque Monkey., J Neurosci source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
It is likely that the multisensory mechanisms involved in producing the present illusions are continuously engaged to refine the central estimate of the location of one's own body in natural situations.
“Thus it is likely that the multisensory mechanisms involved in producing the present illusions are continuously engaged to refine the central estimate of the location of one's own body in natural situations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The present illusions are consistent with the physiological and anatomical organisation of the multisensory brain.
“The present illusions are consistent with the physiological and anatomical organisation of the multisensory brain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
These areas are part of a system that controls actions.
“These areas are part of a system that controls actions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [7] HH Ehrsson, 2004, That's My Hand! Activity in Premotor Cortex Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [41] L Fogassi, 1996, Coding of peripersonal space in inferior premotor cortex (area F4)., J Neurophysiol source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [42] MSA Graziano, 2000, Coding the Location of the Arm by Sight., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- May combine two claims. 19
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 12
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataParticipants had felt the mannequin's body to be their own body, and sensed the touch of the rod directly on the mannequin's abdomen in the synchronous condition.
“From the completed questionnaires it was evident that the participants had felt the mannequin's body to be their own body, and that they sensed the touch of the rod directly on the mannequin's abdomen in the synchronous condition (p = .000, F(1, 223) = 125.434, ANOVA).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire statements S1–S3 validly capture the illusory experience of being the artificial body, and S4–S7 validly control for suggestibility and task-compliance.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataHealthy volunteers can experience other people's bodies, as well as artificial bodies, as being their own.
“Our experiments reveal that healthy volunteers can indeed experience other people's bodies, as well as artificial bodies, as being their own.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · boosted
“The results of our experiments demonstrate that healthy volunteers can perceive another person's body, or an artificial humanoid body, to be their own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Discussion · boosted
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataA difference in SCRs between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation of the humanoid body was reproduced, without any such difference in the conditions with the rectangular object.
“For a third time we reproduced a difference in the SCRs between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation of the humanoid body (N = 12, p = .04, two-tailed t-test), without any such difference being observed in the conditions with the rectangular object (p = .819, two-tailed t-test).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe mean rank of observed SCR after threatening participants' own hand was higher than that obtained by threat to the experimenter's hand in the asynchronous condition, but the effect was not statistically significant.
“Even though the mean rank of the observed SCR after threatening the participants' own hand was higher than that obtained by threat to the experimenter's hand in that condition (13.71 vs. 8.77), the effect was not statistically significant (N = 20, = .737, Z = −.336, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe difference in SCR observed when threatening the experimenter's and participant's wrists in the two conditions was significant, with a significant interaction between Hands and Condition.
“The difference in SCR observed when threatening the experimenter's and participant's wrists in the two conditions was significant [interaction between the main factors Hands (Experimenter's vs. Participant's hand) vs. Condition (Synchronous vs. Asynchronous) was significant (p = 0.001, F(1, 19) = 17.083, Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA on standardized variables].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe illusion works both when the participant does not move and when he or she is executing voluntary movements.
“This works both when the participant does not move and when he or she is executing voluntary movements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe incongruent tactile and muscular information in the asynchronous condition led to a decrease in the strength of the illusion, but could not completely abolish it, as reported by many participants.
“The incongruent tactile and muscular information in the asynchronous condition led to a decrease in the strength of the illusion, but could not completely abolish it, as reported by many participants.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationSynchronous touches applied to a rubber hand in full view and the real hidden hand produce sensations that the touch originates from the rubber hand and a feeling of ownership of the artificial hand.
“In this illusion, synchronous touches applied to a rubber hand in full view of the participant, and the real hand, which is hidden behind a screen, produce the sensations that the touch originates from the rubber hand and a feeling of ownership of the artificial hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [17] M Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see., Nature source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNeurological observations suggest that certain brain regions might be responsible for generating the habitual experience of being located within one's body and of owning it, but they tell little about the underlying processes.
“Although these neurological observations suggest that certain brain regions might be responsible for generating the habitual experience of being located within one's body and of owning it, they tell us little about the underlying processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationHaving the experience of being the owner of one's body is adaptive, and its function probably relates to the problem of localising and correctly identifying oneself in the sensory environment.
“Having the experience of being the owner of one's body is clearly adaptive, and its function probably relates to the problem of localising and correctly identifying oneself in the sensory environment [9], [10], a problem faced by all central nervous systems [11].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [9] M Graziano, 2002, How the brain represents the body: insights from neurophysiology and psychology. source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [10] TR Makin, 2008, On the other hand: Dummy hands and peripersonal space., Behavioural Brain Research source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [11] PS Churchland, 2002, Self-Representation in Nervous Systems., Science source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataStimulation of one body part seems to produce ownership of the entire body being seen; the effect of ownership generalised to non-stimulated body parts.
“Thus, stimulation of one body part seems to produce ownership of the entire body being seen, i.e. the effect of ownership generalised to non-stimulated body parts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe SCR results cannot be explained in terms of a general emotional response to seeing the knife, nor by differences in the distance between the knife and the cameras.
“Thus, the SCR results cannot be explained in terms of a general emotional response to seeing the knife, nor can they be explained by differences in the distance between the knife and the cameras because these effects were all controlled for in our experimental design.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationBy changing the visual perspective, it is possible to induce the feeling of being in a different place or illusory out-of-body experiences where people seem to lose ownership of their own body when observing it from the point of view of another person.
“By changing the visual perspective, it is possible to induce the feeling of being in a different place [21], [22], [23] or, even, illusory ‘out-of-body experiences’ where people seem to lose ownership of their own body when observing it from the point of view of another person (which we refer to as the third person perspective) [6].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [21] M Minsky, 1980, Telepresence., Omni
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [22] MV Sanchez-Vives, 2005, From presence to consciousness through virtual reality., Nat Rev Neurosci source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [23] M Slater, 2007, Understanding and realizing presence in the Presenccia project., IEEE Comput Graph Appl source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEven though participants were able to recognize their own body through the headsets and visually detect self-produced squeezing movements of their own hand, they were still influenced by seeing the experimenter's body from the first person perspective.
“Thus, even though they were able to recognize their own body through the headsets and visually detect the self-produced squeezing movements of their own hand, they were still influenced by seeing the experimenter's body from the first person perspective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationVisual information is particularly important for localising the arms in space.
“and localising the arms in space [35].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [35] RB Welch, 1986, Intersensory interactions.
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationMany multisensory brain areas have particularly large representations of the hands and upper limbs.
“Many multisensory brain areas seem to have particularly large representations of the hands and upper limbs [29], [30]”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [29] M Graziano, 2006, Parieto-frontal interactions, personal space, and defensive behavior., Neuropsychologia source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [30] G Rizzolatti, 1981, Afferent properties of periarcuate neurons in macaque monkeys. I. Somatosensory responses., Behavioural Brain Research source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationVisual information is particularly important for guiding human hand actions.
“visual information is particularly important for guiding human hand actions [31], [32], [33], [34]”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [31] U Castiello, 2005, The neuroscience of grasping., Nat Rev Neurosci source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [32] MSA Graziano, 1999, Where is my arm? The relative role of vision and proprioception in the neuronal representation of limb position., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [33], [34]
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningVisual and somatosensory signals from different body parts are analysed and interpreted together, i.e. there are inter-dependences between the multisensory integration of different body parts.
“This implies that visual and somatosensory signals from different body parts are analysed and interpreted together, i.e. that there are inter-dependences between the multisensory integration of different body parts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe SCR is the peripheral correlate of activity in brain structures related to emotions, and is therefore greater when an owned rubber hand is physically injured than when it is not experienced as part of one's body.
“The SCR is the peripheral correlate of activity in brain structures related to emotions, and is, therefore, greater when an owned rubber hand is physically injured than when it is not experienced as part of one's body [24].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [24] KC Armel, 2003, Projecting sensations to external objects: evidence from skin conductance response., Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationEmotional defence reactions, such as fear and autonomic arousal, have emerged in the course of evolution to enable one to protect one's own body from physical damage.
“Emotional defence reactions, such as fear and autonomic arousal, have emerged in the course of evolution to enable one to protect one's own body from physical damage [26], [27].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [26] AD Craig, 2002, How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body., Nat Rev Neurosci source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [27] AD Craig, 2003, Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body., Current Opinion in Neurobiology source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataGender identity, and differences in the precise shape of the bodies, are not important factors for perceiving a body as one's own.
“These observations suggest that gender identity, and differences in the precise shape of the bodies, are not important factors for perceiving a body as one's own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenParticipants who did not show a reliable threat-evoked SCR (null responders) were excluded from the analysis.
“Participants who did not show a reliable threat-evoked SCR (‘null responders’), i.e. had zero responses in more than two-thirds of the trials, were excluded from the analysis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataIn Experiment #5, within each session the order of which hand was threatened was randomized.
“Within each session we randomized the order of which hand was threatened (either the experimenter's hand or the participant's hand).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn this framework, the body-swap illusions would arise as a result of the brain's tendency to rely heavily on a lifetime of experiences of seeing the world from the first person perspective with eyes that are fixed at a specific position on the skull, and the fact that the body typically produces certain patterns of sensory signals from the different modalities.
“In this framework, the body-swap illusions would arise as a result of the brain's tendency to rely heavily on a lifetime of experiences of seeing the world from the first person perspective with eyes that are fixed at a specific position on the skull, and the fact that the body typically produces certain patterns of sensory signals from the different modalities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The body typically produces certain patterns of sensory signals from the different modalities.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataIn Experiment #3, the type of stimulation and its location (hands vs. abdomen) were randomized across sessions and participants.
“the type of stimulation and its location (i.e. hands vs. abdomen) were randomized across sessions and participants [e.g. (Sh Aa Ah Sa) (Aa Sa Sh Ah) (Aa Sh Ah Sa), where S and A stand for synchronous or asynchronous stimulation and h and a represent the place where the stimulation was applied, i.e., to the hands or the abdomen, respectively].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningIn Experiment #5, the two sessions used were repeated twice in a pseudo-randomized order to minimize the effect of presentation order.
“The two sessions used in the experiment were repeated twice in a pseudo-randomized order [(1, 2, 2, 1) or (2, 1, 1, 2)] to minimize the effect of presentation order.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThere are many anecdotal reports of people feeling a robotic arm to be like their own when the robot arm is viewed from a first person perspective via cameras mounted on the robot and when the movements of the robot's arms reproduce the person's movements in real time.
“With respect to the tele-operator literature, it is interesting to note that there are many anecdotal reports of people feeling a robotic arm to be like their own when the robot arm is viewed from a first person perspective via cameras mounted on the robot and when the movements of the robot's arms reproduce the person's movements in real time [51].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [51] J Cole, 2000, On the immunity principle: a view from a robot., Trends in Cognitive Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenIn Experiment #5, the order of sessions and presentations were balanced across individuals.
“Further, the order of sessions and presentations were balanced across individuals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenIn Experiment #2, the order of the stimulation conditions and the type of object used as threat were randomized across sessions and participants.
“The order of the stimulation conditions and the type of object used as threat were randomized across sessions and participants [e.g. (Sk As Ak Ss) (As Ss Sk Ak) (As Sk Ak Ss), where S and A stand for synchronous or asynchronous stimulation and k and s stand for knife or spoon threat, respectively].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningA key difference probably is that, in the body-swap illusions, the visual, tactile and proprioceptive information is mapped directly onto the multisensory neuronal populations that represent one's own body in ego-centric coordinates.
“A key difference probably is that, in the body-swap illusions, the visual, tactile and proprioceptive information is mapped directly onto the multisensory neuronal populations that represent one's own body in ego-centric coordinates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The questionnaire statements S1–S3 validly capture the illusory experience of being the artificial body, and S4–S7 validly control for suggestibility and task-compliance.
“Three statements were designed to capture the illusory experience of being the artificial body, and the other four served as controls for suggestibility and task-compliance (Figure 2).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Earlier work on body ownership has exclusively studied a single limb, the arm, using the traditional rubber hand illusion.
“Earlier work on body ownership has exclusively studied a single limb, the arm, using the traditional rubber hand illusion.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Until now, it was not known whether the principles underlying changes in ownership would generalise to other body parts, or to an entire body.
“Thus, until now, it was not known whether the principles underlying changes in ownership would generalise to other body parts, or to an entire body.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The body typically produces certain patterns of sensory signals from the different modalities.
“the fact that the body typically produces certain patterns of sensory signals from the different modalities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The sensory experience of one's own body from the first person perspective is different from recognising oneself in mirrors, TV screens or other image representations as observed from a third person perspective.
“The sensory experience of one's own body from the first person perspective is different from recognising oneself in mirrors, TV screens or other image representations as observed from a third person perspective.”
The paper relies on this without support.
When we recognise ourselves in a mirror, we do not have the experience that we are actually in the mirror, or that there has been a change in ownership of our body.
“When we recognise ourselves in a mirror, for example, we do not have the experience that we are actually in the mirror, or that there has been a change in ownership of our body.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Electrodermal response permits assessment of the level of arousal.
“The electrodermal response permits to assess the level of arousal: previous studies demonstrated its utility as an objective measure of anxiety under threatening situations or of body illusions29–31.”
From The impact of multisensory integration and perceptual load in virtual reality settings on performance, workload and presence (2021) · cites this paper as [29]
Bodily self-consciousness includes conscious experiences such as self-identification and self-location, as well as the first-person perspective.
“BSC includes conscious experiences such as self-identification and self-location [36,37,44,45], as well as the first-person perspective [39,46,47].”
From First-person view of one’s body in immersive virtual reality: Influence on episodic memory (2019) · cites this paper as [44]
Multisensory bodily processing during encoding and remembering is relevant not only for conscious bodily experiences of self-identification, self-location, and first-person perspective but also for autonoetic consciousness.
“Autonoetic consciousness is the ability to mentally travel back in subjective time and recollect one’s previous experiences [2,18–20] and the present data suggest that multisensory bodily processing during encoding and remembering are not only of relevance for the conscious bodily experiences of self-identification, self-location, and first-person perspective [36,37,39,44–47], but also autonoetic”
From First-person view of one’s body in immersive virtual reality: Influence on episodic memory (2019) · cites this paper as [44]
Illusory ownership over a physical manikin body that substituted the participant's real body was demonstrated.
“Illusory ownership over a physical manikin body that substituted the participant's real body was demonstrated in [23].”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [23]
Synchronous tapping on the manikin body and the real body led to illusory body ownership.
“Synchronous tapping on the manikin body and the real body led to illusory body ownership, in a similar way to the more traditional rubber hand and enfacement illusions.”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [23]
Ownership can be attributed to a manikin that appears visually to substitute the person's real body as seen through head-mounted displays coupled to a video camera oriented down at the manikin body.
“There is also evidence that ownership can be attributed to a manikin that appears visually to substitute the person's real body as seen through head-mounted displays coupled to a video camera oriented down at the manikin body [14].”
From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [14]
Petkova and Ehrsson's main setup was to manipulate ownership by a 1PP self-representation (a manikin) that was touched either asynchronously or synchronously - similar to our 1PP and TS′ and 1PP and TS.
“Their main setup was to also manipulate ownership by a 1PP self-representation (a manikin) that was touched either asynchronously or synchronously – similar to our 1PP and TS′ (girl's perspective and asynchronous stroking) and 1PP and TS (girl's perspective but synchronous stroking), respectively.”
From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [14]
In Petkova and Ehrsson [14], skin conductance response differed significantly when the manikin body was threatened in the synchronous compared to the asynchronous touch condition.
“In [14] there was a significantly different skin conductance response when the manikin body was threatened in the synchronous compared to the asynchronous touch condition.”
From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [14]
Our experiment also includes that of Petkova and Ehrsson [14] as a special case.
“Our experiment also includes that of Petkova and Ehrsson [14] as a special case.”
From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [14]
There is a critical difference between this experiment and that of Petkova and Ehrsson [14]: in [14] cameras on the manikin's head were fixed, looking down at the manikin's body, so subjects had to have their head fixed in the same orientation.
“Additionally there is a critical difference between our experiment and that of Petkova and Ehrsson [14] where cameras on the manikin's head were in a fixed position, looking down at the manikin's body, and therefore the experimental subjects had to have their head fixed in the same orientation.”
From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [14]
Previous work on ownership has shown that threat-like behavior is often associated with physiological changes.
“We rendered our animation in this way because previous work on ownership has shown that threat-like behavior is often associated with physiological changes [2], [9], [14], [35].”
From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [14]
When people experience ownership over a foreign body, as a result of multisensory stimulation, they also exhibit increased physiological responses to threatening stimuli approaching the body that is attributed to the self.
“When people experience ownership over a foreign body, as a result of multisensory stimulation, they also exhibit increased physiological responses to threatening stimuli approaching the body that is attributed to the self [30].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [30]
Comparable findings have been shown after multisensory stimulation of whole bodies and in the body-swap illusion.
“Comparable findings have been shown after multisensory stimulation of whole bodies [26]–[29] and in the body-swap illusion [30].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [30]
When people experience ownership over a foreign body as a result of multisensory stimulation, they exhibit increased arousal responses to threatening stimuli approaching this newly owned body.
“When people experience ownership over a foreign body, as a result of multisensory stimulation, they also exhibit increased arousal responses to threatening stimuli approaching this newly owned body [30].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [30]
The observed changes in arousal for the critical test condition were consistent with those reported in comparable studies on bodily illusions.
“The observed changes in arousal for the critical test condition were consistent with those reported in comparable studies on bodily illusions (e.g., [30], [39]).”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [30]
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Not confirmedz = -2.599reported p = .028 · recomputed p = .009
“Z = −2.599, p = .028”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Experiment 5 gives conflicting p-values for synchronous versus asynchronous conditions
MajorThe Results report p = 0.037 for threatening the experimenter's hand in the synchronous versus asynchronous condition. Figure 7 reports p = 0.002 for that comparison.
“Finally, we registered a greater SCR when the experimenter's hand was threatened in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous one (N = 20, p = 0.037, Z = −2.091, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test).”
“A significantly higher SRC was registered when the ‘new’ body (the experimenter's hand) was threatened with the knife in the illusion condition than when it was threatened in the control condition (p = 0.002, paired two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test)”
Experiment 5 gives conflicting p-values for comparing the two hands
MinorThe Results report p = .0002 when comparing threats to the experimenter's and participant's hands in the synchronous condition. Figure 7 reports p = .037 for that same comparison.
“We observed significantly stronger skin conductance responses when the knife was moved near the experimenter's wrist than when it was moved towards the participant's own hand in the synchronous condition (N = 20, p = .0002, Z = −3.099, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test)”
“or when the physical ‘old’ body was threatened in the illusion condition (p = .037, paired two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test).”
Figure 3 names a different statistical test from the Results
MinorThe Results identify the Experiment 2 comparisons as Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, whereas the Figure 3 caption calls them t-tests.
“The SCR is significantly greater in the illusion condition than in either of the control conditions (p = .009 and p = .028, two-tailed t-test).”
“N = 10, p = .009, Z = −2.599, p = .028, Z = −2.191, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test”
Methods rule out parametric tests for Experiment 5, but Results use ANOVA
MinorThe Methods say that only Experiments 1 and 4 used parametric tests and that the other three used non-parametric tests. The Experiment 5 Results nevertheless report a repeated-measures ANOVA.
“Only the data from the first and the fourth experiments passed the normality test, therefore we used parametric statistical tests to process the data obtained in those two experiments and the data from the other three experiments were tested with non-parametric statistical tests.”
“interaction between the main factors Hands (Experimenter's vs. Participant's hand) vs. Condition (Synchronous vs. Asynchronous) was significant (p = 0.001, F(1, 19) = 17.083, Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA on standardized variables”
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Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
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Drumming in Immersive Virtual Reality: The Body Shapes the Way We Play
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Perception of Body Ownership Is Driven by Bayesian Sensory Inference
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Self-citationA Separate Reality: An Update on Place Illusion and Plausibility in Virtual Reality
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How to Build an Embodiment Lab: Achieving Body Representation Illusions in Virtual Reality
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Integration of Visual and Tactile Signals From the Hand in the Human Brain: An fMRI Study
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A Virtual Reality Full Body Illusion Improves Body Image Disturbance in Anorexia Nervosa
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Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.
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Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness
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Investigating learning outcomes and subjective experiences in 360-degree videos
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The Illusion of Owning a Third Arm
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Self-citationImmersive Virtual Reality and Virtual Embodiment for Pain Relief
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My face in yours: visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity
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The neuroscience of body memory: From the self through the space to the others
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Is the rubber hand illusion induced by immersive virtual reality?
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Body ownership causes illusory self-attribution of speaking and influences subsequent real speaking
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Out-of-body-induced hippocampal amnesia
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- Authors
- Petkova, V. I., & Ehrsson, H. H.
- Affiliations
- Karolinska Institutet (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Petkova, Valeria I.
- ORCID
- Ehrsson, H. Henrik
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2008-12-03
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- e3832
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC2585011
- OpenAlex
- W2170100837
- Semantic Scholar
- 453a41fc7b9a5c9f588699d731c0dcee1532cef4
- Cited by
- 953
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 59 · 2025: 54 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 71 · 2021: 90 · 2020: 85 · 2019: 67 · 2018: 65 · 2017: 47 · 2016: 61 · 2015: 46 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 49 · 2012: 30
- FWCI
- 54.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Stiftelsen för Strategisk Forskning
- National Institutes of Health
- Medical Research Council
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Multisensory perception and integration
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Tactile and Sensory Interactions
- Keywords
- body ownership, multisensory integration, visual perspective, self-localization, artificial bodies, perceptual illusions
- MeSH terms
- Analysis of Variance, Body Image, Discrimination, Psychological, Female, Gender Identity, Humans, Illusions, Male, Perceptual Distortion, Photic Stimulation, Space Perception, Touch, Visual Perception, Human Body
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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