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The dual avenues of labor market signaling

Waldman, Michael · 2016 · Labour Economics

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Metadata

Authors
Waldman, M.
Venue
Labour Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2016-08
Volume
41
Pages
120-134
ISSN
0927-5371
Cited by
31
References
1
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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Waldman, M. (2016). The dual avenues of labor market signaling. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.001

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