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Cited by 253

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation

Delfgaauw, Josse, Dur, Robert·2007·Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Abstract

This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information. While posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy, it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-off between the probability of filling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the expected worker's motivation. This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 62(4), 605-24.

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Metadata

Authors
Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R.
Venue
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2007-04
Volume
62
Issue
4
Pages
605-624
ISSN
0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3123267395
Cited by
253
References
43
FWCI
14.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.017
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Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R. (2007). Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.017

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.