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Managerial succession and firm performance
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Metadata
- Authors
- Huson, M. R., Malatesta, P. H., & Parrino, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-11
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 237-275
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2080453520
- Cited by
- 806
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 111.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.