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The dual avenues of labor market signaling
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“The gist of the asymmetric learning and the signaling value of education in promotion is that a worker's current employer learns privately about the worker's abilities, whereas prospective employers try to infer information about the worker by observing the actions of the current employer.”
From Employer Learning and the Dynamics of Returns to Universities: Evidence from Chinese Elite Education during University Expansion (2024) · cites this paper as Waldman (2016)
In the citing paper
“More highly educated workers are favored in the promotion process because the wage premium due to the promotion signal is smaller for such workers (Waldman (2016)).”
From Employer Learning and the Dynamics of Returns to Universities: Evidence from Chinese Elite Education during University Expansion (2024) · cites this paper as Waldman (2016)
In the citing paper
“A promotion signals higher ability, and prospective employers will bid more for a promoted worker, which prompts the current employer to offer a large wage raise to this worker.”
From Employer Learning and the Dynamics of Returns to Universities: Evidence from Chinese Elite Education during University Expansion (2024) · cites this paper as Waldman (2016)
In the citing paper
“Thus, firms generally promote to less than the efficient level to avoid paying the wage premium associated with promotions.”
From Employer Learning and the Dynamics of Returns to Universities: Evidence from Chinese Elite Education during University Expansion (2024) · cites this paper as Waldman (2016)
In the citing paper
“This predicts that, ceteris paribus, better educated individuals (elite university graduates here) are more likely to be promoted and hence experience later wage increases.”
From Employer Learning and the Dynamics of Returns to Universities: Evidence from Chinese Elite Education during University Expansion (2024) · cites this paper as Waldman (2016)
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Cites
Riley, J. G. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914187 · Cited by 616
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Cited by
Démurger, S., Hanushek, E. A., & Zhang, L. (2024) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/727519 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Waldman, M.
- Venue
- Labour Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-08
- Volume
- 41
- Pages
- 120-134
- ISSN
- 0927-5371
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 1
- Language
- en
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.