The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Propping and tunneling
Open accessAbstract
In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunneling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model that explains propping. In particular, we suggest that issuing debt can credibly commit an entrepreneur to propping, even though creditors can never take possession of any underlying collateral. This helps to explain why emerging markets with weak institutions sometimes grow rapidly and why they are also subject to frequent economic and financial crises. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 732–750.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Friedman, E., Johnson, S., & Mitton, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 732-750
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2037981693
- Cited by
- 712
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 60.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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