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The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance
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Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?
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Corporate governance, capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., Saunders, A., & Tehranian, H.
- Venue
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-06
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1771-1794
- ISSN
- 0378-4266 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122610520
- Cited by
- 760
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 64.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.