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Cited by 278

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Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto, Riedl, Arno·2013·Games and Economic Behavior
DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.001
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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Reuben, E., & Riedl, A.
Venue
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2013-01
Volume
77
Issue
1
Pages
122-137
ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.001
Cited by
278
References
11
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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