The science of religious beliefs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why have humans, throughout history and across cultures, shown a strong tendency to believe in the existence of superhuman intentional agents and attached this belief to notions of morality, misfortune, and the creation of the world? The answer emerging from the cognitive science of religion appears to be that explicit beliefs are informed and constrained by the natural and cross-culturally recurrent operation of implicit cognitive systems. Successful god concepts resonate with the expectations of these implicit systems but also have attention-demanding and inferentially-rich properties that allow their integration into various areas of human concern. Theological concepts may deviate from these natural cognitive moorings but require special cultural scaffolding, such as Whitehouse's two Modes of Religiosity, to do so and constitute additions to, rather than replacements of the religious beliefs supported by implicit cognitive systems.
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Citations
Cites
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“Even though control conditions demonstrated that readers did not have to understand God’s activity anthropomorphically in the stories (Barrett and Keil, 1996, Study 2), participants generally did use an anthropomorphic concept of God - even when it contradicted their own stated theological beliefs…”
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“In addition, Barrett and colleagues (Barrett, 1998, 1999; Barrett and Keil, 1996; Barrett and VanOrman, 1996) have experimentally demonstrated that stated beliefs about God’s attributes in reflective contexts do not always match implicit beliefs in on-line tasks such as comprehending a narrative.”
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Cited by
Lizardo, O., & Strand, M. (2010) · Poetics · doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2009.11.003 · Cited by 391
McKay, R., & Whitehouse, H. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0038455 · Cited by 353
“Such notions, once posited, would be attention grabbing, memorable, and thus highly transmissible because of their resonance with intuitive cognitive structures such as HADDs (J. L. Barrett, 2000; J. L. Barrett & Lanman, 2008).”
BackgroundFatal attraction: the intuitive appeal of GMO opposition
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Hunter-Gatherers and the Origins of Religion
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Blancke, S., De Smedt, J., De Cruz, H., Boudry, M., & Braeckman, J. (2012) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-011-9402-z · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, J. L., & Lanman, J. A.
- Venue
- Religion
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 109-124
- ISSN
- 0048-721X (ISSN-L)
- 1096-1151
- OpenAlex
- W2032909333
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 36.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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