Thoughtful feelings
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this My Word, Joseph LeDoux describes how his four-decade career exploring how non-conscious processes involving the amygdala detect and respond to danger has contributed to the 'amygdala fear center' meme, a view he does not endorse. The conscious experience of fear, he tells us here, is not wired into the amygdala, but is instead a cognitively assembled understanding that you are in harm's way based on non-conscious memories, schemas, and mental models.
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Citations
Cites
The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?
Baddeley, A. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01538-2 · Cited by 7,359 · cited 1×
“What you are conscious of at any one moment is believed to refl ect the contents of working memory, a mental workspace that underlies the control of thought and action [12].”
BackgroundRethinking the Emotional Brain
LeDoux, J. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.004 · Cited by 1,594 · cited 1×
“For these and other reasons, I have argued that the amygdala’s role in detecting and responding to threats is more appropriately considered in terms of a non-conscious defensive survival circuit than a conscious fear circuit [4,5].”
BackgroundSelf-citationEmpirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869 · cited 3×
“According to the higher-order theory of consciousness, conscious experiences depend on higher-order mental states [5,6,15], especially metacognitive states [22].”
BackgroundWhat is consciousness, and could machines have it?
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aan8871 · Cited by 855 · cited 1×
“The key area of prefrontal cortex involved is the dorsolateral region [13], which is also the main prefrontal region implicated in visual consciousness [14,15].”
BackgroundA higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 · Cited by 690 · cited 7×
“According to the higher-order theory of consciousness, conscious experiences depend on higher-order mental states [5,6,15], espeically metacognitive states [22].”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationHyman, S. E. (2012) · Science Translational Medicine · doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3003142 · Cited by 260
Adolphs, R., Mlodinow, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2019) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2019.09.008 · Cited by 122
Cited by
Rolls, E. T. (2023) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-023-02644-9 · Cited by 312
Raccah, O., Block, N., & Fox, K. C. R. (2021) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1141-20.2020 · Cited by 96
An insula hierarchical network architecture for active interoceptive inference
Fermin, A. S. R., Friston, K., & Yamawaki, S. (2022) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.220226 · Cited by 101
Zalucki, O., Brown, D. J., & Key, B. (2023) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-023-09924-y · Cited by 7
“Since behaviour has limitations as a measure of animal consciousness (Richer 2021) just as it does in humans (LeDoux 2020, 2021), one approach is to first, focus on identifying those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience in any crea-ture and second, on characterising…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- LeDoux, J. E.
- Venue
- Current Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-06
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- R619-R623
- ISSN
- 0960-9822 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4253700575
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 3.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.