CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 29Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolution and Genetic DynamicsEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations

Open access
de Weerd, Harmen, Verbrugge, Rineke·2011·Journal of Theoretical Biology
DOI 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.034
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

Evolutionary models for altruistic behavior typically make the assumption of homogeneity: each individual has the same costs and benefits associated with cooperating with each other and punishing for selfish behavior. In this paper, we relax this assumption by separating the population into heterogeneous classes, such that individuals from different classes differ in their ability to punish for selfishness. We compare the effects of introducing heterogeneity this way across two population models, that each represents a different type of population: the infinite and well-mixed population describes the way workers of social insects such as ants are organized, while a spatially structured population is more related to the way social norms evolve and are maintained in a social network. We find that heterogeneity in the effectiveness of punishment by itself has little to no effect on whether or not altruistic behavior will stabilize in a population. In contrast, heterogeneity in the cost that individuals pay to punish for selfish behavior allows altruistic behavior to be maintained more easily. Fewer punishers are needed to deter selfish behavior, and the individuals that punish will mostly belong to the class that pays a lower cost to do so. This effect is amplified when individuals that pay a lower cost for punishing inflict a higher punishment. The two population models differ when individuals that pay a low cost for punishing also inflict a lower punishment. In this situation, altruistic behavior becomes harder to maintain in an infinite and well-mixed population. However, this effect does not occur when the population is spatially structured.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.034

Cites

10 of 10 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Show all 10 references

Research works printed but not linked: 63

  1. Axelrod, 1981, The evolution of cooperation, Science, 211, 13, 10.1126/science.7466396 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Bickman, 1971, The effect of another bystander's ability to help on bystander intervention in an emergency, J. Exp. Soc. Psychol., 7, 367, 10.1016/0022-1031(71)90035-7 · DOI
  3. Blume, 2003, How noise matters, Games Econ. Behav., 44, 251, 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00554-7 · DOI
  4. Bolton, 1995, Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining, Games Econ. Behav., 10, 95, 10.1006/game.1995.1026 · DOI
  5. Brandt, 2003, Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B: Biol. Sci., 270, 1099, 10.1098/rspb.2003.2336 · DOI
  6. Brandt, 2006, Punishing and abstaining for public goods, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 103, 495, 10.1073/pnas.0507229103 · DOI
  7. Camerer, 1995, Anomalies: ultimatums, dictators and manners, J. Econ. Perspect., 9, 209, 10.1257/jep.9.2.209 · DOI
  8. Caplan, 1989, Preschoolers' responses to peers' distress and beliefs about bystander intervention, J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry, 30, 231, 10.1111/j.1469-7610.1989.tb00237.x · DOI
  9. Clutton-Brock, 1995, Punishment in animal societies, Nature, 373, 209, 10.1038/373209a0 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Cramer, 1988, Subject competence and minimization of the bystander effect, J. Appl. Soc. Psychol., 18, 1133, 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1988.tb01198.x · DOI
  11. Crespi, 2001, The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms, Trends Ecol. Evol., 16, 178, 10.1016/S0169-5347(01)02115-2 · DOI
  12. Eldakar, 2008, Selfishness as second-order altruism, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 105, 6982, 10.1073/pnas.0712173105 · DOI
  13. Eldakar, 2007, Selfish punishment: altruism can be maintained by competition among cheaters, J. Theor. Biol., 249, 198, 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.024 · DOI
  14. Falk, 2005, Driving forces behind informal sanctions, Econometrica, 2017, 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x · DOI · Paper page
  15. Fehr, 2002, Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature, 415, 137, 10.1038/415137a · DOI · Paper page
  16. Fisher, 1995, Heterogenous demand for public goods: behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism, Public Choice, 85, 249, 10.1007/BF01048198 · DOI
  17. Fletcher, 2007, The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness, J. Theor. Biol., 245, 26, 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.09.030 · DOI
  18. Foster, 1990, Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, Theor. Popul. Biol., 38, 219, 10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-J · DOI
  19. Fudenberg, 1992, Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks, J. Econ. Theor., 57, 420, 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90044-I · DOI
  20. Fudenberg, 1990, Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games, Am. Econ. Rev., 80, 274
  21. Güth, 1982, An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 3, 367, 10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · DOI
  22. Griffin, 2002, Kin selection: fact and fiction, Trends Ecol. Evol., 17, 15, 10.1016/S0169-5347(01)02355-2 · DOI
  23. Grilo, 2011, Effects of asynchronism on evolutionary games, J. Theor. Biol., 269, 109, 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.022 · DOI
  24. Gächter, 2009, Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B: Biol. Sci., 364, 791, 10.1098/rstb.2008.0275 · DOI
  25. Gächter, 2008, The long-run benefits of punishment, Science, 322, 1510, 10.1126/science.1164744 · DOI
  26. Hamilton, 1964, The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II, J. Theor. Biol., 7, 17, 10.1016/0022-5193(64)90039-6 · DOI
  27. Hardin, 1968, The tragedy of the commons, Science, 162, 1243, 10.1126/science.162.3859.1243 · DOI · Paper page
  28. Hauert, 2002, Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games, Science, 296, 1129, 10.1126/science.1070582 · DOI
  29. Hauert, 2002, Replicator dynamics for optional public good games, J. Theor. Biol., 218, 187, 10.1006/jtbi.2002.3067 · DOI
  30. Hauert, 2007, Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment, Science, 316, 1905, 10.1126/science.1141588 · DOI
  31. Hauert, 2009, Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations, Biol. Theor., 3, 114, 10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114 · DOI
  32. Hemelrijk, 1999, An individual-orientated model of the emergence of despotic and egalitarian societies, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B: Biol. Sci., 266, 361, 10.1098/rspb.1999.0646 · DOI
  33. Hemelrijk, 2000, Towards the integration of social dominance and spatial structure, Anim. Behav., 59, 1035, 10.1006/anbe.2000.1400 · DOI
  34. Hemelrijk, 2002, Despotic societies, sexual attraction and the emergence of male ‘tolerance’: an agent-based model, Behaviour, 139, 729, 10.1163/156853902320262790 · DOI
  35. Henrich, 2001, In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies, Am. Econ. Rev., 91, 73, 10.1257/aer.91.2.73 · DOI
  36. Huston, 1981, Bystander intervention into crime: a study based on naturally-occurring episodes, Soc. Psychol. Q., 44, 14, 10.2307/3033858 · DOI
  37. Ifti, 2004, Effects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on the spatial continuous prisoner's dilemma, J. Theor. Biol., 231, 97, 10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.003 · DOI
  38. Janssen, 2008, Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible, J. Theor. Biol., 254, 541, 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017 · DOI
  39. Killingback, 1996, Spatial evolutionary game theory: hawks and doves revisited, Proc.: Biol. Sci., 263, 1135, 10.1098/rspb.1996.0166 · DOI
  40. Lehmann, 2007, Group selection and kin selection: two concepts but one process, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 104, 6736, 10.1073/pnas.0700662104 · DOI
  41. Lindgren, 1994, Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games, Physica D: nonlinear Phenom., 75, 292, 10.1016/0167-2789(94)90289-5 · DOI
  42. Monnin, 2001, Policing in queenless ponerine ants, Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 50, 97, 10.1007/s002650100351 · DOI
  43. Mulder, 1993, Dominant males punish helpers for temporary defection in superb fairy-wrens, Anim. Behav., 45, 830, 10.1006/anbe.1993.1100 · DOI
  44. Nakamaru, 2006, The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher, J. Theor. Biol., 240, 475, 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.011 · DOI
  45. Nikiforakis, 2008, A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments, Exper. Econ., 11, 358, 10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3 · DOI
  46. Nowak, 2006, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation, Science, 314, 1560, 10.1126/science.1133755 · DOI · Paper page
  47. Nowak, 1993, The spatial dilemmas of evolution, Int. J. Bifur. Chaos, 3, 35, 10.1142/S0218127493000040 · DOI
  48. Nowak, 2004, Evolutionary dynamics of biological games, Sci. Signal., 303, 793
  49. Nowak, 2010, The evolution of eusociality, Nature, 466, 1057, 10.1038/nature09205 · DOI
  50. Orbell, 1993, Social welfare, cooperators' advantage, and the option of not playing the game, Am. Sociol. Rev., 58, 787, 10.2307/2095951 · DOI
  51. Pantin, 1982, Induced competence and the bystander effect, J. Appl. Soc. Psychol., 12, 100, 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1982.tb00852.x · DOI
  52. Rand, 2010, Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation, J. Theor. Biol., 265, 624, 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010 · DOI · Paper page
  53. Reuben, 2009, Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations, Res. Memo., 29, 1
  54. Semmann, 2003, Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game, Nature, 425, 390, 10.1038/nature01986 · DOI
  55. Sigmund, 2001, Reward and punishment, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 98, 10757, 10.1073/pnas.161155698 · DOI · Paper page
  56. Taylor, 1978, Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics, Math. Biosci., 40, 145, 10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9 · DOI
  57. Trivers, 1976, Haplodiploidy and the evolution of the social insect, Science, 191, 249, 10.1126/science.1108197 · DOI
  58. Wenseleers, 2004, Worker reproduction and policing in insect societies: an ESS analysis, J. Theor. Biol., 17, 1035
  59. Wenseleers, 2005, Queen and worker policing in the tree wasp Dolichovespula sylvestris, Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 58, 80, 10.1007/s00265-004-0892-4 · DOI
  60. West, 2002, Cooperation and competition between relatives, Science, 296, 72, 10.1126/science.1065507 · DOI
  61. Wilkinson, 1984, Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat, Nature, 308, 181, 10.1038/308181a0 · DOI
  62. Wilson, 1980, Caste and division of labor in leaf-cutter ants (Hymenoptera: Formicidae: Atta), Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 7, 143, 10.1007/BF00299520 · DOI
  63. Wu, 2009, Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 106, 17448, 10.1073/pnas.0905918106 · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

See all 29

Metadata

Authors
de Weerd, H., & Verbrugge, R.
Affiliations
University of Groningen (NL)
Corresponding author
de Weerd, Harmen
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-12
Volume
290
Pages
88-103
ISSN
0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.034
OpenAlex
W2110950359
Cited by
29
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1
FWCI
4.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Trinity's Access to Research Output (TARA) (Trinity College Dublin) (submittedVersion)
  • University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (277-80-001, NWO 277-80-001)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
altruistic punishment, heterogeneity, cooperation, social insects, spatially structured populations, social norms, cost of punishment, well-mixed populations, evolutionary stability, social networks
MeSH terms
Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Group Processes, Models, Genetic, Population Density, Punishment

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review