Plants Neither Possess nor Require Consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In claiming that plants have consciousness, 'plant neurobiologists' have consistently glossed over the remarkable degree of structural and functional complexity that the brain had to evolve for consciousness to emerge. Here, we outline a new hypothesis proposed by Feinberg and Mallat for the evolution of consciousness in animals. Based on a survey of the brain anatomy, functional complexity, and behaviors of a broad spectrum of animals, criteria were established for the emergence of consciousness. The only animals that satisfied these criteria were the vertebrates (including fish), arthropods (e.g., insects, crabs), and cephalopods (e.g., octopuses, squids). In light of Feinberg and Mallat's analysis, we consider the likelihood that plants, with their relative organizational simplicity and lack of neurons and brains, have consciousness to be effectively nil.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
Legrain, V., Iannetti, G. D., Plaghki, L., & Mouraux, A. (2011) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.10.005 · Cited by 854
Kucyi, A., & Davis, K. D. (2015) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2014.11.006 · Cited by 587 · cited 1×
“These regions correspond to different sensory, affective, cognitive, motor, and vegetative components that together form the complex psychophysiological experience of pain [44].”
BackgroundKristan, W. B. (2016) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2016.05.030 · Cited by 63
Cited by
Evolutionary transitions in learning and cognition
Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2019.0766 · Cited by 98
“Restricted learning by association has been recorded in plants (for a debate, see [28,29]), and there are a few disputed cases of conditioning in the protist Paramecium and in a cnidarian species [5].”
BackgroundStigmergic coordination and minimal cognition in plants
Sims, R., & Yilmaz, Ö. (2023) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123221150817 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Taiz, L., Alkon, D., Draguhn, A., Murphy, A., Blatt, M., Hawes, C., Thiel, G., & Robinson, D. G.
- Venue
- Trends in Plant Science
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-08
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 677-687
- ISSN
- 1360-1385 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2953521529
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 2.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Taiz, L., Alkon, D., Draguhn, A., Murphy, A., Blatt, M., Hawes, C., Thiel, G., & Robinson, D. G. (2019). Plants Neither Possess nor Require Consciousness. Trends in Plant Science. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2019.05.008
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