The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence
Abstract
Exploiting a unique data set containing information about the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, the authors study the relationship between bribe payments, taxes, and firm growth in Uganda for the period 1995-97. Using industry-location averages to circumvent the potential problem of endogeneity, and to deal with issues of measurement error, they find that both the rate of taxation, and the rate of bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth. For the full data set, a one percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with three percentage point reduction in firm growth - an effect about three times that of taxation. Moreover, after excluding outliers, the authors find that bribery has a much greater negative impact on growth, and taxation a considerably smaller one. This provides some validation of firm-level theories of corruption, which posit that corruption retards development, even more than taxation does.
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Self-citation
Cited by
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.4.69 · Cited by 2,355
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Balarajan, Y., Selvaraj, S., & Subramanian, S. (2011) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(10)61894-6 · Cited by 1,026
The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries
Seligson, M. A. (2002) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-2508.00132 · Cited by 1,025
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fisman, R., & Svensson, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Development Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-05
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 63-75
- ISSN
- 0304-3878 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2170545497
- Cited by
- 1,694
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 74.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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