The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence
Open accessAbstract
Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust “deontological” agents who reject harming one person to save many others than “consequentialist” agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies (total N = 2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker – but still evident – preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction (political leader). Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.
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Cites
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Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
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Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434 · cited 2×
“There are of course important differences – both theoretical and psychological - between instrumentally killing someone to achieve the greater good and impartially maximising welfare by privileging strangers over our family (Kahane et al., 2018).”
BackgroundInference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.
Everett, J. A. C., Pizarro, D. A., & Crockett, M. J. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000165 · Cited by 317
Self-citationWhen it takes a bad person to do the right thing
Uhlmann, E. L., Zhu, L. (., & Tannenbaum, D. (2013) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005 · Cited by 149
Cited by
Brady, W. J., Crockett, M. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620917336 · Cited by 417
Self-citationEverett, J. A. C., Colombatto, C., Chituc, V., Brady, W. J., & Crockett, M. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/9yqs8 · Cited by 254
Self-citationDeconstructing moral character judgments
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., & Gray, K. (2022) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.008 · Cited by 41
Principles of moral accounting: How our intuitive moral sense balances rights and wrongs
Johnson, S. G. B., & Ahn, J. (2021) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104467 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Everett, J. A. C., Faber, N. S., Savulescu, J., & Crockett, M. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-11
- Volume
- 79
- Pages
- 200-216
- ISSN
- 0022-1031 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2888456782
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 7.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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