Cited by 117Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceFree Will and AgencyVisual perception and processing mechanisms

Discussion

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Ned J. Block·1996·Trends in Neurosciences

Abstract

There are two concepts of consciousness, access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. But just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness might come to the same thing in the brain. Some recent papers by Crick and Koch raise issues that suggest that these two concepts of consciousness might have different (though overlapping) neural correlates, despite Crick and Koch's implicit rejection of this idea.

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0166-2236(96)20049-9

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  • Equation (10) holds true whenever a theory of consciousness is under investigation where access consciousness determines phenomenal consciousness.

    “In terms of Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (Block 1996), Equation (10) holds true whenever a theory of consciousness is under investigation where access consciousness determines phenomenal consciousness.”

    From Falsification and consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Block 1996

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Milner, A.D. and Goodale, M.A. (1995) The Visual Brain in Action, Oxford University Press
  2. Raffman, D. (1995) Conscious Experience: On the Persistence of Phenomenology (Metzinger, T., ed.), Schoningh 11 Block, N. (1996) Contemp. Psychol. 41, 427-429 12

Cited by

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Authors
Block, N. J.
Affiliations
New York University (US)
Corresponding author
Ned J. Block
Venue
Trends in Neurosciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1996-11
Volume
19
Issue
11
Pages
456-459
ISSN
0166-2236 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2108735670
Cited by
117
References
0
Citations by year
2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 5
FWCI
5.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Trends in Neurosciences (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
University of Oxford
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Keywords
access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, neural correlates of consciousness, brain and consciousness
MeSH terms
Animals, Consciousness, Neurons

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