The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do directors perform for pay?
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Citations
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Cited by
Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance☆
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007 · Cited by 5,711
Self-citationThe Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Self-citationFerrell, A., Liang, H., & Renneboog, L. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.12.003 · Cited by 1,427
Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1107721 · Cited by 1,202
Self-citationBank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.002 · Cited by 660
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 154-171
- ISSN
- 0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121338118
- Cited by
- 457
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 80.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.