Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Self-citationMACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*
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Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies
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Self-citation
Cited by
Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?
Shi, M., & Svensson, J. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009 · Cited by 969
Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence
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Self-citationDeclining inequality in Latin America: a decade of progress?
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.48-5195 · Cited by 553
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x · Cited by 548
Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
Policy uncertainty, irreversibility, and cross-border flows of capital
Julio, B., & Yook, Y. (2016) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.08.004 · Cited by 473
Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions
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Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries
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Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL DEFICITS: A SURVEY
Eslava, M. (2011) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2010.00647.x · Cited by 185
Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline?
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“Unlike in Brender and Drazen (2005), the ‘political cycle’ – a larger deficit in the election year – does not appear to be significant for the countries in our sample.”
Citizens, Legislators, and Executive Disclosure: The Political Determinants of Fiscal Transparency
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“The data collected by Cheibub et al. (2010) cover a shorter time period, starting after the end of World War II.”
BackgroundThe Political Economy of Government Debt
(2016) · Handbook of Macroeconomics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesmac.2016.03.014 · Cited by 174
“Brender and Drazen (2005) challenges these results.”
Faye, M., & Niehaus, P. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3516 · Cited by 160
Metadata
- Authors
- Brender, A., & Drazen, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Monetary Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-10
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1271-1295
- ISSN
- 0304-3932 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123262528
- Cited by
- 893
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 75.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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