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Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
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Metadata
- Authors
- Traulsen, A., Pacheco, J. M., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-06
- Volume
- 246
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 522-529
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2156793488
- Cited by
- 378
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 60.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.