Cited by 126Statistical Methods and Bayesian InferenceProbability and Statistical ResearchStatistical Methods in Clinical Trials

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Rejection odds and rejection ratios: A proposal for statistical practice in testing hypotheses

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Bayarri, M.J., Benjamin, Daniel J., Berger, James O., Sellke, Thomas M.·2016·Journal of Mathematical Psychology

Abstract

Much of science is (rightly or wrongly) driven by hypothesis testing. Even in situations where the hypothesis testing paradigm is correct, the common practice of basing inferences solely on p-values has been under intense criticism for over 50 years. We propose, as an alternative, the use of the odds of a correct rejection of the null hypothesis to incorrect rejection. Both pre-experimental versions (involving the power and Type I error) and post-experimental versions (depending on the actual data) are considered. Implementations are provided that range from depending only on the p-value to consideration of full Bayesian analysis. A surprise is that all implementations–even the full Bayesian analysis–have complete frequentist justification. Versions of our proposal can be implemented that require only minor modifications to existing practices yet overcome some of their most severe shortcomings.

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  • For Clinton's supporters, the least-squares estimate of β is 0.15 (SE 0.16), so β=0 but not β=0.5 is within the usual margin of error; for Trump's supporters, the estimated slope is 0.44 (SE 0.09), close to 0.5, with p≈10^{-6} for testing β=0 and Bayes factor ≈26,628, giving strong odds to reject the null of no selective non-response bias.

    “Lo and behold, for Clinton's supporters, the least-squares estimator for β is 0.15 with (estimated) standard error 0.16, so β = 0-but not β = 0 . 5-is well within the usual margin of error. In contrast, the estimated slope for Trump's supporters is 0.44, quite close to the theoretical value 0 . 5 in the presence of a biased R -mechanism. Its estimated standard error is 0.09, and hence the usual z”

    From Statistical paradises and paradoxes in big data (I): Law of large populations, big data paradox, and the 2016 US presidential election (2018) · cites this paper as Bayarri et al. (2016)

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Research works printed but not linked: 34

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Metadata

Authors
Bayarri, M. J., Benjamin, D. J., Berger, J. O., & Sellke, T. M.
Affiliations
  • Universitat de València (ES)
  • University of Southern California (US)
  • Duke University (US)
  • Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Corresponding author
Berger, James O.
Venue
Journal of Mathematical Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2016-06
Volume
72
Pages
90-103
ISSN
0022-2496 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3124008874
Cited by
126
References
14
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 10
FWCI
26.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Update notices
erratum (2019-04-01)
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Mathematical Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (DMS-1007773, DMS-1407775, BCS-1521855)
  • National Institutes of Health / National Institute on Aging (R01-AG042568)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods in Clinical Trials
Keywords
rejection ratio, hypothesis testing, p-values, statistical evidence, power, type I error, Bayesian analysis, null hypothesis testing, statistical inference

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