The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation
Abstract
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information. While posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy, it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-off between the probability of filling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the expected worker's motivation. This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 62(4), 605-24.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.
Deci, E. L. (1971) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0030644 · Cited by 4,170
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
Akerlof, G. A. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885099 · Cited by 3,210
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00150 · Cited by 3,011
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise
Hansmann, H. B. (1980) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/796089 · Cited by 2,545
Diamond, P. A. (1971) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5 · Cited by 1,629
Cited by
Perry, J. L., Hondeghem, A., & Wise, L. R. (2010) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02196.x · Cited by 983
Invited Editorial: Drilling for Micro-Foundations of Human Capital–Based Competitive Advantages
Coff, R., & Kryscynski, D. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310397772 · Cited by 529
Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx016 · Cited by 336
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x · Cited by 336
Self-citationNonmonetary Incentives and the Implications of Work as a Source of Meaning
Cassar, L., & Meier, S. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.3.215 · Cited by 288
Metadata
- Authors
- Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 605-624
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123267395
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 14.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.