The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do directors perform for pay?
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Citations
Cites
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Hausman, J. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913827 · Cited by 18,820
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.
Deci, E. L. (1971) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0030644 · Cited by 4,170 · cited 2×
“For example, the introduction of monetary rewards may reduce the provision of effort by agents because it breaks a reciprocity norm (Fehr, Gatcher, and Kirchsteiger, 1996) or because it substitutes extrinsic for intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971).”
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00150 · Cited by 3,011
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Performance Pay and Productivity
Lazear, E. P. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.5.1346 · Cited by 2,487
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175 · cited 5×
“…that pay low or no meeting fees signal that they are soft, i.e. they do not care about attendance.31 31Recent papers that stress the informational content of external rewards (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b; Benabou and Tirole, 2003) emphasize the negative effects of external rewards on motivation.”
InfluentialBoard meeting frequency and firm performance
Vafeas, N. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00018-5 · Cited by 2,071
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
Cited by
Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance☆
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007 · Cited by 5,711
Self-citationThe Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Self-citationFerrell, A., Liang, H., & Renneboog, L. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.12.003 · Cited by 1,427
Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1107721 · Cited by 1,202
Self-citationBank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.002 · Cited by 660
Self-citationFemale board directorship and firm performance: What really matters?
Bennouri, M., Chtioui, T., Nagati, H., & Nekhili, M. (2018) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.12.010 · Cited by 553
Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?
Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.011 · Cited by 510
Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?
Falato, A., Kadyrzhanova, D., & Lel, U. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.005 · Cited by 373
Edmans, A., Fang, V. W., & Lewellen, K. A. (2017) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx018 · Cited by 361
Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting
Jiang, W., Wan, H., & Zhao, S. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv125 · Cited by 324
Can corporate social responsibility protect firm value during the COVID-19 pandemic?
Qiu, S. (., Jiang, J., Liu, X., Chen, M.-H., & Yuan, X. (2021) · International Journal of Hospitality Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2020.102759 · Cited by 321
Dedman, E., & Lennox, C. (2009) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.07.003 · Cited by 269
Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors
Bouwman, C. H. S. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr034 · Cited by 265
Governance and the Financial Crisis
Adams, R. B. (2012) · International Review of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01147.x · Cited by 264
Self-citationFemale directors and managerial opportunism: Monitoring versus advisory female directors
Zalata, A. M., Ntim, C. G., Choudhry, T., Hassanein, A., & Elzahar, H. (2019) · The Leadership Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.101309 · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 154-171
- ISSN
- 0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121338118
- Cited by
- 457
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 80.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.