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A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.
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“In order to analyse these questions, an even simpler model was proposed, based on a binary score, taking only the values 'good' or 'bad', depending on what the co-player did when last observed 39-41 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [40]
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“This mixture can be vulnerable to the invasion of defectors 39,40 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [40]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Panchanathan, Karthik
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 224
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-126
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1979970001
- Cited by
- 388
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 70.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, evolution of cooperation, evolutionarily stable strategy, information availability, defectors
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Helping Behavior, Hierarchy, Social, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological, Trust
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