The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 64 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rank‐Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance
Open accessAbstract
We investigate simultaneously the impact of promotion‐based tournament incentives for VPs and equity‐based (alignment) incentives for VPs and the chief executive officer (CEO) on firm performance. We find that tournament incentives, as measured by the pay differential between the CEO and VPs, relate positively to firm performance. The relation is more positive when the CEO nears retirement and less positive when the firm has a new CEO, and weakens further when the new CEO is an outsider. Our analysis is robust to corrections for endogeneity of all our incentive measures and to several alternative measures of tournament incentives and firm performance.
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Cites
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Cited by
Bebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. J. M., & Peyer, U. C. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006 · Cited by 993
Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies
Kini, O., & Williams, R. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.09.005 · Cited by 499
Do Better-Connected CEOs Innovate More?
Faleye, O., Kovacs, T., & Venkateswaran, A. (2014) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109014000714 · Cited by 417
Self-citationInternalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership
He, J. (., Huang, J., & Zhao, S. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019 · Cited by 413
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
Cheng, Q., Lee, J., & Shevlin, T. (2016) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51275 · Cited by 412
Metadata
- Authors
- KALE, J. R., REIS, E., & VENKATESWARAN, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-05-20
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1479-1512
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3123062188
- Cited by
- 505
- References
- 64
- FWCI
- 57.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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