The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?
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Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956 · cited 1×
“As we show below, we find no evidence for the proposition that official regulatory restrictions ameliorate the risk-taking incentives produced by generous deposit insurance.”
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590 · cited 1×
“Yet, entry policies may matter more than actual entry in creating a competitive environment [Boot and Thakor (1997, 2000)].”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 39
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Cited by
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
Self-citationEntry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship
Klapper, L., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.09.006 · Cited by 1,723
Shleifer, A. (2005) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1354-7798.2005.00291.x · Cited by 350
Bank concentration, competition, and financial inclusion
Owen, A. L., & Pereira, J. M. (2018) · Review of Development Finance · doi:10.1016/j.rdf.2018.05.001 · Cited by 154
Metadata
- Authors
- Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-04
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 205-248
- ISSN
- 1042-9573 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123183289
- Cited by
- 2,296
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 78.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.