Seller reputation: From word-of-mouth to centralized feedback
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“A second result shows that centralized feedback leads sellers with higher cumulative success rates to sell more products in more regions, suggesting that centralization facilitates the expansion of reputable sellers into new markets.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Cai et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“Although prices appear to be lower for reputable sellers, they do enjoy more listings and higher success rates, in line with Cabral & Hortac ¸su's (2010) results.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Cai et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“One result demonstrates that an increase in the cumulative success rate of a seller is correlated with a larger fraction of repeat buyers, but this effect weakens after feedback centralization.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Cai et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“This result ties in nicely with intuition: Centralized feedback acts as a substitute to relationships.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Cai et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“Perhaps surprisingly, this effect diminishes after feedback centralization.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Cai et al. (2014)
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Citations
Cites
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Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911840 · Cited by 572
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
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Cited by
Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524
Metadata
- Authors
- Cai, H., Jin, G. Z., Liu, C., & Zhou, L.-A.
- Venue
- International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-05
- Volume
- 34
- Pages
- 51-65
- ISSN
- 0167-7187
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 5
- Language
- en
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.