Corporate governance effect on financial distress likelihood: Evidence from Spain
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The paper explores some mechanisms of corporate governance (ownership and board characteristics) in Spanish listed companies and their impact on the likelihood of financial distress. An empirical study was conducted between 2007 and 2012 using a matched-pairs research design with 308 observations, with half of them classified as distressed and non-distressed. Based on the previous study by Pindado, Rodrigues, and De la Torre (2008) , a broader concept of bankruptcy is used to define business failure. Employing several conditional logistic models, as well as to other previous studies on bankruptcy, the results confirm that in difficult situations prior to bankruptcy, the impact of board ownership and proportion of independent directors on business failure likelihood are similar to those exerted in more extreme situations. These results go one step further, to offer a negative relationship between board size and the likelihood of financial distress. This result is interpreted as a form of creating diversity and to improve the access to the information and resources, especially in contexts where the ownership is highly concentrated and large shareholders have a great power to influence the board structure. However, the results confirm that ownership concentration does not have a significant impact on financial distress likelihood in the Spanish context. It is argued that large shareholders are passive as regards an enhanced monitoring of management and, alternatively, they do not have enough incentives to hold back the financial distress. These findings have important implications in the Spanish context, where several changes in the regulatory listing requirements have been carried out with respect to corporate governance, and where there is no empirical evidence regarding this respect.
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Citations
Cites
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“According to that, some literature suggests a nonlinear relationship between board size and performance (among others, Yermack, 1996 and Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and consequently also with business failure likelihood.”
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“The empirical debate about financial distress has focused on explanation power of financial and accounting information (Altman, 1968, 1982; Beaver, 1966, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984) applying diverse statistical methods (linear discriminant analysis, logistic analysis, probit analysis).”
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“The empirical debate about financial distress has focused on explanation power of financial and accounting information (Altman, 1968, 1982; Beaver, 1966, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984) applying diverse statistical methods (linear discriminant analysis, logistic analysis, probit analysis).”
BackgroundMethodOutside directors and CEO turnover
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“Thus, empirical evidence (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994; Weisbach, 1988) shows that outside directors represent better the interests of the shareholders than inside directors.”
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BackgroundStewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991) · Australian Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/031289629101600103 · Cited by 3,552 · cited 1×
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Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models
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MethodA Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance
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“According to that, some literature suggests a nonlinear relationship between board size and performance (among others, Yermack, 1996 and Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and consequently also with business failure likelihood.”
BackgroundResultThe effects of board size and diversity on strategic change
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BackgroundBOARD COMPOSITION FROM A STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVE
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.1992.tb00672.x · Cited by 1,252 · cited 3×
“This is consistent with the argument of the Resources Dependency Theory (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1972), according to which companies with more size board have the ability to control management and to access the resources and information.”
BackgroundResultOutside directors and the adoption of poison pills
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8 · Cited by 1,156
(2007) · Financial Management for Hospitality Decision Makers · doi:10.4324/9780080506456-11 · Cited by 1,022
Ownership and control: Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century
(1996) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/0024-6301(96)90031-x · Cited by 885
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Pfeffer, J. (1973) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2391668 · Cited by 696 · cited 3×
“This is consistent with the argument of the Resources Dependency Theory (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1972), according to which companies with more size board have the ability to control management and to access the resources and information.”
BackgroundResultCORPORATE BOARD SIZE, COMPOSITION AND CORPORATE FAILURES IN RETAILING INDUSTRY[1]
Chaganti, R. S., Mahajan, V., & Sharma, S. (1985) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.1985.tb00005.x · Cited by 588 · cited 4×
“Meanwhile, Chaganti et al. (1985), Simpson and Gleason (1999) and Lajili and Zéghal (2010) find no relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the board and business failure.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialTests of the generalizability of Altman's bankruptcy prediction model
Grice, J. S., & Ingram, R. W. (2001) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/s0148-2963(00)00126-0 · Cited by 478 · cited 1×
“Financial distress is defined as the lack of company’s capacity to satisfy its financial obligations (Grice & Dugan, 2001; Grice & Ingram, 2001; Pindado et al., 2008).”
BackgroundMarket Prices, Financial Ratios, and the Prediction of Failure
Beaver, W. H. (1968) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490233 · Cited by 420 · cited 2×
“The empirical debate about financial distress has focused on explanation power of financial and accounting information (Altman, 1968, 1982; Beaver, 1966, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984) applying diverse statistical methods (linear discriminant analysis, logistic analysis, probit analysis).”
BackgroundMethodEarnings management, surplus free cash flow, and external monitoring
Chung, R., Firth, M., & Kim, J.-B. (2005) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2003.12.002 · Cited by 386 · cited 1×
“Daily and Dalton (1994b), Firth, Chung, and Kim (2005) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) found a negative relationship between institutional investors and financial distress likelihood.”
BackgroundCorporate Governance and Financial Distress: evidence from Taiwan
Lee, T., & Yeh, Y. (2004) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00379.x · Cited by 360 · cited 4×
“…being therefore necessary to include variables representative of ownership and/or corporate governance characteristics in order to improve the predictive power of models (Chang, 2009; Chen, 2008; Deng & Wang, 2006; Fich & Slezak, 2008; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Simpson & Gleason, 1999; Wang & Deng, 2006).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe Limitations of Bankruptcy Prediction Models: Some Cautions for the Researcher
Grice, J. S., & Dugan, M. T. (2001) · Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting · doi:10.1023/a:1017973604789 · Cited by 341 · cited 1×
“Financial distress is defined as the lack of company’s capacity to satisfy its financial obligations (Grice & Dugan, 2001; Grice & Ingram, 2001; Pindado et al., 2008).”
BackgroundCorporate governance and the bankrupt firm: An empirical assessment
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1994) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250150806 · Cited by 340 · cited 4×
“Daily and Dalton (1994b) and Simpson and Gleason (1999) reported a positive relationship between the dual power and the probability of bankruptcy, and Wang and Deng (2006) find a positive relationship only in the case of public administrationcontrolled companies.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialFinancial distress and corporate governance: an empirical analysis
Elloumi, F., & Gueyié, J. (2001) · Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society · doi:10.1108/14720700110389548 · Cited by 331 · cited 1×
“Regarding the relationship between the presence of outside directors on the board and business failure, Gueyie and Elloumi (2001) and Wang and Deng (2006) conclude that firms with higher proportion of outside directors are less likely to fail due to the fact that they are more efficient in imposing…”
BackgroundEstimating financial distress likelihood
Pindado, J., Rodrigues, L., & de la Torre, C. (2008) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.10.006 · Cited by 300 · cited 2×
“Sobre la base del estudio de Pindado et al. (2008), se ha usado un concepto amplio de fracaso empresarial.”
BackgroundBoard structure, ownership, and financial distress in banking firms
Simpson, W. G., & Gleason, A. E. (1999) · International Review of Economics & Finance · doi:10.1016/s1059-0560(99)00026-x · Cited by 239 · cited 4×
“…being therefore necessary to include variables representative of ownership and/or corporate governance characteristics in order to improve the predictive power of models (Chang, 2009; Chen, 2008; Deng & Wang, 2006; Fich & Slezak, 2008; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Simpson & Gleason, 1999; Wang & Deng, 2006).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialCan corporate governance save distressed firms from bankruptcy? An empirical analysis
Fich, E. M., & Slezak, S. L. (2008) · Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting · doi:10.1007/s11156-007-0048-5 · Cited by 215 · cited 7×
“…of view, smaller boards and larger percentage of independent or outside directors are more effective in the implementation of mechanisms for corporate control (Jensen, 1993), thereby decreasing the chances of the company to achieve unstable economic and financial situations (Fich & Slezak, 2008).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialCorporate governance and corporate failure: a survival analysis
Parker, S., Peters, G. F., & Turetsky, H. F. (2002) · Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society · doi:10.1108/14720700210430298 · Cited by 199
Mangena, M., & Chamisa, E. (2008) · The International Journal of Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.01.002 · Cited by 196 · cited 15×
“We used a matched-pairs research design (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2001) for constructing our sample.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialCorporate Governance and Financial Distress: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
Wang, Z., & Deng, X.-L. (2006) · Chinese Economy · doi:10.2753/ces1097-1475390501 · Cited by 173 · cited 5×
“Daily and Dalton (1994b) and Simpson and Gleason (1999) reported a positive relationship between the dual power and the probability of bankruptcy, and Wang and Deng (2006) find a positive relationship only in the case of public administrationcontrolled companies.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialCorporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China
Liu, C., Uchida, K., & Yang, Y. (2012) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2011.11.002 · Cited by 166 · cited 2×
“At the same line, Wang and Deng (2006) and Liu, Uchida, and Yang (2012) argue that management holding shares is linked to long-term value generation.”
BackgroundResultOwnership structure and the likelihood of financial distress in the Netherlands
Donker, H. A., Santen, B., & Zahir, S. (2009) · Applied Financial Economics · doi:10.1080/09603100802599647 · Cited by 120 · cited 8×
“Management could make decisions aimed to obtain short-term personal benefits rather than to overcoming the financial distress, due to the insecurity of their jobs (Donker et al., 2009).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe characteristics of firms subject to adverse rulings by the Financial Reporting Review Panel
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2001) · Accounting and Business Research · doi:10.1080/00014788.2001.9729621 · Cited by 119 · cited 1×
“According to the prior literature, each of these financial distress observations was matched with not financial distressed observations which have a similar size (total asset), same industry and the same accounting period (Beasley, 1996; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Peasnell et al., 2001).”
BackgroundCorporate Governance and Bankruptcy Filing Decisions
Lajili, K., & Zéghal, D. (2010) · Journal of General Management · doi:10.1177/030630701003500401 · Cited by 64 · cited 6×
“However, this result is contrary to that obtained by Lajili and Zéghal (2010) or Mangena and Chamisa (2008), those who do not find a relationship between board size and distressed companies.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialTreesa, J. (2024) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003461159-8 · Cited by 63
The Timescale Effects of Corporate Governance Measure on Predicting Financial Distress
Chen, H.-H. (2008) · Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies · doi:10.1142/s0219091508001246 · Cited by 45 · cited 1×
“…being therefore necessary to include variables representative of ownership and/or corporate governance characteristics in order to improve the predictive power of models (Chang, 2009; Chen, 2008; Deng & Wang, 2006; Fich & Slezak, 2008; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Simpson & Gleason, 1999; Wang & Deng, 2006).”
BackgroundCorporate governance and financial distress
Thorburn, K. S. (2004) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781843769835.00011 · Cited by 43 · cited 4×
“…being therefore necessary to include variables representative of ownership and/or corporate governance characteristics in order to improve the predictive power of models (Chang, 2009; Chen, 2008; Deng & Wang, 2006; Fich & Slezak, 2008; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Simpson & Gleason, 1999; Wang & Deng, 2006).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialAn Empirical Examination of The Relationship Between CEOs and Directors
Daily, C. M. (n.d.) · Journal of Business Strategies · doi:10.54155/jbs.12.1.50-68 · Cited by 31
Control of Directors’ Compensation in Spanish Companies: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Merino, E., Lizano, M. M., & Ochovo, R. B. (2012) · Studies in managerial and financial accounting · doi:10.1108/s1479-3512(2012)0000025018 · Cited by 13
Self-citationCorporate governance issues and director compensation structure in Spanish companies
Lizano, M. M., Merino, E., & Ochovo, R. B. (2011) · AFRICAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT · doi:10.5897/ajbm.9000156 · Cited by 8
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Manzaneque, M., Priego, A. M., & Merino, E.
- Venue
- Revista de Contabilidad
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2016-01
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 111-121
- ISSN
- 1138-4891 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1140667333
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 29.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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