Exploring implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Sense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. Recently, a distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency has been proposed, analogous to distinctions found in other areas of cognition, notably learning. However, there is yet no strong evidence supporting separable implicit and explicit components of sense of agency. The so-called 'Perruchet paradigm' offers one of the few convincing demonstrations of separable implicit and explicit learning systems. We adopted this approach to evaluate the implicit-explicit distinction in the context of a simple task in which outcomes were probabilistically caused by actions. In line with our initial predictions, we found evidence of a dissociation. We discuss the implications of this result for theories of sense of agency.
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Citations
Cites
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 1×
“Although this feeling of agency may be ‘conscious’, it is a pre-reflective state (Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik et al., 2008).”
Implicit learning of artificial grammars
Reber, A. S. (1967) · Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(67)80149-x · Cited by 2,026
Voluntary action and conscious awareness
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn827 · Cited by 1,546
Self-citationStimulus information as a determinant of reaction time.
Hyman, R. (1953) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0056940 · Cited by 1,443 · cited 1×
“This was due to the presence of a ‘positive recency effect’, whereby explicit prediction after a single E1 event is lower than after a single E1–E2 pairing (see also, Hyman, 1953).”
Abnormalities in the awareness of action.
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01907-1 · Cited by 947
Dissociating neural correlates of action monitoring and metacognition of agency
Miele, D. B., Wager, T. D., Mitchell, J. P., & Metcalfe, J. (2011) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00052 · Cited by 120
The Feeling of Agency: Empirical Indicators for a Pre-Reflective Level of Action Awareness
David, N., Stenzel, A., Schneider, T. R., & Engel, A. K. (2011) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00149 · Cited by 29
Cited by
The Senses of Agency and Ownership: A Review
Braun, N., Debener, S., Spychala, N., Bongartz, E., Sörös, P., Müller, H. H. O., & Philipsen, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00535 · Cited by 333
Tapal, A., Oren, E., Dar, R., & Eitam, B. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01552 · Cited by 302
Eitam, B., Kennedy, P. M., & Tory Higgins, E. (2013) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/s00221-012-3370-7 · Cited by 141
I control therefore I do: Judgments of agency influence action selection
Karsh, N., & Eitam, B. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.002 · Cited by 125
“In the background section we briefly mentioned that current work on agency differentiates between implicit and explicit measures of agency (Moore et al., 2012) or between feelings and judgments of agency.”
BackgroundDissociating neural correlates of action monitoring and metacognition of agency
Miele, D. B., Wager, T. D., Mitchell, J. P., & Metcalfe, J. (2011) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00052 · Cited by 120
Metadata
- Authors
- Moore, J. W., Middleton, D., Haggard, P., & Fletcher, P. C.
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-12
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1748-1753
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2040452248
- Cited by
- 128
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 2.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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