The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation
Abstract
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information. While posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy, it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-off between the probability of filling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the expected worker's motivation. This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 62(4), 605-24.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.
Deci, E. L. (1971) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0030644 · Cited by 4,170 · cited 2×
“where p(�) is the probability of getting the job for a worker of type �, given by ( 13 ) in case of observable motivation and by (A8) in case of unobservable motivation, respectively.”
BackgroundLabor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
Akerlof, G. A. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885099 · Cited by 3,210
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00150 · Cited by 3,011
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise
Hansmann, H. B. (1980) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/796089 · Cited by 2,545
Diamond, P. A. (1971) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5 · Cited by 1,629
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201413 · Cited by 1,389
Chapter 12 The theory of equalizing differences
Rosen, S. (1986) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(86)01015-5 · Cited by 1,301
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory
Rose‐Ackerman, S. (1996) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 919
New Developments in Models of Search in the Labor Market
Mortensen, D. T., & Pissarides, C. A. (1999) · London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · Cited by 721
Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling
Riley, J. G. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.432 · Cited by 704
Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market
Brown, C. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884607 · Cited by 596
‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision
Francois, P. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00075-x · Cited by 540
Pricing and Matching with Frictions
Burdett, K., Shi, S., & Wright, R. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/322835 · Cited by 505
The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World
Preston, A. E. (1989) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298216 · Cited by 431
RYAN, A. M., McFARLAND, L., & SHL, H. B. (1999) · Personnel Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1999.tb00165.x · Cited by 377
Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials
Montgomery, J. D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937911 · Cited by 358
On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation
Frey, B. S. (1997) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-7187(96)01028-4 · Cited by 356
Human Relations in the Workplace
Rotemberg, J. J. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261951 · Cited by 345
The Wage Differential between Nonprofit Institutions and Corporations: Getting More by Paying Less?
Handy, F., & Katz, E. (1998) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1006/jcec.1998.1520 · Cited by 279
Bewley, T. F. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00002-6 · Cited by 247
What Price the Moral High Ground?
Frank, R. H. (1996) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061299 · Cited by 233
Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets
Manning, A. (2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt5hhpvk · Cited by 217
Survey Evidence on Wage Rigidity and Unemployment: Sweden in the 1990s*
Agell, J., & Lundborg, P. (2003) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00002 · Cited by 205
A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
Shi, S. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00213 · Cited by 193
Whither the Nonprofit Wage Differential? Estimates from the 1990 Census
Leete, L. (2001) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209982 · Cited by 190
Quinn, R. P., & Staines, G. L. (1979) · Deep Blue (University of Michigan) · Cited by 158
Furnham, A. F. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003209126 · Cited by 157
Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in a repeated game with incomplete contracts
Falk, A., Gächter, S., & Kovács, J. (1999) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(99)00009-4 · Cited by 154
Frey, B. S. (1993) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(93)90120-y · Cited by 127
The price of a price: on the crowding out and in of social norms
Janssen, M. C. W., & Mendys-Kamphorst, E. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2002.11.004 · Cited by 117
The recruitment and selection of young people by small businesses
Bartram, D., Lindley, P. A., Marshall, L., & Foster, J. (1995) · Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8325.1995.tb00592.x · Cited by 95
The employment relation as a social relation
Baron, J. N. (1988) · Journal of the Japanese and International Economies · doi:10.1016/0889-1583(88)90004-4 · Cited by 83
Glazer, A. (2004) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.10.004 · Cited by 81
Outcome, Process and Power in Direct Democracy – New Econometric Results
Frey, B. S., Kucher, M., & Stutzer, A. (2001) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1010335530271 · Cited by 54
Graduate recruitment in Britain: A survey of selection methods used by organizations
Keenan, T. (1995) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.4030160403 · Cited by 40
Outcome, process & power in direct democracyPreprint
Frey, B. S., Kucher, M., & Stutzer, A. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-004372992 · Cited by 33
Blood, Bribes and the Crowding-Out of Altruism by Financial Incentives
Seabright, P. (2002) · Cited by 17
Cited by
Perry, J. L., Hondeghem, A., & Wise, L. R. (2010) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02196.x · Cited by 983
Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service*
Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., & Rossi, M. A. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt008 · Cited by 568
Invited Editorial: Drilling for Micro-Foundations of Human Capital–Based Competitive Advantages
Coff, R., & Kryscynski, D. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310397772 · Cited by 529
Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx016 · Cited by 336
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x · Cited by 336
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 605-624
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123267395
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 14.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.