The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments
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Citations
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Cited by
Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans
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Leading by example: The case of leader OCB.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Güth, W., Levati, M. V., Sutter, M., & van der Heijden, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-06
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 5-6
- Pages
- 1023-1042
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2111279948
- Cited by
- 407
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 46.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.