The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
Open accessAbstract
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners’ dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Cooperative subjects and subjects with optimistic beliefs about others often vote in favor of the institution. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always implemented by the players. Institutional costs, remaining free-riding incentives, and a lack of learning opportunities are identified as the most important barriers. Unresolved cooperation problems, like global climate change, are often characterized by these barriers. The experimental results also show that cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen institutions than exogenously imposed institutions. However, a significant share of players fails to implement the institution and they often perform poorly, which is why we cannot conclude that letting people choose is better than enforcing institutions from outside.
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The search for mechanisms that encourage sustainable reciprocation in this class of common pool resource (CPR) problem has been a central concern in the social sciences.
“The search for mechanisms that encourage sustainable reciprocation in this class of common pool resource (CPR) problem has been a central concern in the social sciences10,11.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Ostrom, E. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763 · Cited by 20,653 · see citing works
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Field, B. C., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146384 · Cited by 19,082 · see citing works
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,765 · see citing works
Ultrastructural Characterization of the Lower Motor System in a Mouse Model of Krabbe Disease
Cappello, V., Marchetti, L., Parlanti, P., Landi, S., Tonazzini, I., Cecchini, M., Piazza, V., & Gemmi, M. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-016-0001-8 · Cited by 13,097 · see citing works
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264 · see citing works
Akerlof, G., & Kranton, R. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554881 · Cited by 5,824 · see citing works
Gender Differences in Preferences
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 · Cited by 5,694 · see citing works
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Rabin, M. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,833 · see citing works
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 3,027 · see citing works
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Elinor Ostrom, B., Walker, J. M., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,066 · see citing works
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,502 · see citing works
Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
Camerer, C. F., & Ho, T. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00054 · Cited by 1,486 · see citing works
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
Chaudhuri, A. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 · Cited by 1,445 · see citing works
James Andreoni, A. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6 · Cited by 1,119 · see citing works
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1123633 · Cited by 997 · see citing works
Nyborg, K., Anderies, J. M., Dannenberg, A., Lindahl, T., Schill, C., Schlüter, M., Adger, W. N., Arrow, K. J., Barrett, S., Carpenter, S., et al. (2016) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaf8317 · Cited by 775 · see citing works
Self-citationThe strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons
Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9272-x · Cited by 743 · see citing works
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans
Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S., & Christakis, N. A. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1108243108 · Cited by 653 · see citing works
Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters
Frey, B. S., Benz, M., & Stutzer, A. (2004) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE · doi:10.1628/0932456041960560 · Cited by 608 · see citing works
Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis
Zelmer, J. (2003) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1023/a:1026277420119 · Cited by 586 · see citing works
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
Sutter, M., HAIGNER, S. D., & Kocher, M. G. (2010) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00608.x · Cited by 545 · see citing works
Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans
Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.0209 · Cited by 485 · see citing works
Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion in Switzerland
Pommerehne, W. W., & Weck‐Hannemann, H. (1996) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00130416 · Cited by 480 · see citing works
Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India
Bardhan, P. (2000) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/452480 · Cited by 447 · see citing works
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*
Tyran, J., & Feld, L. P. (2006) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x · Cited by 419 · see citing works
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency
Page, T., Putterman, L., & Unel, B. (2005) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x · Cited by 404 · see citing works
Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., & Riedl, A. M. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1335 · Cited by 376 · see citing works
Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
Bó, P. D., Foster, A., & Putterman, L. G. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2205 · Cited by 372 · see citing works
Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions
Charness, G. B., & Sutter, M. (2012) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.26.3.157 · Cited by 364 · see citing works
Economics, Values, and Organization
(1998) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174855 · Cited by 352 · see citing works
Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis
Feld, L. P., & Tyran, J. (2002) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/1467-6435.00183 · Cited by 280 · see citing works
Beyond outcomes: measuring procedural utility
Frey, B. S. (2004) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpi002 · Cited by 275 · see citing works
Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem
Ertan, A. S., Page, T., & Putterman, L. G. (2008) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.007 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes
Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Herr, A., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00497 · Cited by 209 · see citing works
Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision
James Andreoni, A., & Gee, L. (2012) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003 · Cited by 190 · see citing works
Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
Markussen, T., Putterman, L. G., & Tyran, J. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt022 · Cited by 179 · see citing works
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods
Hamman, J. R., Weber, R. A., & Woon, J. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00531.x · Cited by 142 · see citing works
The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects
Bó, E. D., Bó, P. D., & Eyster, E. (2017) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdx031 · Cited by 137 · see citing works
VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS
Kroll, S., Cherry, T. L., & Shogren, J. F. (2007) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00028.x · Cited by 134 · see citing works
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
Coricelli, G., Fehr, D., & Fellner-Röhling, G. (2004) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002704264143 · Cited by 130 · see citing works
Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group
NOUSSAIR, C. N., & Tan, F. (2011) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01516.x · Cited by 97 · see citing works
Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
Burton-Chellew, M. N., Nax, H. H., & West, S. A. (2015) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.2678 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Hauk, E., & Nagel, R. (2001) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002701045006004 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Kamei, K., Putterman, L. G., & Tyran, J. (2014) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Institutions and morale: the crowding-out effect
Frey, B. S. (1998) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174855.019 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation
Brekke, K. A., Hauge, K. E., Lind, J. T., & Nyborg, K. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.003 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
Margreiter, M., Sutter, M., & Dittrich, D. A. V. (2005) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-005-3359-9 · Cited by 65 · see citing works
Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods
Dannenberg, A., Lange, A., & Sturm, B. (2014) · Economica · doi:10.1111/ecca.12073 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Self-citationOn cooperation in open communities
Gürerk, Ö., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.10.001 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Compensating the cooperators: is sorting in the prisoner’s dilemma possible?
Bohnet, I., & Kübler, D. F. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.04.002 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Cooperation in viscous populations—Experimental evidence
Grimm, V., & Mengel, F. (2008) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.005 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Cooperation and authoritarian values: An experimental study in China
Vollan, B., Landmann, A., Zhou, Y., Hu, B., & Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2017) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.01.007 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Information-sensitive Leviathans
Nicklisch, A., Grechenig, K. R., & Thöni, C. (2016) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.008 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding Out Hypothesis when Taxation Is Endogenous
Sutter, M., & Weck‐Hannemann, H. (2004) · FinanzArchiv Public Finance Analysis · doi:10.1628/001522104774102815 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Tipping Versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
Barrett, S. A., & Dannenberg, A. (2017) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvw022 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Self-citationGroup formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A survey and meta-analytic evidence
Guido, A., Robbett, A., & Romaniuc, R. (2019) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.009 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Democracy and compliance in public goods games
Gallier, C. (2019) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103346 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Self-citationBernard, M. M., Dreber, A., Strimling, P., & Eriksson, K. (2013) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.009 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions?
Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., Persson, E., & Wang, X. (2016) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.007 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Gürerk, Ö. (2012) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.004 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence
McEvoy, D. M., Murphy, J. J., Spraggon, J. M., & Stranlund, J. K. (2010) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpq023 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
On the effects of asymmetric and endogenous taxation in experimental public goods games
Sutter, M., & Weck‐Hannemann, H. (2003) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00288-4 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Experimental Evidence on the Workings of Democratic Institutions
Bó, P. D. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107300361.014 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Group Formation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: a Survey and Meta-Analytic EvidencePreprint
Guido, A., Robbett, A., & Romaniuc, R. (2018) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/sdu59 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment
Dannenberg, A., Haita-Falah, C., & Zitzelsberger, S. (2020) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-019-09609-y · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Self-citationKrálovičová, J., Knut, M., Cross, N. C. P., & Vořechovský, I. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep25256 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods
Gerber, A., Neitzel, J., & Wichardt, P. C. (2013) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.09.002 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Non-binding agreements in public goods experiments
Dannenberg, A. (2015) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpv048 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Self-citationInstitutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas
Marcin, I., Robalo, P. B., & Tausch, F. (2019) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.007 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the Institutional Formation Affect Cooperation?*
Martinsson, P., & Persson, E. (2018) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12321 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Agreements: An Experimental Analysis
McEvoy, D. M., Cherry, T. L., & Stranlund, J. K. (2014) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-014-9800-1 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Coalition Formation and Voting in Public Goods Games
Dannenberg, A. (2012) · Strategic Behavior and the Environment · doi:10.1561/102.00000011 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Self-citationCreating an Efficient Culture of CooperationPreprint
Fehr, E., & Williams, T. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3062528 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game
Grimm, V., & Mengel, F. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.018 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Endogenous sanctioning institutions and migration patterns: Experimental evidence
Cobo‐Reyes, R., Katz, G., & Meraglia, S. (2019) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.029 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Culture and Prevalence of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürdal, M. Y., Gürerk, Ö., & Yahşi, M. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2021.101692 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas
Rockenbach, B., & Wolff, I. (2016) · German Economic Review · doi:10.1111/geer.12103 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Democracy and Compliance in Public Goods GamesPreprint
Gallier, C. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3057268 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Self-citation
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Dannenberg, A. (2015). Nonbinding agreements in public goods experiments. Oxford Economic Papers, 68(1), 279-300.
- Gross, J., Médez, Z., Okamoto-Barth, S., & Riedl, A. (2016). Building the Leviathan-Voluntary cen- tralization of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans. Scientific Reports, 6(1), 1-7.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Sun, W., Liu, L., Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Vasconcelos, V. V. (2021) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.102844 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
Segregation and clustering of preferences erode socially beneficial coordination
de Vasconcelos, V. V. L., Constantino, S. M., Dannenberg, A., Lumkowsky, M., Weber, E. U., & Levin, S. A. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102153118 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Self-citationOrtiz-Riomalo, J. F., Koessler, A., Miranda-Montagut, Y., & Cárdenas, J.-C. (2022) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-022-01215-x · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Democracy and compliance in public goods games
Gallier, C. (2019) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103346 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Effects of Norms on Environmental Behavior
Dannenberg, A., Gutsche, G., Batzke, M. C. L., Christens, S., Engler, D., Mankat, F., Möller, S., Weingärtner, E., Ernst, A., Lumkowsky, M., et al. (2024) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1086/727588 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Decision to Link Trade Agreements to the Supply of Global Public Goods
Barrett, S. A., & Dannenberg, A. (2021) · Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists · doi:10.1086/716902 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Self-citationFostering co-operation through participation in natural resource management. An integrative review
Ortiz-Riomalo, J. F., Koessler, A., & Engel, S. (2022) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.117184 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Religion and cooperation across the globe
Caicedo, F. V., Dohmen, T., & Pondorfer, A. (2023) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.025 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Disincentives from redistribution: evidence on a dividend of democracy
Sausgruber, R., Sonntag, A., & Tyran, J. (2021) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103749 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Desperation and inequality increase stealing: evidence from experimental microsocieties
Radkani, S., Holton, E., de Courson, B., Saxe, R. R., & Nettle, D. (2023) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.221385 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Koster, R., Pîslar, M., Tacchetti, A., Balaguer, J., Liu, L., Elie, R., Hauser, O. P., Tuyls, K., Botvinick, M., & Summerfield, C. (2025) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-025-58043-7 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
A well-timed shift from local to global agreements accelerates climate change mitigation
Karatayev, V. A., de Vasconcelos, V. V. L., Lafuite, A.-S., Levin, S. A., Bauch, C. T., & Anand, M. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-23056-5 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Punishment institutions selected and sustained through voting and learning
de Vasconcelos, V. V. L., Dannenberg, A., & Levin, S. A. (2022) · Nature Sustainability · doi:10.1038/s41893-022-00877-w · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Self-citationThe demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people
Bühren, C., & Dannenberg, A. (2021) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103862 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Self-citationLeading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Benefit Heterogeneity
Yu, J., & Kocher, M. G. (2020) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-023-01459-1 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Culture and Prevalence of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürdal, M. Y., Gürerk, Ö., & Yahşi, M. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2021.101692 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Kölle, F., Kübler, D. F., & Ockenfels, A. (2024) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108348 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Inequality as a barrier to economic integration? An experiment
Camera, G., Hohl, L., & Weder, R. (2022) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-022-09777-4 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Free mobility across group boundaries promotes intergroup cooperation
Gross, J., Götz, M., Reher, K., & Toscano, F. (2025) · Communications Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44271-025-00192-y · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Pledge-and-Review in the Laboratory
Lippert, S., & Tremewan, J. (2020) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.003 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
The Influence of Indirect Democracy and Leadership Choice on Cooperation
Schories, F. E. (2022) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-022-09750-1 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Strand, J. (2020) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-9251 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Nhim, T., Schuch, E., & Richter, A. P. (2023) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107932 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Conflict, cooperation, and institutional choice
Jin, S., Columbus, S., Lange, P. A. M. V., & Balliet, D. P. (2023) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104566 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
The endogenous formation of common pool resource coalitions
Chávez, C. A., Murphy, J. J., Quezada, F. J., & Stranlund, J. K. (2023) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.028 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Sympathy with resentment: Willingness to report criminal behavior depends on the punishment
Aimone, J. A., Rentschler, L., Smith, V. L. S., & Wilson, B. J. (2024) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-024-01233-6 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Do institutions evolve like material technologies?
Molho, C., Peña, J., Singh, M., & Derex, M. (2024) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101913 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Cognitive institutions: In search of new behavioral foundations of economics
Frolov, D. P. (2025) · Voprosy Ekonomiki · doi:10.32609/0042-8736-2025-5-46-65 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Greiff, M., & Kempa, K. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107067 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Participation of charity beneficiaries
Grieco, D., & Bripi, F. (2022) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2022.05.002 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Do Upfront Investments Increase Cooperation? A Laboratory ExperimentPreprint
Casoria, F., & Ciccone, A. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3383536 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Ghannam, M. (2025) · International journal of organizational analysis · doi:10.1108/ijoa-12-2024-5081 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Alt, M. (2023) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2023.102144 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Dannenberg, A., Klatt, C., & Pico, P. (2024) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-024-00906-6 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Self-citationDecentralized voluntary agreements do not reduce emissions in a climate change experiment
Ponte, A. D., Masiliūnas, A., & Lim, N. (2024) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108438 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Cooperation through rational investments in social organization
Sokolova, A., Buskens, V., & Raub, W. (2024) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/10434631241298072 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The detrimental effect of group size on institution formation
Detemple, J., & Kosfeld, M. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107298 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Intellectual property reform in the laboratory
Benslimane, I., Crosetto, P., Magni-Berton, R., & Varaine, S. (2022) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2022.12.005 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Dominated Contract in Team ProductionPreprint
He, S., & Miao, B. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3804149 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The effect of commitment in the public goods game with endogenous institution formation
Inaba, M., Kawamura, T., & Ogawa, K. (2023) · Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics · doi:10.1111/apce.12424 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Cloos, J., Greiff, M., & Kempa, K. (2025) · Environment Development and Sustainability · doi:10.1007/s10668-024-05949-9 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
A real effort vs. standard public goods experiment: Asking for effort does make a difference
Schütze, T., & Wichardt, P. C. (2025) · Social Science Research · doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2025.103171 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Social preferences under the shadow of the future
Kölle, F., Quercia, S., & Tripodi, E. (2025) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/eec.2024.11 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Moharana, R. K., Swain, S. S., Behera, B., & Aditya, A. (2026) · Journal of Public Affairs · doi:10.1002/pa.70110 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Evolutionary branching and consistency in group cooperation
Glaubitz, A., & Fu, F. (2026) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2523204123 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence
Cobo-Reyes, R., Katz, G., Markussen, T., & Meraglia, S. (2019) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The democracy effect: A weights-based estimation strategy
Bó, P. D., Foster, A., & Kamei, K. (2024) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.02.007 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Can Leading by Example Alone Improve Cooperation?
Zhang, Z., Elvis, N. T., Wang, J., & Hou, G. (2024) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs14070601 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Representation, Peer Pressure and Punishment in a Public Goods Game
Kim, H., İriş, D., Lee, J., & Tavoni, A. (2022) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-025-00970-6 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Dannenberg, A. (2025) · Water Economics and Policy · doi:10.1142/s2382624x25710018 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citationA Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations
Hofmann, E., Kyriacou, L., & Schmidt, K. M. (2022) · Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik · doi:10.1515/jbnst-2021-0054 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Intellectual Property Reform in the LaboratoryPreprint
Crosetto, P., Benslimane, I., Magni-Berton, R., & Varaine, S. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4089163 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Social Hierarchies between Democracy and Autocracy
Toelstede, B. (2020) · Linköping studies in arts and science · doi:10.3384/diss.diva-171091
MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT AS A MEANS OF DIVERTING PUBLIC ATTENTION
Володимирович, А. Ф. (2022) · Eastern Europe economy business and management · doi:10.32782/easterneurope.36-1
Fairness and Inequality in Institution FormationPreprint
Detemple, J., & Kosfeld, M. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4578834
Fairness and Inequality in Institution FormationPreprint
Detemple, J., & Kosfeld, M. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4580841
Fan, J., & Chen, L. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4635118
Fan, J., & Ling, C. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4638599
Do institutions evolve like material technologies?Preprint
Molho, C., Peña, J., Singh, M., & Derex, M. (2024) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/3uy7b
The Political Hare and the Stag HuntPreprint
Rosokha, Y., Lyu, X., Tverskoi, D., & Sergey Gavrilets, B. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4891324
Schreck, P., Sobotta, T., & Feldhaus, C. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4899127
Social Dynamics of Cooperation
Schröder, J. M. (2024) · doi:10.5463/thesis.828
The Political Hare and the Stag HuntPreprint
Rosokha, Y., Lyu, X., Tverskoi, D., & Sergey Gavrilets, B. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5043223
Voluntary Partnerships for Equally Sharing Contribution Costs
Buso, I. M., Cagno, D. T. D., Güth, W., & Spadoni, L. (2025) · The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · doi:10.1515/bejte-2024-0043
Punishment Under Imperfect Information: The Role of Monitoring InstitutionsPreprint
Goeschl, T., Haberl, B., & Soldà, A. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5146233
Intergenerational Democracy for Sustainable Resource AllocationPreprint
You, J. S. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5168773
Institution formation in weakest-link games
Caparrós, A., Blanco, E., & Finus, M. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106943
Cooperation with and Without Trust: Experimental EvidencePreprint
Aycinena, D., Camera, G., & Kujal, P. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5235875
The demand for complete and incomplete punishment institutions to promote cooperation
Bühren, C., Dannenberg, A., & Händel, P. D. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107071
Self-citationZhou, Y., Chen, S., & Yan, J. (2026) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107432
Observers' implicit expectations of intragroup helping behaviorPreprint
Huangliang, J., Ji, L., Liu, Y., Jin, W., & Jun, Y. I. N. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6555793
Spatial protection of cooperation by voting-based allocation
Guo, K., Li, X., Wang, W., Feng, J., & Shi, L. (2026) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0333253
Achieving long-term success in irrigation commons
Frey, U. J., & Pokharel, A. (2026) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0353875
- Authors
- Dannenberg, A., & Gallier, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Kassel (DE)
- Centre for European Economic Research (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Dannenberg, Astrid
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2020-09
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 716-749
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2972894591
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 4
- FWCI
- 11.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Experimental Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Open Research (University of Surrey) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- H2020 European Research Council (636746)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, public goods game, common-pool resources, free-riding, institutional expenditures, optimism bias, climate change cooperation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
